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ABSTRACT 
Three extensions or applications of downward comparison 
processes were investigated in the current study: the impact 
of downward comparison on affect and subjective well-being; 
the role of downward comparison processes in the development 
and maintenance of perceptions of vulnerability to negative 
events; and attitude change as a form of (indirect) downward 
comparison. Female subjects were selected to participate in a 
simulated discussion group on the basis of their global self-
esteem levels and their use of effective contraceptive 
methods. Half of these participants received information 
about a comparison target who was using an ineffective 
contraceptive method (a downward comparison target) whereas 
the remaining individuals received no such information. 
Results revealed significant mood improvement in low self-
esteem, downward comparison subjects. No additional predicted 
interactions proved significant. Implications concerning the 
influence of threat on individual differences in downward 
comparison, the theoretical importance of indirect downward 
comparison, and the role of downward comparison in enhancing 
perceptions of invulnerability were discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Long before psychology emerged as an independent 
scientific discipline, scholars and social scientists were 
questioning how people develop a sense of who they are as 
individuals—what modern psychologists refer to as the self-
concept. One recurring thesis over the years has been that, 
during the process of self-concept development, people rely 
heavily on information obtained from their social environment. 
More specifically, they gain information about themselves or 
"discover" who they are through their interactions with other 
people (cf. Cooley, 1902; Hyman, 1942; Mead, 1934). From this 
perspective, self-definition is essentially a social process. 
Sociologist C. H. Cooley, for example, embraced this social 
dynamic in his conceptualization of the "looking glass" self 
when he suggested that our self-concept is a reflection of how 
others view us (Cooley, 1902). 
In social psychology, an equally prominent theoretical 
position has emphasized that social groups provide individuals 
with an valuable source of self-evaluative information. That 
is, they serve "as a standard or comparison point against 
which people measure themselves," which may be an integral 
component in the process of self-concept development and 
refinement (cf. Suis, 1977). This viewpoint forms the basis 
for one of the most historically prominent theories in the 
discipline, Leon Festinger's statement of the principles of 
social comparison (Festinger, 1954). 
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Like theorists before him, Festinger was intrigued by the 
way individuals use other people as a social source of 
information about themselves. Out of this curiosity grew his 
formulation of the underlying motivation for and the 
circumstances or rules governing the process of social 
comparison (SC). Although direct tests of the original 
hypotheses were conducted only sporadically over the years 
following 1954, social comparison theory has increasingly 
influenced social psychological research by serving as the 
point of departure from which a number of theoretical 
extensions and clinical applications have been developed (cf. 
Goethals & Darley, 1977; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983; 
Tesser, 1980; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988; Wills, 1981, 
1991) . 
The current study was designed to investigate and extend 
one such theoretical off-spring, Thomas Wills' elaboration of 
the principles of downward (social) comparison (Wills, 1981). 
In keeping with the current enthusiasm for testing both the 
basic principles of and applications for downward comparison 
theory (cf. Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989, 1991; Wheeler, 1991), the 
general goal of the present study will be to examine more 
closely the mechanics involved in the downward comparison 
process and the consequences to self of comparing with, a 
"worse off" other. Three specific extensions or applications 
of the process will be explored: the applicability of 
attitude change as a form of (indirect) downward comparison; 
the impact of downward comparison on affect and subjective 
well-being; and the role of downward comparison processes in 
the development and maintenance of perceptions of 
vulnerability to negative events. Prior to expanding on these 
issues as they relate to downward comparison theory, the 
principle assumptions underlying both social and downward 
comparison processes will be reviewed. 
Principles of Social Comparison 
Self-evaluation 
In the central tenet of his theory on social comparison, 
Festinger asserted that people possess a drive for self-
evaluation. They seek information about the correctness of 
their opinions and proficiency of their skills and this is 
especially the case when they feel uncertain about their 
abilities or opinions (Festinger, 1954). Under what 
circumstances does this motivation evolve into a social event? 
Initially, we explore the physical world for an objective or 
absolute standard with which to compare our skills or 
opinions. In the absence of an objective source for 
ascertaining the accuracy of such an opinion or the quality of 
a skill, however, we are most inclined to compare our 
abilities and opinions with the next best information source— 
other people. 
Similarity 
With whom do we socially compare? According to 
Festinger, the choice of an appropriate comparison target is 
the result of a relatively selective process. We don't 
indiscriminately settle on some random comparison target. In 
what has become known as the "similarity" hypothesis, 
Festinger stated "someone else close to one's ability or 
opinion will be chosen for comparison" (p. 121). 
The underlying assumption for the hypothesis is that 
comparison with a divergent other is imprecise—it lacks 
information relevant to the self. In short, information about 
others whose abilities are increasingly different from ours is 
irrelevant. Why should a first year medical student, for 
example, compare her/his clinical skills with those of a 
veteran practitioner? The sheer number and quality of skill 
differences that might emerge from such a comparison would 
probably be overwhelming (not to mention discouraging) for the 
hapless student. Comparison with a similar other, say another 
first year student with a similar educational situation and 
equivalent opportunities, provides more realistic skills 
appraisal. Thus, the most common interpretation of 
Festinger's similarity hypothesis suggests that the selection 
of a comparison other is merely a function of that target's 
capabilities on the comparison dimension presently under 
consideration. To rely entirely on this restrictive 
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interpretation, however, shortchanges the attempt to 
thoroughly explain the complex process of selecting a similar 
comparison other. 
In a less frequently noted hypothesis, Festinger stated 
that "if persons who are very divergent from one's opinion or 
ability are perceived as different from oneself on attributes 
consistent with the divergence, the tendency to narrow the 
range of comparability becomes stronger" (p. 133). In other 
words, people would be less likely to select a comparison 
other if that person was dissimilar to themselves on both the 
relevant comparison dimension and attributes relevant to that 
dimension. If I were to compare my tennis skills with that of 
another person, for example, I would not be interested solely 
in his/her playing ability but also in gender, age, hours of 
practice time, general physical stamina, etc. Theoretically, 
my preference for this person as a suitable comparison target 
would decline as the self-other differences across such 
variables increased. 
This preference for seeking target information that is 
associated with the primary social comparison dimension has 
come to be referred to as the "related-attributes" hypothesis 
(Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wheeler & Zuckerman, 1977; Wood, 
198 9) . A number of subsequent theorists have reformulated 
that line of reasoning by arguing that "we do not merely seek 
out someone with an opinion similar to ours but rather seek 
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out someone who ought to have, by virtue of similarity to us 
on attributes related to the opinion issue, a similar opinion" 
(Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robinson, Cruder, & 
Butzine, 1969, p. 231). 
Thus, using a combination of the similarity and related-
attributes hypotheses, the selection of a similar other 
requires that we assess the potential comparison target's 
comparability to us on both the specific dimension in question 
and on dimension-related attributes. For the current study, 
the related-attributes concept will re-emerge as an integral 
component in the conceptualization and study of attitude 
change as a method of downward comparison. 
Upward Comparison 
In addition to the preceding hypotheses, Festinger 
posited a third crucial hypothesis, one that was closely 
linked to the preference for a similar comparison other. He 
said that the social comparison process was also affected by a 
culturally-determined drive toward increasingly better 
performances such that an individual was "oriented toward some 
point on the ability continuum slightly better than his own 
performance..." (p. 126). Festinger referred to this 
phenomenon as the unidirectional drive upward and, although he 
didn't specify how this dynamic affected one's preference for 
a comparison target, other researchers have suggested that it 
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is manifested in a preference for a similar but slightly 
superior comparison other (cf. Wheeler, 1966). 
In addition to providing us with information about our 
skills relative to those of another person, upward comparison 
is educative in that it also provides us with the opportunity 
to discover what this person is doing differently that makes 
his/her performance just that little bit better than ours 
without pointing out glaring skill deficiencies that might 
cause us to feel discouraged. We should be able to develop 
the skills evidenced by such comparison others because their 
skills are only slightly better than ours—suggesting that 
only minor skill adjustments would be required on our part to 
acquire similar capabilities. Thus the goal of self-
evaluation, and concomitant self-improvement, can be satisfied 
through such a comparison. 
Summary 
The three preceding hypotheses represent the most 
influential and widely studied aspects of the theory of social 
comparison as it was originally stated. Although Festinger 
was primarily interested in interpreting the impact of these 
phenomena in the more general study of group dynamics and 
interpersonal influences, other social psychologists have 
conducted basic research designed to study more specifically 
the need for self-evaluation and preferences for similar or 
upward comparison targets. A great deal of research has 
8 
tested this seemingly straightforward, but deceptively 
complicated trio of ideas. 
Challenges to Social Comparison Theory 
Initial research supported Festinger's ideas on the 
upward comparison and self-evaluation hypotheses (see 
Hakmiller, 1966a; Wheeler, 1966). Eventually, however, 
conflicting results began to emerge and some researchers began 
to question whether social comparison processes were governed 
solely by these central principles (for reviews see Wills, 
1991; Wood & Taylor, 1991). 
For example, Hakmiller (1966b) proposed that several 
instrumental functions of social comparison processes co­
exist, including accurate self-assessment, self-improvement, 
and self-aggrandizement. He argued that the latter comparison 
motivation occurs when people are struggling with negative 
information about themselves and so, rather than seeking 
accurate self-information, these individuals focus on the 
differences between themselves and "an Other who is quite 
inferior". In so doing, Hakmiller proposed, the impact of 
threatening feedback is reduced. 
To test for the presence of such a self-aggrandizement 
motivation, Hakmiller told participants in his study that they 
had high levels of a personality trait called "hostility 
towards parents." Half were told that the trait was a 
negative attribute (and thus were in the high threat 
condition) whereas the remaining participants were told that 
the trait was a positive quality (i.e., the low threat 
condition). The opportunity to review the score of another 
participant in the study was provided and participants could 
choose a score that was either higher or lower than their own. 
Results indicated that high threat subjects preferred to 
receive information about someone who had more of the negative 
trait than themselves—evidence for what Hakmiller referred to 
as a downward comparison preference. Moreover, these 
individuals subsequently reported being less "upset" than did 
their counterparts in the experiment. 
Hakmiller suggested that his results were evidence of a 
valuational, rather than an evaluational, motivation 
underlying the comparison process. By this, Hakmiller meant 
that sometimes the information present in a comparison 
situation was sought not so much for its self-assessment 
(knowledge) value but for its "comforting value." In the 
years since Hakmiller's research, this motivation has been 
relabeled as the self-enhancement motivation for social 
comparison. 
Hakmiller's findings and interpretations are clearly 
among the earliest to contradict Festinger's predictions and 
thus contribute to the growing dispute concerning the 
processes involved in social comparison. Eventually, a more 
direct challenge to the basic premises of social comparison 
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was issued by Brickman and Bulman (1977) . These authors 
echoed many of Hakmiller's earlier sentiments and developed a 
detailed attack against the three primary principles of social 
comparison theory. Specifically, they provided empirical 
evidence that sometimes people seek to avoid social comparison 
and, on those occasions when they ^  engage in social 
comparison, they prefer to compare with others who are 
dissimilar and/or performing worse than themselves. Although 
it is not the purpose of the present paper to review their 
specific arguments here, it is noteworthy that the preference 
and tendencies for engaging in downward comparison occupied a 
prominent position in their theoretical discussion. 
Downward Comparison Theory 
As the preceding arguments gained momentum, the stage was 
set for further development of the downward comparison 
perspective. Thomas Wills was the first to expand upon the 
concept in a formal theoretical statement (Wills, 1981). 
Adopting a somewhat less adversarial position than that of 
Brickman and Bulman, Wills offered an organized set of 
hypotheses that were complementary to Festinger's concepts, 
but which were explicitly concerned the underlying motivation 
for downward comparison, the situational and dispositional 
circumstances that elicit the process, and the different ways 
or routes through which people express the DC motivation. 
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Self-enhancement 
The basis of downward comparison (DC) theory was the 
premise that self-evaluation was not the sole motivation 
underlying social comparison activities. Wills' position was 
that, under some circumstances, people socially compare out of 
a need to feel better about themselves; they need to self-
enhance « Specifically, when people are subjected to physical 
or psychological (i.e., situational) threat or when they are 
in a chronic state of threat due to low self-esteem (i.e., 
dispositional threat) they are thought to experience a sense 
of decreased subjective well-being. People engage in 
"comparison with a less fortunate other," downward comparison, 
in an effort to restore subjective well-being (Wills, 1981, p. 
245) . 
The Role of Situational Threat 
In what he referred to as the "situational corollary," 
Wills proposed that the motivation for downward comparison is 
evoked when a person's "physical or psychological well-being 
has been decreased." The potential for threatening situations 
to evoke DC preferences had been discussed and empirically 
tested long before Wills' formal observation as evidenced by 
the incorporation of threat-inducing manipulations in early DC 
research. Recall that Hakmiller (1966b) manipulated 
threatening and nonthreatening feedback about a personality 
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trait and found systematic differences between high and low 
threat subjects in their requests for (DC) information. 
In a more recent study, Gibbons and Gerrard (1989) placed 
persons with high and low self-esteem in a state of decreased 
subjective well-being by having them describe their college 
adjustment problems. These subjects were then given the 
opportunity to read another student's statement, which 
reflected either similar adjustment difficulties or adjustment 
success. It was argued that those subjects who had been 
threatened (by the review of their own adjustment 
inadequacies) were more likely to experience mood amelioration 
following information about someone else who was reportedly in 
an even worse situation. In short, they were expected to (and 
did) benefit from a DC opportunity because the threatening 
situation in which they had been placed resulted in decreased 
subjective well-being. These studies support Will's 
assumption that situations involving psychological threat, and 
the decreased subjective well-being that results from them, 
motivate downward comparison activity. 
Passive and Active Downward Comparison 
One of the unique characteristics of downward comparison 
processes, as Wills describes them, is that people may engage 
in DC through either one of two different routes. We may take 
advantage of information indicating that "worse off" others 
exist around us, a process Wills called passive downward 
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comparison; or we may actually create less advantaged others 
through derogation or causing them harm (active DC). An 
example of the passive process occurs when threatened people 
were given the option of waiting with a similarly threatened 
peer (one who was awaiting a shock or some other form of 
punishment) or a non-threatened peer. They more often select 
the threatened peer (the fear-affiliation effect; cf. 
Schachter, 1959; Zimbardo & Formica, 1963). According to 
Wills, when these subjects selected this peer they were 
capitalizing on the fact that there were disadvantaged others 
available for observation and used that as an opportunity for 
comparison; thus, they engaged in a form of passive DC. 
Methodologically, subsequent research attempting to measure 
passive DC has commonly involved either having subjects select 
or indicate a preference for a comparison other, or it has 
involved measuring the impact of providing downward comparison 
information on subjects' mood states (cf. Gibbons, 1986, 
Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989). The latter technique has been 
employed under the assumption that those people who simply 
read or "observe" DC information will react to it, albeit 
passively, with mood improvements (i.e., an increase in 
subjective well-being). 
Wills also believed that, under some conditions, people 
actively involve themselves in the DC process by derogating or 
actually causing harm to another person. In the process they 
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create a "worse off" other with whom they can compare their 
skills. Wills reinterpreted results from research on 
scapegoating (cf. Strieker, 1963; Miller & Bugelski, 1948) and 
hostile or displaced aggression (cf. Berkowitz & Holmes, 1960) 
as support for this second active DC route. The general 
conclusion of these studies was that when subjects were 
presented with some kind of ego threat and subsequently given 
an opportunity to either state their impression of or behave 
aggressively toward a comparison target, they would derogate 
or aggress toward that person. In short, these subjects were 
engaging in active DC. Methods in contemporary DC research 
that include giving people the opportunity to rate themselves 
and comparison others are likely to evoke these active 
downward comparison processes (cf. Crocker et al., 1987/ 
Gibbons & Honey McCoy, 1991). 
Thus, Wills hypothesizes that a variety of DC strategies 
are available to those persons engaging in self-enhancing 
activities. Persons engaging in DC might use either process— 
indeed. Wills provided no clarification as to when one type or 
the other might prevail. Contemporary research on the final 
major area of Wills' statement of concern for the present 
paper, his explanation of personality differences with respect 
to the DC motivation, offers some insightful observations on 
the use of these active/passive strategies. 
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Individual Differences in Downward Comparison 
Wills expected that certain dispositional states 
characterize persons who experience chronic levels of 
decreased subjective well-being. In what he referred to as 
the "personality corollary," Wills proposed that low self-
esteem individuals fit such a pattern and thus, would be most 
likely to engage in and benefit from DC. Other researchers 
have extended this tendency to other people in analogous 
states of decreased subjective well-being, such as depression. 
Research designed to test this premise has not provided 
straightforward support but, rather, has resulted in a more 
complicated explanation of preferences for the active and 
passive paths of DC. 
Support. Gibbons (1986) provided convincing evidence in 
favor of Wills' original statement of the personality 
corollary. In the first study, persons reporting high or low 
levels of depression wrote a self-disclosing statement about a 
personally significant event with either a positive or 
negative outcome. Following a measure of mood state, they 
were allowed to select a positive or negative statement 
supposedly written by one of the other participants in the 
experiment. It was expected that participants who were 
depressed and had written a self-disclosing statement about a 
negative personal event—and thus would be experiencing a 
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decrease in subjective well-being—would prefer to read a 
negative statement. Results supported this prediction. 
In a second study, Gibbons had persons who were either 
depressed or nondepressed read about a peer who reported 
feeling guilty due to his/her role in an accident. It was 
hypothesized that providing individuals with negative 
information concerning another person would give them the 
opportunity to take advantage of a DC situation (i.e., they 
could engage in passive DC). More specifically, it was 
predicted that depressed subjects would demonstrate mood 
improvement following this downward comparison opportunity. 
This expectation was supported; thus, it was argued that 
depressed, threatened persons are more likely than their 
nondepressed, nonthreatened counterparts to engage in DC. 
In a conceptually similar study. Gibbons and Gerrard 
(1989) had high or low self-esteem, mildly threatened subjects 
listen to (bogus) information about a student who was or was 
not having trouble adjusting to college. As expected, results 
indicated that threatened, low self-esteem persons who engaged 
in passive DC (i.e., those who listened to information about 
problematic adjustment to college) demonstrated significant 
mood improvements relative to similar subjects who listened to 
information about nonproblematic adjustment. 
Consistent with Wills' reasoning, the results obtained in 
these studies supported the hypothesis that chronic threats. 
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including dispositional characteristics such as low self-
esteem or depression, are related to the observed preferences 
for and benefits obtained from downward comparison 
opportunities. These empirical findings in support of the 
personality hypothesis have not remained unchallenged, 
however. 
Contradiction. Counter to Wills' hypothesis, a growing 
number of studies have demonstrated that persons who are not 
depressed or who are high in self-esteem also demonstrate a 
tendency for engaging in self-enhancing strategies. This 
evidence is derived from a variety of studies testing the 
relationship between individual differences, including 
chronically negative mood states and self-esteem, and a range 
of dependent measures covering judgments of control for 
events, perceptions of skill or opinion uniqueness, and 
comparative (self-other) attribute ratings. Self-other 
differences on these variables in the direction of viewing 
self as more in control of events, or possessing unique skills 
or more positive traits than others are all argued to 
represent self-enhancing strategies. Examples of several 
studies are provided below. 
Alloy and her colleagues have repeatedly found that 
nondepressed participants tend to vary their estimates of 
personal control of events in ways that are self-protective. 
This tendency is not found among depressed participants (cf. 
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Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981). 
These tendencies are also relevant when considering self-
esteem as the individual difference variable. For example, 
Campbell (1986) found that high SE (and nondepressed) persons 
were particularly likely to over- and underestimate the degree 
to which others shared their opinions or skills relative to 
similar estimates by low SE (or depressed) persons. These 
tendencies vary as a function of the desirability of the trait 
and apparently represent efforts to appear unique when a 
positive trait is being considered (i.e., self-enhancement), 
and similar to others when the focus is on a negative trait 
(i.e., self-protection). In a series of studies comparing 
personal attribute ratings for self and other, Crocker, 
Thompson, McGraw, and Ingerman (1987) observed that high, but 
not low, self-esteem persons responded to ego-threatening, 
failure feedback by engaging in ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation—self-enhancement strategies that, 
according to these authors, are considered to be 
manifestations of downward comparison. 
The evidence across these studies suggests that the 
tendency to engage in self-enhancing strategies is not 
specific to low self-esteem (or depressed) individuals but 
rather, under some circumstances, it is an activity prevalent 
among those who are high in self-esteem or who are 
nondepressed. Thus, these results stand in contradiction to 
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Wills' assumptions concerning individual differences in 
downward comparison. 
Reconciliation. The emergent trends across those studies 
demonstrating support or nonsupport for the personality 
corollary suggest that both high and low self-esteem persons 
engage in the self-enhancing processes of DC and benefit from 
doing so. Subjects in those studies that support the 
personality corollary were engaging in passive forms of DC 
(e.g., simply stating a preference for DC information or 
evidencing mood amelioration). Subjects in the nonsupporting 
studies, on the other hand, engaged in procedures that 
provided an opportunity to derogate the target or rate 
themselves more positively (i.e., active DC). Thus, the focus 
of the individual differences question appears to be not who 
engages in the process of downward comparison but what type of 
DC different people select. 
Recently, Gibbons and Boney McCoy (1991) investigated the 
difference in use of both active and passive forms of DC for 
persons with either high or low self-esteem. In their first 
study, high and low self-esteem subjects received either 
threatening or nonthreatening feedback and then received DC 
information that another student was having difficulty 
adjusting to college. Subjects' moods were assessed pre- and 
post-DC information to determine the impact of passive DC. 
Measures of active DC included subjects' evaluations of the 
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comparison target in terms of competence and likability as 
well as prevalence estimates for adjustment problems in 
college. These authors hypothesized that low self-esteem, 
threatened subjects would replicate earlier mood findings by 
demonstrating mood improvement following the passive DC 
opportunity. High self-esteem, threatened subjects, on the 
other hand, were expected to derogate their downward 
comparison target (i.e., engage in active DC). The pattern of 
obtained results followed these predictions. Subjects in the 
low self-esteem, threatened, DC condition demonstrated 
significant mood improvements (indicative of engaging in 
passive DC) whereas high self-esteem, threatened, DC subjects 
were more likely to rate the comparison target more negatively 
in terms of personal attributes. They also rated problematic 
college adjustment as less common (i.e., lower in prevalence). 
Both self-other attribute differences and prevalence 
adjustments were measures of what these authors interpreted as 
active DC. In combination, these data provided some of the 
strongest evidence to date that both high and low self-esteem 
persons engage in DC processes, but that they prefer to engage 
in and benefit from different forms of the process—an 
increasingly consistent conclusion in the downward comparison 
literature (cf. Wills, 1991; Wood & Taylor, 1991). 
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Summary 
The concept of downward comparison represents an 
important modification of social comparison theory and has 
been the foundation for an increasing amount of empirical 
effort. The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
reviewed thus far highlight the continuing maturation of both 
social and downward comparison theories. Contrary to 
Festinger's original belief, accurate self-evaluation is now 
viewed as only one of a variety of goals for social comparison 
(Wood & Taylor, 1991) . Moreover, the evidence to date 
supports the idea that downward comparison mechanisms are 
convenient means for satisfying the goal of self-enhancement. 
However, the process of downward comparison can hardly be 
described as a simple social event. On the contrary, it is 
itself a highly complicated process and, as we have observed 
thus far, it elicits different behaviors and emotional 
reactions from different people. 
As the volumes of work related to social and downward 
comparison continue to accumulate, it has been argued that 
previous research has overemphasized the process of target 
preference and selection. In addition to attempts to expand 
upon our knowledge of basic theoretical concepts of downward 
comparison (e.g., the definition of similarity to a comparison 
target), contemporary researchers are now focusing on an ever-
expanding list of issues including, for example, the 
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importance or personal relevance of the comparison dimension 
and the impact of incongruent goals (see Wood & Taylor, 1991; 
Wills, 1991, for reviews of these issues). In keeping with 
that spirit, the remainder of the present paper was developed 
to test three very specific applications and extensions of 
downward comparison theory: the applicability of attitude 
change as a form of (indirect) downward comparison; the impact 
of downward comparison on affect and subjective well-being; 
and the role of downward comparison processes in the 
development and maintenance of perceptions of vulnerability to 
negative events. 
Indirect Active Downward Comparison 
In the literature devoted to downward comparison 
principles, considerable emphasis has been placed on the study 
of the self-enhancement motivation. Thus far, most attention 
has been focused on studies validating or challenging Wills' 
concepts of passive and active DC as self-enhancing techniques 
as well as observed individual differences for engaging in 
these processes. However, focus on these perspectives should 
not be taken to imply that passive observation and active 
derogation represent the exclusive range of self-enhancement 
strategies. On the contrary—according to Wood and Taylor 
(1991), the self-enhancement motivation may actually be 
realized through a variety of strategies. 
23 
For example, some self-enhancement techniques involve 
several alternatives for target selection—we may select known 
(actually existing) persons whose activities or attributes 
cause them to be "worse off" others or we may simply imagine 
that such a person exists (cf. Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 
1983). We may also feel better about ourselves if we choose 
to avoid the comparison process altogether, thus eliminating 
the possibility of discovering that our abilities are worse 
than expected (cf. Brickman & Bulman, 1977) . Still other 
self-enhancement strategies emphasize variations that occur in 
the process of selecting the comparison dimension. For 
example, we may engage in what has been referred to as 
"dimensional comparison" (Taylor et al., 1983), by selectively 
focusing on dimensions on which we, rather than the comparison 
target, appear to be advantaged. Thus, it has been suggested 
there is actually a great deal of variety in the psychological 
methods used by people for achieving self-enhancement. One of 
the major goals of the current study is to investigate the 
existence of yet another, albeit indirect, pathway to self-
enhancement . 
As noted, over the past decade considerable attention has 
been paid to the distinction between passive and active 
downward comparison. Building on this distinction, the 
current study was designed to test an extension of the process 
of active downward comparison. Active DC, as it has been 
24 
frequently conceptualized with the comparative ratings 
methodology, could be relabeled as a form of direct active DC. 
It often involves negative evaluations or derogation of some 
central attribute(s) of the target as an individual. Often 
the personality characteristics of the DC target, his or her 
positive or negative traits, were the actual focus of the 
downward comparison (e.g., s/he was evaluated as competent, 
likeable, etc.; cf. Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991). 
One of the empirical questions addressed by the current 
study is whether people engage in active DC by indirectly 
derogating the comparison target. Is it possible that people 
derogate others by developing negative attitudes toward some 
activity, behavior, object, etc. that happens to be 
tangentially associated with the DC target? The theoretical 
basis for this process, referred to here as indirect active 
DC, lies in early research explicating the conceptual elements 
of balance theory, as well as Festinger's related-attributes 
hypothesis. 
Balance Theory and the Related-Attributes Hypothesis 
P-O-X theory. The concept of "balance" and the theories 
that sprang from it were based, in part, on the general 
Gestalt notion of Pragnanz, a belief that people try to make 
sense out of their perceptual world by imposing some kind of 
coherence, completeness, or meaningful structure upon the 
elements within a perceptual field. Fritz Heider incorporated 
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this notion into his theory of human social interaction, P-O-X 
theory (Heider, 1958). In seeking to identify ways in which 
social and/or physical entities are related to one another, 
Heider visualized the relationship in the form of a triad with 
the elements consisting of a perceiver (P), another person 
(0), and a third entity {X), which could be an object, a third 
person, etc. Balance, or harmony, within this triadic 
relationship depends on the sentiment links between each 
element (i.e., how P feels about 0 and X, how 0 feels about 
X) . The simplest example of a balanced triad relationship 
occurs when all the sentiment links are positive [P likes 0 
and X, and 0 likes X] . 
For the purposes of the current study, we are interested 
in a more complicated form of a balanced triad, which occurs 
when two of the sentiment links are negative and the remaining 
link is positive. Say, for example, person P dislikes person 
0 but discovers that person 0 likes object X. Balance in this 
relationship could occur if P dislikes X. A state of 
imbalance would occur if P disliked 0 but also liked X as much 
as did 0. According to balance theory, P would strive to 
obtain a balanced relationship and could do so by either 
developing a negative opinion or changing an existing opinion 
toward X so that it was negative. It is important to 
emphasize that the relationship links described thus far are 
sentiment links—how the people involved in the triad feel 
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about one another and the third entity. In this example, 
negative or positive attitudes toward 0 and X are reflections 
of those sentiments. 
This type of balance has particular relevance to a 
downward comparison situation and the development of the 
concept of indirect active DC. If a comparer (represented by 
P in the P-O-X formulation) indicates that s/he dislikes or 
thinks poorly of a downward comparison target (0), then the 
press for balance in this triadic relationship would dictate 
that P also make negative assessments about items or objects 
(X) that are related to 0 in any positive way. Consequently, 
the comparer forms two types of evaluations in this situation: 
direct derogation of the comparee (by rating him/her 
negatively) and indirect derogation or devaluation of any 
object, X, associated with the comparison target. The 
related-attributes hypothesis (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & 
Darley, 1977) suggests similar theoretical arguments— 
specifically that, as social comparers, we are interested in 
and pay attention to objects (or dimensions) associated with a 
comparison target. 
Related-attributes hypothesis. As discussed earlier, the 
positive restatement of Festinger's concept of related 
attributes suggested that we assess the degree of our 
similarity to a comparison other by attending to attribute 
information consistent with (relevant to) the comparison 
27 
dimension. An elaboration of the related-attributes 
perspective was incorporated by Goethals and Darley (1977) 
into their attributional approach to social comparison and is 
of particular interest for the current conceptual development. 
These authors argued that the comparison process is an 
attribution problem. The dispositions typically being 
evaluated in social comparison often cannot be observed 
directly but, rather, have to be inferred through a person's 
behaviors. Using information from the social environment, we 
attempt to determine the cause of the person's behavior: was 
it due to external (environmental) influences or internal 
(dispositional) influences? With respect to the present 
study, the most important aspect of this inferential process 
is the recognition that a person's performance is often only 
partly influenced by his or her actual ability on that 
dimension. Performance is also affected by a variety of 
nonability factors (or related attributes) such as luck, task 
difficulty, effort, age, gender, access to products that 
facilitate/inhibit performance, etc. Consequently, Goethals 
and Darley argue that we seek knowledge about nonability 
factors when we engage in any comparison process designed to 
evaluate an ability. Such knowledge becomes extremely 
important during the process of social comparison because it 
is informative during the determination of one's similarity 
with the comparison target. It also eliminates any suspicions 
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that nonability factor differences are possible alternative 
explanations for observed ability differences. 
Integration. How might these concepts, drawn from P-O-X 
theory and the related-attributes hypothesis, be assimilated 
within the proposed framework of indirect active downward 
comparison? The related-attributes hypothesis contributes to 
the present discussion because it highlights the idea that 
individuals engaging in social comparison do indeed pay 
attention to information concerning factors tangentially 
related to the primary comparison dimension. The balance 
concepts of P-O-X theory contribute to the indirect active DC 
conceptualization in that they suggest we react, at the 
affective level, to both the comparison other (0) and 
nonability factors (X) . Moreover, Goethals and Darley (1977) 
contend that sometimes people distort (i.e., change) a 
comparison target's standing on nonability factors as a means 
of explaining or rationalizing that person's performance. 
Although these authors spoke of such distortion as a way of 
discounting a target's successful (superior) performance, this 
observation suggests that our interpretation of nonability 
factors or related attributes may be influenced by the 
motivational aspects of the social comparison situation. 
Moreover, such distortion suggests that our evaluations of 
ancillary information may change as our evaluations of 
comparison targets change. As we come to rate a person more 
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negatively, as often is the case in downward comparison 
situations, we may also view objects associated with the 
comparison target more negatively. 
Attitude Change as Indirect Active Downward Comparison 
The current study is conducted, in part, to test the 
assumption that changes in our attitudes toward an object 
associated with a downward comparison target represent a form 
of indirect active DC. In keeping with Wills' traditional 
definition of active downward comparison, direct active DC is 
defined as derogation of or negative attitudes expressed 
concerning a comparison target. Indirect active DC, on the 
other hand, is expected to occur via the derogation or 
development of negative attitudes toward objects, behaviors, 
etc. associated with a downward comparison target. In both 
cases, derogation is manifested through negative attitudes or 
evaluations—in one case, toward the target, in the other 
case, toward the associated object. More importantly, a 
negative change in attitude is interpreted as evidence of 
individuals engaging in active downward comparison processes. 
Consistent with earlier observations of individual differences 
in active DC, it may also be the case that individual 
differences exist in the use of direct and indirect active DC. 
At a general level, then, the study is designed partially to 
test the assumption that attitude change constitutes a form of 
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indirect active DC. In addition, it examines individual 
differences in the use of these two active DC processes. 
Preliminary support. Some early evidence for attitude 
change as a form of indirect active DC was obtained in Reis, 
Gerrard, and Gibbons (1993). In that study, high and low 
self-esteem women who used effective or ineffective methods of 
contraception listened to information supposedly given by 
another member of a simulated discussion group on 
contraception. Some subjects heard information indicating 
that this woman used effective methods of contraception (i.e., 
the pill) whereas others heard information indicating that she 
was ineffective in her contraceptive practices (i.e., she used 
rhythm inconsistently). The manipulated target contraceptive 
comparison information, in juxtaposition to subjects' own 
contraceptive practices, created opportunities for upward, 
downward, or lateral comparisons. Prior to and following the 
comparison opportunity, subjects were asked to rate a variety 
of contraceptive methods, including the method used by the 
comparison target, in terms of effectiveness and likelihood of 
using the methods. Change in this type of rating was 
interpreted as evidence of indirect active DC as previously 
described. 
Results from that study indicated that high self-esteem 
subjects in upward comparison conditions (i.e., ineffective 
contraceptors who listened to information about an effective 
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contraceptor) demonstrated significant negative reactions 
toward the comparison target's contraceptive method (i.e., 
their ratings of the target's contraceptive method became more 
negative), Those findings were not surprising given earlier 
research that indicated that high self-esteem persons tend to 
be more resistant to information that conflicts with their own 
attitudes or values (cf. Cohen, 1959; Linton & Graham, 1959). 
Reis et al. suggested that in this upward comparison situation 
the competence beliefs of these high SE participants were 
challenged by evidence that their performance was less 
effective than that of another person. Therefore, they 
reacted by derogating the comparison target's contraceptive 
method. 
A marginally significant 4-way interaction (p < .07) was 
obtained in unreported analyses from that study on negative 
changes in reactions toward the ineffective comparison 
target's contraceptive method (i.e., the downward comparison 
conditions). Subjects in the low self-esteem, downward 
comparison condition were more likely to derogate the DC 
target's contraceptive method than were their high self-esteem 
counterparts (t(101)= 2.97, £ < .004)—in other words, they 
tended to engage in indirect active DC. Although our ability 
to interpret this specific result more fully was diminished 
substantially by the lack of similar differences between this 
crucial cell and several other conditions within the design. 
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these results served as an Impetus to further investigate the 
impact of social comparison processes on attitudes related to 
a comparison target. They provided some tentative support for 
the general hypothesis that attitude change can result from 
social comparison opportunities. Moreover, attitude change 
appeared to be moderated by factors such as the type of 
comparison and self-esteem. In addition to these findings, 
evidence of individual differences in the use of indirect 
social comparison has been reported recently by other authors. 
Individual differences. In their description of an 
Integrative model for self-enhancement strategies, Brown, 
Collins, and Schmidt (1988) suggested that both high and low 
self-esteem persons experience an identical "universal" 
motivation for developing a positive self-image. As a result, 
both engage in self-enhancing strategies but do so in 
different ways. According to these authors, persons with high 
self-esteem probably developed that positive self-image 
because it was "grounded in social reality"; they tend to be 
fairly skilled, competent individuals, and have experienced 
sufficient worldly success to support a positive self-view. 
Low self-esteem persons, on the other hand, tend to have 
experienced more negative feedback and frequently doubt their 
competence. Thus, those with low self-esteem are faced with a 
dilemma; they, like high self-esteem individuals, desire a 
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positive self-image but do not have the experiences to support 
such a self-belief. 
The main thrust of Brown et al.'s argument is that high 
and low self-esteem individuals engage in different types of 
self-enhancing strategies in their effort to develop positive 
self-image. People with high self-esteem are more likely to 
engage in direct forms of self-enhancement strategies—those 
that will call attention to them as individuals, that 
accentuate their positive qualities and minimize any negative 
personal qualities. Examples would include inflating self-
evaluations or ratings of personal performance. Low self-
esteem persons, on the other hand, are more likely to attempt 
to direct the focus of attention away from the self. They are 
not likely to engage in self-aggrandizement because, in their 
case, they frequently don't have the skills to back up the 
self-promoting claims. Such a tactic simply could not 
withstand the forces of scrutiny. According to Brown et al., 
these individuals seek to self-enhance through indirect 
methods such as affiliating with skilled others or derogating 
the work of others. Neither technique focuses attention on 
the self per se but still has the ultimate impact of 
facilitating a favorable self image. 
In studies designed to test these assumptions, these 
researchers provided participants with the opportunity to 
compare the work of a group to which they belonged (i.e., own-
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group) with that of either a similar or dissimilar group 
(labeled in-group and out-group, respectively) or the work of 
a similar group with that of a dissimilar group. They 
expected that high self-esteem subjects would demonstrate the 
greatest differences in group performance ratings in the own-
group vs. out-group conditions. These subjects would rate the 
work that they had personally helped to produce as superior to 
that of the out-group. Low self-esteem subjects, on the other 
hand, were expected to show evidence of favoritism only in the 
in-group vs. out-group condition—where the focus of the 
evaluation is not their work product, but rather that of a 
similar group. The authors argued that these favoritism 
biases represent direct and indirect self-enhancement, 
respectively. Results supported these hypotheses. 
An additional finding from this research is particularly 
relevant for the current test of indirect active DC. Brown et 
al. posited that derogation of the outgroups' work would 
represent a form of indirect enhancement because the focus is 
not drawn to the performance of a group associated with 
personal performance but rather the work of an entirely 
unrelated group. Consistent with their earlier arguments on 
individual differences for indirect self-enhancement, Brown et 
al. hypothesized that low self-esteem persons would be most 
likely to engage in this type of indirect derogation and these 
expectations were supported empirically. The conclusion drawn 
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by these authors was that high self-esteem persons are more 
likely to engage in direct forms of self-enhancement (i.e., 
in-group favoritism) whereas low self-esteem persons are more 
likely to derogate the work of others (i.e., indirect self-
enhancement . ) 
It is particularly important to note that, in Brown et 
al.s' study, low self-esteem individuals were derogating 
another group's work, not characteristics of the group members 
per se. Such a derogation is consistent with the operational 
definition of indirect active DC developed in the current 
study. Together, the theoretical conceptualizations and 
empirical findings of Brown et al. and Reis et al. provide 
support for the general concept of indirect self-enhancement 
and the specific hypotheses concerning individual differences; 
moreover, recognition of and acceptance for these concepts at 
the theoretical level has recently been advocated by Wills 
(1991) and other DC researchers (see Wood & Taylor, 1991) . 
Threat and Indirect Active DC 
A final note considering the impact of threat in indirect 
self-enhancement strategies is called for at this point. In 
his original statement. Wills was emphatic that engaging in 
downward comparison was a characteristic of those persons 
facing physical or psychological threat (Wills, 1981; p. 246). 
Moreover, he has recently reaffirmed that assertion with 
evidence that people will shift from an upward to downward 
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comparison preference in the presence of threat (Amabile & 
Glazebrook, 1982; Levine & Green, 1984; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985). Consistent evidence of the 
impact of threatening situations on the use of indirect self-
enhancement has not been forthcoming, however. 
For example, in a companion study to their indirect self-
enhancement research. Brown et al. (1988) manipulated feedback 
about a personal skill such that half the participants 
believed the skill to be positive and the remaining 
participants believed it to be negative. The remaining 
procedural aspects of the study were identical to their 
initial study (i.e., the participants engaged in own-group vs. 
in-group or out-group work evaluations). Results indicated 
that individuals receiving the negative feedback replicated 
the self-enhancement biases noted in the first study whereas 
positive feedback produced far less favoritism bias. Although 
these data provide only weak support of the impact of threat 
(given that the results only replicate the effects obtained 
under no threat conditions), these authors argued that such 
differences suggest that in-group favoritism satisfies a self-
enhancement motivation and occur in the presence of negative 
(threatening) information. 
It should be noted that, in the only explicit test of 
attitude change as a form of indirect active DC (Reis et al., 
1993), some qualified individual differences were observed in 
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indirect active DC in an experimental design that did not 
include a threat manipulation. It is certainly conceivable 
that low levels of self-esteem provide sufficient threat to 
motivate the indirect active DC activity, but the nature of 
attitude change under conditions of overt threat remains to be 
tested. It may be the case that "threat may merely heighten a 
prevailing tendency to make downward comparisons" (Wood & 
Taylor, 1991; p. 45.), thus leading to the expectation that 
attitude change, although probably experienced differently by 
high and low self-esteem persons, will be the greatest under 
conditions of threat. In keeping with the Brown et al. 
findings, however, it may be that attitude change under 
conditions of threat will simply replicate the findings 
observed in the no threat, downward comparison conditions of 
the Reis et al. study and that positive feedback reduces the 
tendency for attitude change entirely. 
Summary 
The current study is conducted, in part, to test 
assumptions concerning individual differences in the use of 
indirect and direct active DC, and the role of threat in 
indirect and direct self-enhancement strategies. The 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence relevant to this 
portion of the current study support the contention that 
social comparers use several types of information about their 
comparison target. Few studies have assessed reactions to 
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direct and indirect forms of DC. The one study that has 
addressed attitude change toward an object associated with the 
DC target as a form of indirect self-enhancement did not 
include a measure of threat. Thus, a number of questions 
remain to be addressed. In the current study, both downward 
comparison information and threat will be manipulated and 
measures of direct and indirect active DC (derogation of the 
DC target or derogation of an object associated with the 
target) will be obtained. In keeping with the foregoing 
theoretical presentation, it is predicted that high self-
esteem, threatened persons would be the most likely persons to 
derogate a DC target. Persons low in self-esteem were 
expected to engage in derogation of an object that has been 
associated with the DC target during the presentation of 
social comparison information. The effects of varying 
conditions of threatening feedback on attitude change will be 
assessed. 
Social Comparison and Perceived Vulnerability 
The second major focus of the current study involves the 
relationship between perceptions of vulnerability to negative 
life events and use of social comparison information, 
particularly downward comparison information. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that these beliefs can be 
influenced by social information such as that found in social 
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comparison opportunities (Perloff, 1983; Perloff & Fetzer, 
1986/ Weinstein, 1982, 1984, 1988). 
Biases in Risk Perception 
One consistent finding in the literature on risk 
perception is that nonvictims, those people who haven't 
experienced a particular negative life event, tend to 
systematically underestimate their personal chances of being 
involved in such an event (cf. Knopf, 1976; Weinstein, 1980). 
People also generate biased comparative risk estimates in that 
they underestimate their personal chances of being a victim of 
a negative event relative to those of other people (Harris & 
Guten, 1979; Weinstein, 1980). With respect to negative 
health events, this bias is most consistently demonstrated for 
events that people view as controllable. Several underlying 
motivational and cognitive causal mechanisms have been offered 
as explanations for such biased perceptions—one of which 
includes the process involved in the selection of a social 
comparison target (Perloff, 1983; Weinstein, 1980). 
Causal Mechanisms for Perceptions of Vulnerability 
Motivational mechanisms. Most motivational explanations 
of the comparative risk bias have in common the assumption 
that this phenomenon reflects some type of self-protective or 
self-serving function. For example, one such explanation 
argues that acknowledging that one is likely to encounter a 
negative event, such as an accident or serious illness, is 
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very anxiety provoking and the bias serves to reduce that 
anxiety (Kirscht, Haefner, Kegels, & Rosenstock, 1966). An 
additional motivational explanation suggests that the bias 
reflects a need for personal control. It is not uncommon for 
people to exaggerate their ability to control chance outcomes 
(Langer, 1975). Perloff (1983) argues that the need for 
control affects perceptions of vulnerability because people 
believe they are more capable than others of controlling 
random events, such as negative life events, and are therefore 
more likely to prevent such events from occurring. 
A final motivational explanation for the bias combines 
this notion of personal control with Lerner's just world 
theory (Lerner & Miller, 1978). A belief in a just world 
underlies a common assumption that the victim of misfortune 
must have done something to deserve or had some amount of 
control over the events that lead to his/her mishap. We blame 
the victim for his/her problems. At the same time, 
acknowledging personal vulnerability to a similar negative 
event is an unsettling prospect. Lerner suggested that this 
tendency toward blame, in conjunction with the motivation to 
avoid fears of personal victimatization, results in efforts to 
convince ourselves that we are different from the victim (and 
thus can avoid a similar mishap). According to Perloff 
(1983), our perception of vulnerability to negative events 
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stems partly from the belief that we are less deserving of 
misfortunes than were previous victims. 
Cognitive mechanisms. As with the motivational 
explanations, several cognitive factors have been suggested as 
contributing to the bias. One very basic explanation is that 
we simply do not have information about what others do to 
protect themselves. Weinstein has suggested that even when 
information concerning the health-promoting activities of 
others is known, access to that information is restricted by a 
prevalent tendency for egocentric thought (Weinstein, 1982). 
Egocentrism, thinking almost exclusively about ourselves and 
not about others, results in reduced attention allocated to 
information concerning the activities of others. An 
additional type of selective recall has been observed in the 
tendency to emphasize personal "risk reducing" rather than 
"risk promoting" behaviors when making risk assessments 
(Gerrard, Gibbons, & Warner, 1991). 
For the purposes of the current study, the most relevant 
cognitive explanation originated from Weinstein's (1980) 
suggestion that comparative risk assessments are biased 
because of the way in which people select a comparison other 
at the time of the risk assessment process. More 
specifically, Weinstein said that comparative risk differences 
occur because we compare ourselves to an inappropriate 
comparison standard or target—"an unrealistic stereotype of a 
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person who does nothing to improve his or her chances or even 
engages in counterproductive activity" (Weinstein, 1980; p. 
819)—instead of comparing ourselves to a person doing the 
same amount and type of (non)risky behaviors as ourselves. 
Errors in the selection of a comparison target are 
thought to result from an inappropriate dependence on the 
representativeness heuristic (Weinstein, 1980, 1982, 1983) . 
When contemplating personal risks for a negative event, people 
supposedly call to mind a picture of the "typical" person who 
experiences such an event. Perceptions of vulnerability for 
the event are a function of our similarity to that 
"prototypical" victim—if we see ourselves as dissimilar to 
the prototypical victim then we rate our chances of 
experiencing the hazard as proportionately lower than 
his/hers. As similarity increases between self and another 
person (as is the case with a peer or relative), perceptions 
of risk differences decrease (see Perloff & Fetzer, 1986) . 
From a social comparison perspective, it is also 
important to keep in mind that when the prototypical hazard 
victim does nothing or engages in counterproductive efforts to 
prevent the negative event, he/she constitutes a downward 
comparison target, particularly since people have the tendency 
to think they're personally doing something to reduce personal 
risks. Thus, it appears that certain characteristics of the 
comparison target (in this case, similarity to self) affect 
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the magnitude of risk estimate differences. This further 
suggests that risk estimate biases are, to some extent, 
malleable depending on the type of information people consider 
at the time of the risk estimation. 
Eliminating Perceptions of Invulnerability 
Given the consistency with which findings of biases in 
comparative risk estimates appear in the perception of 
vulnerability literature, one particularly important empirical 
question has focused on the stability of the bias. Are people 
tenacious in their beliefs of comparative invulnerability or 
are there conditions under which it is possible to vary the 
strength of the bias (i.e., either intensify it or eliminate 
it completely)? In two studies, Weinstein found evidence 
that, although somewhat malleable, the bias appeared to be 
fairly persistent (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Lachendro, 
1982) . 
In a third study, however, he was successful in totally 
eliminating the bias. Weinstein (1983) created an 
experimental treatment designed to test the degree to which 
people's lack of information about the self-protective 
behaviors of others contributed to perceptions of 
vulnerability. Subjects indicated their risk standings 
relative to those of average students at their university on 
the risk factors, such as number of hours spent exercising, 
number of eggs eaten weekly, etc., that are associated with 11 
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different health and safety risk events (e.g., heart attack, 
drinking problems, injury in an auto accident, etc.). 
Subjects in an "other-information" condition reported their 
personal risk on these 11 factors in addition to receiving 
information about the risk standing of typical students at 
their university on the 11 events. For all but one risk 
situation, Weinstein found no evidence of risk estimate bias 
for subjects in the self- and other-risk condition. In 
addition, he found that those persons who considered only 
their own risk reported the greatest self-other bias. These 
data support Weinstein's assumption that differences in self-
other perceptions of invulnerability result, in part, from a 
tendency to underemphasize or ignore the nonrisky or 
preventive behaviors of others. Moreover, these results 
demonstrate that such information has a significant effect on 
individuals' comparative judgments. 
For the current study, it is of particular interest that 
Weinstein's use of (social comparison) information about 
others was effective in reducing and even eliminating the 
bias. These results underscore the general assumption that 
comparative risk estimates, though consistently biased to 
favor the self, are clearly not stable, but rather are 
affected by, among other things, the presence and absence of 
certain information concerning the social comparison target. 
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Increasing Perception Bias 
Up to this point, attempts to manipulate the bias have 
focused primarily on factors that result in its reduction or 
elimination and have been successful when information about 
the preventive behaviors of others has been emphasized. 
Weinstein's findings are of considerable practical importance 
because perceptions of vulnerability appear to be one factor 
that influences the adoption of preventive or restorative 
health behaviors (Janz & Becker, 1984; Weinstein, 1988) . 
However, one unanswered empirical question concerns whether it 
is possible to manipulate social information so as to 
significantly increase, rather than reduce or eliminate, the 
bias. Bias change of this nature would also be of practical 
significance since it hints that there may be some naturally 
occurring circumstances (such as some temporary threat) during 
which people exaggerate the bias in order to feel even more 
invulnerable to the negative event than would normally be the 
case. One of the purposes of the current research was to 
explore the conditions under which self-other differences in 
risk estimation increase. 
The basic logic of this portion of the current study is 
that if some kinds of social information are effective in 
eliminating the bias, then perhaps other types of information 
increase the bias. Reconsidering Weinstein's (1983) 
techniques for eliminating the bias, it is important to note 
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that he described the typical student's risk factor behaviors 
as "self-protective activities," rather loosely implying that 
these students were at least doing something behaviorally to 
protect their health. In short, he focused subjects* 
attention on another's risk-reducing behaviors—leaving open 
the question as to how his subjects might have reacted to 
information about another's risk-increasing behaviors. 
This observation stands somewhat in contradiction to 
Weinstein's definition of the bias as the product of a 
downward comparison process in which the comparison target 
engages in "nothing to improve his or her chances or even 
engages in counterproductive activity" (Weinstein, 1980; p. 
819). Argued in its weakest form, this definition implies 
that the bias can be initially created simply by finding out 
that another person is, at the very least, doing nothing to 
prevent a negative health occurrence. One of the purposes of 
the current study is to explore the stronger version of 
Weinstein's definition—that the perception of vulnerability 
is influenced by knowledge that another person is engaging in 
counterproductive activity. In short, if the perception of 
invulnerability can be partly based on simply knowing (or 
assuming) that a comparison other is doing nothing, then 
finding out that another person is counterproductive in 
his/her health behaviors could push the bias in an even more 
exaggerated (invulnerable) direction. Such an effect could 
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simply reflect a cognitive process involving the observation 
that one's health conduct is clearly superior to behavior of 
this counterproductive person. In the light of this 
information, our pre-existing beliefs about comparative risk 
may become temporarily bolstered. Bias increase could also 
serve a self-protective, motivational function, especially 
when a person feels threatened in some manner. Creating a 
greater risk estimate difference between self and comparison 
target might reduce feelings of threat. 
To explore the conditions under which bias estimates 
might increase, one of the primary manipulations in the 
current study involves providing subjects with information 
that another person is engaging in a counterproductive health-
related behavior. It is expected that this information will 
affect comparative health risk estimates so as to create more 
extreme differences in beliefs of self-other invulnerability. 
On a theoretical level, an observation of bias increase will 
provide researchers in the area with additional information 
concerning the dynamics of risk-bias development. The 
observation of bias increase would be important at a practical 
level as well. Some health researchers have indicated that 
perceptions of invulnerability are predictors of 
nonparticipation in preventive health regimen (cf. Janz & 
Becker, 1984). Thus, any tendency for people to engage in 
48 
attempts to actively increase self-other risk differences may 
compromise the effectiveness of health interventions. 
Bias Changes; Self-perception vs. Other-perception 
Although the malleability of risk estimates is 
pragmatically important to health researchers, another issue 
of growing theoretical importance is the degree to which bias 
changes involve changes in self-perception or other-
perception. Throughout his research, one of Weinstein's 
common techniques of measuring comparative risk bias was to 
ask subjects to answer the question "Compared to other Rutgers 
students of my sex, my chances of developing [illness] are: 
much below average, below average, ". In an early paper, 
Weinstein suggested that people presumably create mental lists 
of risk factors for both themselves and others and then use 
those lists when making comparative risk judgments (Weinstein, 
1980). Since comparative risk estimates incorporate both 
types of information, changes in the bias could involve any of 
the following factors: changes in perceptions of risk unique 
to the self, changes in perceptions of risk unique to the 
comparison other, or some combination of both. The relatively 
few studies that have been done to address this question have 
produced inconsistent results. 
For example, Weinstein has argued that "it was the 
feedback about peers that reduced unrealistic optimism" 
(Weinstein, 1983; p. 18) implying that changes in comparative 
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risk estimates reflect changes in perceptions of the 
comparison other. Weinstein's data are derived from a "self 
relative to other," or comparative perspective, however, 
rendering it impossible to directly observe any independent 
changes in perceptions of self or other. Weinstein's 
assumption, although not directly tested in his own work, has 
received support from other researchers who found that as 
behavioral differences between self and a comparison other 
increase, as might be the case in a DC situation, trait 
evaluations of that target were affected more than were 
similar evaluations for self (cf. Hansen & Donoghue, 1977; 
Sanders, 1982). This observation underscores the assumption 
that other-perception is the more malleable component of self-
other estimates. 
At the same time, the results of other research suggest 
the possibility that changes in either self-perceptions or 
other-perceptions may occur (and thus, affect comparative risk 
estimates,) but under different information conditions. For 
example, Weinstein and Lachendro (1982) had subjects make 
comparative risk estimates for 6 negative life events, 4 of 
which were health-related. Two experimental manipulations 
then followed. First, half the subjects elaborated on factors 
that increased or decreased their personal risk (i.e., 
personal review); the remaining subjects did not (i.e., no 
personal review). Then, subjects were asked either to (1) 
50 
read information about or (2) imagine the risk factors for 
other students at their college or (3) were not asked to 
consider information about others. Measures of comparative 
risk were assessed following these manipulations. Results 
revealed that subjects in the no personal review/other 
information conditions (i.e., social comparison information) 
tended to become less biased in their estimates. This trend 
is particularly interesting given the second finding that 
subjects in both the personal review/no other information and 
no personal review/no other information conditions tended to 
increase their comparative risk estimates. 
The former finding suggests that instructions to focus 
explicitly on another's risk factors results in changes in 
other-perception. Thus, social comparison information may 
affect comparative risk estimates mainly through changes in 
other-perceptions. The latter finding supports the conclusion 
that the lack of social comparison information and a primary 
focus on self-risk results in bias change through change in 
self-perception. However, the results of Weinsten and 
Lachendro do not exclude the possibility that perceptions of 
self might be influenced by risk information about a 
comparison target. Research examining the impact of social 
comparison information on self- and other-perception in 
isolation would be necessary to address that question more 
specifically. So, although informative, these studies do not 
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provide a clarification of the dynamics of individual changes 
in self- or other-risk perceptions (and thus, the impact of 
such change on comparative risk estimates). Moreover, since 
the methods employed in these studies had subjects focus on a 
combination of risk factors for the comparison target, they 
also fail to enlighten us as to how self, other, and 
comparative risk estimates might be affected by information 
specifically concerned with another's risk-increasing 
behaviors. 
The Role of Threat in Biased Risk Estimation 
As reviewed earlier in the general section on downward 
comparison principles, both dispositional (i.e., low self-
esteem, depression) and situational threats have traditionally 
been viewed as significant variables to be considered in DC 
processes. Although the social comparison perspective has 
been a primary cognitive explanation for vulnerability biases, 
threat variables have been conspicuously absent from risk bias 
studies. This exclusion fails to recognize the motivational 
forces underlying DC phenomena (Wills, 1980) and 
underemphasizes the argument that risk biases reflect 
motivational (as well as cognitive selection) processes 
(Perloff, 1983; Weinstein, 1982). 
In traditional DC literature, situational threat 
inductions have been effective in decreasing subjective well-
being and, ultimately, were shown to be related to subjective 
52 
well-being improvement even when such a threat is not specific 
to the comparison dimension (cf. Gibbons, 1986; Gibbons & 
Boney McCoy, 1991; Wills, 1981). In short, DC ameliorated the 
negative state induced by the situational and/or dispositional 
threats. If vulnerability biases reflect attempts to 
ameliorate anxiety produced by the recognition that negative 
health outcomes are possible, it might be expected that threat 
inductions in a risk bias study would result in attempts to 
reduce negative concerns by increasing ones' sense of 
invulnerability and thus widen the comparative risk estimate 
difference. 
A separate line of literature concerning the relationship 
between self-esteem and social influence attempts is also 
relevant here. Cohen has argued that individual differences 
in reactions to threatening information can be observed such 
that persons with low self-esteem are more accepting of 
challenging or threatening information concerning the self, 
presumably because negative information is consistent with 
their self-image (Cohen, 1959). High self-esteem individuals, 
on the other hand, are more likely to react negatively toward 
such information because it doesn't fit with what they believe 
about themselves. Combining this observation with the 
hypothesis that comparative risk differences occur in response 
to a recognized threat from a negative event leads to the 
conclusion that high and low self-esteem persons may differ in 
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their patterns of risk estimation. Indeed, a study on risk 
estimates for lung cancer revealed that smokers high in self-
esteem viewed themselves as less vulnerable to the disease 
than did their low self-esteem counterparts (Niles, 1964). 
The presence of situational and dispositional threat may 
also affect changes in risk estimates in such a way that high 
self-esteem, threatened subjects would react with greater 
changes in risk estimates. These individuals may over-react 
to the threatening feedback and, thus, become even more 
adamant about their prior belief of invulnerability. Because 
low self-esteem or nonthreatened persons tend to be more 
accepting of threatening information, they may react to it 
with negligible change in risk estimates. Previous research 
on perceptions of vulnerability has not investigated the 
effects of either situational or dispositional threat on risk 
estimate change. Therefore, these dimensions will be included 
in the current study. 
Summary 
The selection of a downward comparison target has been 
implicated in the development of motivated biases concerning 
health threats. The long term implications resulting from 
such a process are of particular importance if, as some 
researchers believe, this bias interferes with preventive 
health practices (Weinstein, 1988). The current research 
tests the assumption that providing downward comparison 
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information can serve to strengthen the bias and does so 
differentially on the basis of situational and dispositional 
threat. In light of Cohen's observations of individual 
differences in reactions to threat, it is expected that high 
self-esteem, threatened persons would be most likely to 
demonstrate bias increases. The study was also designed to 
determine if changes in risk estimates reflect changes in 
self-risk perception or changes in other-risk perception. 
Downward Comparison and Subjective Well-being 
There can be no doubt that a great deal of empirical 
energy has been directed toward testing questions concerning 
the processes involved in downward comparison (i.e., target 
selection, motivations for DC, etc.). At the same time, 
considerable attention has been focused on the outcome of 
engaging in the process—how do we feel after comparing with 
"worse off" other? In his theoretical statement. Wills 
predicted that improvement or restoration of subjective well-
being should follow downward comparison experiences. Indeed, 
a growing number of studies have demonstrated that 
improvements in self-esteem and mood states follow DC 
opportunities. The third general focus of the present study 
concentrated on that evidence and the impact of DC on two 
measures of subjective well-being—mood and self-esteem. 
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Self-esteem and Downward Comparison 
One of the first studies to demonstrate the impact of 
social comparison processes on self-esteem was Morse and 
Gergen's (1970) "Mr. Clean—Mr. Dirty" study. In their study, 
summer job applicants completed half the items of a modified 
Coopersmith (1959) Self-esteem Inventory as part of a job 
screening procedure and then casually encountered either a 
socially desirable (i.e., upward comparison target) or 
socially undesirable (i.e., downward comparison target) job 
competitor while they were waiting to complete their job 
interview. Following this comparison opportunity, the second 
half of the Coopersmith inventory was administered. Compared 
to subjects who engaged in an upward comparison situation, 
subjects who had engaged in downward comparison demonstrated 
more positive self-esteem. 
Reis, Gerrard, and Gibbons (1993), described earlier, 
also demonstrated that social comparison situations (in 
particular, downward comparison opportunities) can positively 
influence self-esteem. The design and procedures for this 
study were discussed earlier in the section of this paper 
devoted to indirect active DC. In addition to the measures of 
attitudes toward the target's contraceptive method, subjects 
also responded to measures of self-esteem and mood. It was 
expected, based on Morse and Gergen's earlier findings, that 
the largest self-esteem improvements would be observed for low 
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self-esteem subjects in the downward comparison condition. 
The results supported this prediction, replicating Morse and 
Gergen's demonstration of the impact of DC on self-esteem. No 
significant effects were produced on the mood measures, 
however. That finding will be addressed shortly. 
Mood and Downward Comparison 
It has been hypothesized that, in addition to self-
esteem, another dimension of subjective well-being—affective 
state—is influenced by DC opportunities. Ample support for 
the contention that downward comparison results in 
amelioration of negative mood states has been observed. The 
Hakmiller (1966) study, also described earlier, provided the 
first confirmation that the process resulted in affective 
benefits. In this study, subjects were assigned to high or 
low threat conditions through the provision of negative or 
positive trait information. Although the study was conducted 
primarily to test questions about comparison target 
preferences under differing conditions of threat, subjects 
were also asked to report the amount of "upset" they felt at 
two points in the procedure: after receiving their own trait 
information and after receiving the trait information of 
another group member who had more of this negative trait. 
Results indicated significant decreases in upset for high 
threat subjects after receiving the downward comparison 
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information whereas low threat subjects did not demonstrate 
significant changes in their affect. 
More recently, Gibbons (1986) and Gibbons and Gerrard 
(1989) provided additional support for Hakmiller's mood 
findings. Gibbons (1986) found that threatened, depressed 
subjects demonstrated improved mood states after reading that 
a peer was having feelings of guilt over an accident whereas 
nondepressed subjects did not. Similarly, Gibbons and Gerrard 
(1989) found that mildly threatened, low self-esteem subjects 
demonstrated improved mood states after listening to 
information indicating that a another student was having 
trouble adjusting to college, but they did not demonstrate 
mood improvement after hearing a statement about successful 
adjustment. Taken together, these three studies provide 
convincing evidence that downward comparison has a positive 
impact on subjective well-being as demonstrated by mood 
amelioration. It should be noted, however, that the mood 
studies to date have demonstrated mood differentials in 
downward vs. upward comparison situations or focused solely on 
the downward comparison situation. A straightforward test of 
the mood amelioration hypothesis would be demonstrated in a 
downward comparison/no comparison contrast. The design of the 
current experiment will allow for such a test. 
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Threat and Downward Comparison 
The preceding self-esteem and mood findings support 
Wills' tenet that engaging in downward comparison results in 
improvements in subjective well-being. Upon closer 
examination, a noteworthy methodological inconsistency between 
the studies becomes apparent. Specifically, the self-esteem 
and mood studies appear to differ in their emphasis on threat 
as a mediating factor in subjective well-being enhancement. 
For example, although one could conceivably argue that 
subjects in the Morse and Gergen (1970) study felt some threat 
since they were trying to obtain a rather scarce summer job, 
threat per se was not manipulated, nor was it measured. 
Moreover, in the Reis et al. (1993) study, subjects were asked 
to describe their personal contraceptive histories and 
listened to the contraceptive history of another woman. 
Again, threat was not manipulated. Despite that absence, 
however, improvements in self-esteem did occur in the downward 
comparison situations. 
By way of contrast, studies that have documented mood 
amelioration have all incorporated some form of threat 
induction in that subjects either wrote about personal 
problems or were told they didn't possess high levels of a 
desirable trait (cf. Gibbons, 1986; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; 
Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991). Mood change following downward 
comparison was also measured in the Reis et al. (1993) study 
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but, interestingly, in this case no significant changes in 
mood were obtained. In the absence of a threat manipulation, 
social comparison failed to produce a significant impact on 
subjects* mood. 
Admittedly, there were other minor methodological 
differences between the self-esteem and mood studies that 
might account for these discordant findings; none, however, 
appear as salient as the absence/presence of a threat 
induction. It is important to note that this observation has 
only recently become apparent as the number of studies 
incorporating mood and self-esteem as measures of subjective 
well-being have begun to appear (cf. Reis et al., 1993). 
Thus, the literature on downward comparison provides 
relatively few insights as to why changes in both dimensions 
are not equally dependent on the presence of threat. For that 
reason, it is necessary to turn to related theory for answers 
concerning the relative differences between self-esteem and 
mood measures under conditions of threat. Cohen and 
Leventhal's (1979) explication of problem-focused and emotion-
focused coping mechanisms allows for the development of 
hypotheses concerning differences between mood and self-esteem 
responses in social comparison. This theory contributes to 
the current discussion of downward comparison principles 
because it explores how people are affected by and react to 
situational and psychological threat. 
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Coping Mechanism Literature 
Reactions to threatening situations have been extensively 
studied by psychologists Interested in topics other than 
downward comparison. In health psychology, for example, 
research conducted on coping mechanisms have focused primarily 
on how people respond to environmental and psychological 
stressors. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), when we 
regard consequences of an event as negative and potentially 
harmful, that event is classified as a stressor—something 
that threatens our mental and physical livelihood. These 
dynamics are similar to those hypothesized in the downward 
comparison literature in which psychological or physical 
threats have a direct, negative impact on feelings of 
subjective well-being. In both cases, actions are focused on 
alleviating the impact of that threat. 
Although a variety of coping mechanisms have been 
proposed, two general categories outlined by Lazarus and his 
colleagues are of particular relevance for the current study 
(Lazarus, 1991). Problem-focused coping mechanisms include 
those techniques that concentrate on changing or eliminating 
the stressor or source of threat whereas emotion-focused 
coping mechanisms involve techniques designed to mitigate its 
emotional impact. Thus, one type of response seeks to change 
the situation whereas the other is directed toward changing 
how we feel about the situation. Either strategy might be 
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successful in reducing the stress involved in a situation and 
the selection of which form of coping to use depends on the 
characteristics of the situation. For example, some threats 
may require significant time, effort, and resources to change, 
and so the most effective coping mechanism, at least 
initially, may be to change how we feel about the situation. 
Of course, it would be expected that at some point effective 
coping would probably also include problem-focused coping to 
reduce the likelihood that the stressor will continue to tax 
our coping resources. 
One important area of consideration in the selection of a 
coping technique involves the immediacy with which the chosen 
response would result in threat alleviation. Some cognitive 
psychologists have argued for the primacy of negative emotion 
alleviation under the assumption that once negative emotion is 
aroused "it won't let us go off and worry about other problems 
until something is done about this one" (Simon, 1983, p. 30). 
In other words, we might engage in emotion-focused coping 
before problem-focused coping because we need to get rid of 
our negative feelings before we can turn our attention to more 
practical issues involved in changing the situation. 
This type of primacy effect may explain differences in 
mood and self-esteem reactions to threat inductions used in 
downward comparison studies. Participants who were subjected 
to threat manipulations in DC mood studies reported that they 
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were upset or dissatisfied with their results (cf., Hakmiller, 
1966; Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991)—clearly they were 
experiencing a form of threat and the negative feelings that 
result from it. These subjects were also among those that 
demonstrated significant mood improvements following DC. 
Therefore, perhaps DC represented a form of emotion-focused 
coping. At the same time, it is important to note that in 
Reis et al. (1993) no threat inductions were manipulated, and 
there was no evidence of mood amelioration. These empirical 
findings provide support for the assumption that, in 
threatening social comparison situations, one of our primary 
concerns might be mood amelioration. 
It is also important to point out that Reis et al. found 
significant improvements in self-esteem, and this was 
particularly the case for low self-esteem subjects. It might 
be the case that, in the absence of negative emotion-provoking 
threats, our primary focus is not mood. Rather, under those 
circumstances, we might be more able to pay attention to other 
(esteem relevant) information available in the downward 
comparison opportunity. Clearly, this assumption could only 
be answered through a DC study that incorporates both mood and 
self-esteem measures assessed under conditions of high or low 
threat. To date, such a study has not been conducted and 
therefore, this empirical test represents the third focus in 
the present study. 
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Summary 
In his original personality and situational corollaries, 
Wills suggested that low self-esteem, threatened persons would 
be most likely to demonstrate the benefits of increased 
subjective well-being following downward comparisons. 
Research involving mood and self-esteem as operationalizations 
of subjective well-being has supported that contention but 
with a qualification. Self-esteem effects have been noted 
under conditions of minimal or no threat, whereas mood effects 
have been noted only when specific threat inductions have been 
manipulated. Moreover, the pattern of effects supports an 
assumption that the manifestation of the self-enhancement 
motivation under conditions of immediate threat results in 
efforts toward mood amelioration rather than self-esteem 
enhancement. 
The empirical question that emerged from this observation 
was whether self-esteem and mood could be affected 
differentially under varying conditions of threat. The 
current study involved a downward comparison situation under 
varying levels of threat and, based on previous research, it 
is expected that mood improvements would be maximal for low 
self-esteem, downward comparison subjects under conditions of 
high threat. In contrast, self-esteem improvements are 
expected to occur for low self-esteem, downward comparison 
subjects at low levels of threat. 
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The Current Study 
Purpose 
Over the past decade a number of basic and applied 
questions have been tested concerning the motivation, process, 
and outcomes of engaging in downward comparison. The present 
research will continue that tradition. It will address 
theoretical issues concerning the relationship between threat 
and subjective well-being, and the nature of indirect downward 
comparison. The study will also have an applied focus 
involving the manipulation of vulnerability perceptions. The 
challenge and overall purpose of the current study is to 
coherently incorporate and investigate each of these issues in 
a unified downward comparison framework. 
Comparison dimension. One key to the integrated study of 
these issues involves the selection of a comparison dimension 
that is highly meaningful to college subjects in a research 
setting, but yet is also one that is flexible enough to meet 
the unique demands of each of the intended empirical 
questions. As was the case with Reis et al. (1993), the 
comparison dimension for the present study is contraceptive 
use. This dimension has been selected for the following 
reasons. 
Clearly, contraceptive use is a particularly salient 
issue to college-aged women, especially those who are sexually 
active and wish to avoid an unplanned pregnancy. Thus, 
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potential participants might find a research project on 
contraception to be high in "mundane realism" (Carlsmith, 
Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976). Second, by the time most people 
are in college, they are familiar with most methods of 
contraception and have formed opinions about them (Forrest & 
Henshaw, 1983). At the same time, it is likely that they have 
attitudes about people who use different contraceptive 
methods. Moreover, there is evidence that individual 
differences in self-esteem moderate attitude toward 
contraception (Herold, Goodwin, & Lero, 1979) . These 
established attitudinal tendencies provide the opportunity to 
obtain measures of change in both indirect and direct active 
DC, as conceptualized for this study. Thirdly, the use of 
methods with high failure rates or inconsistent use of 
contraception carries with it a very real and, for a number of 
individuals, negative consequence—unplanned pregnancy. Thus, 
subjects in the current study could be about their perception 
of vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy as it related to their 
contraceptive use. Moreover, it was possible to ask similar 
risk perception questions for a sexually active comparison 
target who used an extremely ineffective method of 
contraception—nothing. 
Finally, the contraceptive dimension works well in the 
current study because this is a dimension on which comparison 
target effectiveness can be manipulated in a straightforward 
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manner. Thus, a downward comparison opportunity, in the form 
of information about a peer who did not use any contraception, 
was easily created and provided to study participants. The 
preceding characteristics of the comparison dimension provided 
a great deal of procedural maneuverability with which to test 
the fairly disparate empirical issues of interest in the 
context of a single study. 
Overview 
High and low self-esteem, sexually-active female subjects 
who reported using an effective method of contraception were 
asked to provide tape-recorded information about their social 
and contraceptive use backgrounds as part of a simulated 
laboratory discussion group on the topic of contraception (cf. 
Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Reis, Gerrard & Gibbons, 1993). 
Subjects then listened to a similar statement they thought was 
recorded by another discussion group participant. Those 
subjects assigned to the downward comparison conditions 
listened to a standard pre-recorded social and contraceptive 
history of a woman whose contraceptive information indicated 
that she was using an "ineffective" contraceptive method 
(i.e., nothing). The remaining subjects listened only to the 
social history portion of the tape (i.e., they did not listen 
to the contraceptive history portion of the target's tape 
recorded comparison statement). Prior to the exchange of 
social comparison information, half the subjects received 
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threatening feedback concerning levels of a (bogus) 
personality trait, whereas the other half received low threat 
feedback. Pre- and post-social comparison measures of direct 
and indirect active DC (derogation of target and derogation of 
target's contraceptive method), perception of invulnerability 
to unplanned pregnancy, and self-esteem and mood were to be 
assessed. Follow-up measures of perceptions of vulnerability, 
target derogation, and target contraceptive method derogation 
were obtained approximately 6 weeks after the experiment and 
were used in exploratory analyses of attitude/perception 
persistence. 
Design 
The design for the study was a 2 (High vs. Low Self-
esteem) X 2 (High vs. Low Threat) x 2 (Downward vs. No 
Downward Comparison Information) x time mixed factorial 
design. Time was the within subjects factor and tested the 
data collected at either 2 or 3 intervals depending on the 
dependent measure. The primary repeated measures analyses 
were conducted on the following pre- and post-DC manipulation 
dependent measures; mood, self-esteem, perceptions of 
vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy, direct active DC (i.e., 
the specific derogation of the comparison target) and indirect 
active DC (i.e., the derogation of the comparison target's 
stated contraceptive method). 
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The follow-up data were collected to provide the 
opportunity for exploratory analyses on the persistence of 
change in perceptions of vulnerability, and target and 
contraceptive method derogation. These measures were 
collected at 3 points over the course of the entire experiment 
(either mass testing, post-DC information, and follow-up 
session for the perception and method derogation variables or 
pre-DCI, post-DCI and follow-up session for the target 
derogation variables). 
Hypotheses 
Indirect vs. direct active DC. The first general set of 
hypotheses (see Table 1 for a summary of all hypotheses) was 
developed to test assumptions concerning indirect strategies 
of self-enhancement, specifically attitude change as a form of 
indirect active DC. Moreover, individual personality 
characteristics and varying levels of threat were expected to 
have an impact on subjects' reactions to indirect and direct 
active DC opportunities. Direct active DC was operationally 
defined as negative changes in evaluations of a downward 
comparison target, in this case, a woman who used no form of 
contraception. Indirect active DC involved negative changes 
in attitude toward the target's contraceptive method. 
Persons high in self-esteem have been found to engage in 
self-esteem restorative techniques that involve both self-
enhancement (in-group favoritism) and out-group derogation. 
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Table 1 
Hypotheses 
1. Direct Active DC 
- under conditions of high threat, high self-esteem, 
downward comparison subjects will engage in the greatest 
amount of comparison target derogation 
2. Indirect Active DC 
- low self-esteem, downward comparison subjects are 
expected to demonstrate the greatest amount of target 
contraceptive method derogation 
3. Perceptions of vulnerability 
a. high self-esteem, threatened, downward comparison 
subjects are expected to demonstrate the greatest 
increases in self-other risk differences for an unplanned 
pregnancy 
b. low self-esteem subjects, regardless of threat level, 
were expected to demonstrate the least change in their 
comparative risk bias 
c. subjects who reviewed the comparison target's risk 
(contraceptive) information in addition to reviewing 
their own behavior are expected to evidence the greatest 
changes in other-risk estimates. 
d. subjects who review only their own contraceptive risk 
behavior should demonstrate the greatest amount of self-
perception change 
4. Self-esteem 
- under conditions of low threat, low self-esteem, 
downward comparison subjects were expected to demonstrate 
improvements in self-esteem 
5. Mood 
- under conditions of high threat, low self-esteem, 
downward comparison subjects were expected to demonstrate 
the greatest amount of mood improvement. 
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Specifically, Crocker et al. (1987) found that high self-
esteem persons rated out-group members more negatively than 
their own group members (i.e., they engaged in derogation). 
Similar results were noted by Gibbons and Boney McCoy (1991). 
In keeping with these results, it is predicted that high self-
esteem, downward comparison subjects who have received 
threatening feedback, will engage in the greatest amount of 
comparison target derogation—direct active downward 
comparison. 
Brown et al. (1988) reported that low self-esteem 
individuals were more likely to derogate the work of out-group 
members and, in their study, this was especially true for 
threatened, low self-esteem individuals. However, Reis et al. 
(1993) found the low self-esteem persons engaged in attitude 
change (indirect derogation) without the presence of a threat 
manipulation. Therefore, the predictions for indirect active 
DC were that low self-esteem subjects who receive downward 
comparison information were expected to demonstrate the 
greatest amount of target contraceptive method derogation. A 
priori predictions concerning the impact of threat on target 
method derogation are not possible given inconsistent findings 
in previous literature. 
Perceptions of vulnerability. The second major purpose 
of the current study was to explore the impact of a forced 
downward comparison opportunity on subject's perceptions of 
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vulnerability to a negative health event—in this case, 
unplanned pregnancy. More specifically, it was expected that 
providing subjects with information about the risky 
contraceptive practices of a comparison target would 
exaggerate self-other differences regarding the risks for 
unplanned pregnancy. Such information was expected to have 
particular impact on high threat, high self-esteem individuals 
since these persons are most likely to be affected by efficacy 
messages that affirm their beliefs about themselves (cf. 
Cohen, 1959). At the same time, the threat feedback may 
motivate needs for self-enhancement and thereby result in a 
temporary increase in their already positive beliefs that they 
are unlikely to experience an unplanned pregnancy. As a 
result, high self-esteem, threatened subjects were expected to 
demonstrate the greatest increases in self-other risk 
estimates for an unplanned pregnancy. 
Low self-esteem persons, on the other hand, tend to be 
less responsive to evidence that they are more efficacious 
than another person. After all, such information doesn't tend 
to support their overall self-view (Cohen, 1959). Therefore, 
even in light of information that their contraceptive behavior 
is more effective than that of a downward comparison target, 
these subjects were expected to demonstrate less change in 
their comparative risk bias. 
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An additional test was designed to assess whether changes 
in comparative risk estimates involve changes in self- or 
other-perceptions. The procedures of the study are such that 
all subjects engage in an initial review of their own 
contraceptive practices. If the review of self and others' 
conduct disrupts peoples' usual egocentric tendency and thus 
affects perceptions of others' risk, as found by Weinstein 
(1980) and Sanders (1982), subjects who receive the downward 
comparison information following a review of their own 
behavior were expected to demonstrate the greatest changes in 
other-risk estimates. Review of only self-conduct capitalizes 
on individuals' egocentrism and is thought to be related to 
changes in self-risk estimates. In keeping with Weinstein and 
Lachendro's (1982) results, subjects in the current study who 
review their own contraceptive behavior, but not that of the 
comparison target, were expected to demonstrate the greatest 
amount of self-perception change. 
Self-esteem and mood. The final area of inquiry involved 
assessing the effect of DC, under varying conditions of 
threat, on subjects' self-esteem and mood. Consistent with 
the separate lines of research on the impact of DC on mood or 
self-esteem, it was expected that the presence of low or high 
threat information will affect subjects' mood states and 
global self-esteem differently. Specifically, under 
conditions of high threat, low self-esteem, downward 
73 
comparison subjects are expected to demonstrate the greatest 
amount of mood improvement. Under conditions of low threat, 
low self-esteem, downward comparison subjects are expected to 
demonstrate improvements in self-esteem. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Ethics Review 
The Iowa State University Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects In Research reviewed this project and concluded that 
the rights and welfare of the human subjects were adequately 
protected, that risks were outweighed by the potential 
benefits and expected value of the knowledge sought, that 
confidentiality of data was assured, and that Informed consent 
was obtained by appropriate procedures. 
Subject Selection 
Subjects were selected from a pool of female 
undergraduates who participated in mass-testing sessions 
conducted during the 1990-91 school year. Approximately 23% 
of the women participating in mass testing refused to complete 
the screening questionnaires relevant to this study, reducing 
the sample pool from 850 to approximately 650 women. 
Additional screening on the basis of self-esteem, sexual 
activity, and contraceptive use (to be described in greater 
detail in the following paragraphs) further reduced the sample 
of potential participants to approximately 180. Of these 
women, 102 participated in the experiment portion of the 
current study. 
The selection of potential subjects from the mass-testing 
pool was conducted in two phases. First, subjects were 
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selected on the basis of their global self-esteem scores as 
measured by the modified version of the Janis-Field (JF) 
"Feelings of Inadequacy Scale" (Eagly, 1967/ Janis & Field, 
1959). The classification of high and low self-esteem mass-
testing subjects was made by using cutoff scores that were 2 
points on either side of the distribution median (JF score of 
50). Thus, the potential pool of high self-esteem subjects 
included women with JF scores less 4 9 (n = 353; JF M = 41) 
whereas the potential pool of low self-esteem subjects 
included those women with JF scores greater than 51 (n = 407; 
JF M = 61; note: some participants who refused to participate 
are included in the self-esteem categorization ns). Women 
with scores between 4 9 and 51 were not eligible for selection 
in the current study. For the current study, fifty-four women 
(M JF = 41) were selected from the high self-esteem, mass-
testing pool and forty-three women (M JF = 61) were drawn from 
the low self-esteem end of the distribution. 
Potential subjects who met the self-esteem restrictions 
were screened a second time on the basis of their prior sexual 
activity and contraceptive use. Participants were selected 
for study participation if they (a) had engaged in sexual 
intercourse at least once per month over the three months 
prior to mass testing, and (b) had consistently used a 
contraceptive method with a "typical use" effectiveness rating 
greater than 90% (Hatcher et al., 1984). Thirty-four percent 
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of the mass-testing sample fit these criteria. For the sample 
of women participating in the study, birth control pills were 
the most frequently reported current contraceptive method 
(68%), followed by condom (25%), a combination of the pill and 
condom (6%), and a combination of the condom and contraceptive 
sponge (1%). Subjects reported an average number of 3.1 
sexual partners over the course of their sexual history and 
had intercourse an average of 7.2 times per month prior to 
mass testing. All subjects were approximately 19 years old 
and were single (never married). 
Subject Attrition 
During experimental debriefing, five subjects reported 
suspicions about the study procedures, specifically stating 
that they felt either the threat manipulation or the social 
comparison information was contrived. These subjects were not 
included in the analyses, which produced a final experiment N 
of 97 subjects. Of those subjects, 82 agreed to return for 
the follow-up sessions. The primary reason for attrition at 
the time of follow-up was inability to contact study 
participants (nine subjects could not be contacted). Only two 
participants explicitly refused to participate in the follow-
up, although four others declined follow-up participation 
because they "had enough extra credit" or reported having no 
time available during the week before final examinations to 
participate in an experiment. 
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Measures 
The following description of the experimental dependent 
measures corresponds with four major data collection points 
(see Table 2 for an overview of questionnaire presentation) 
and has been adopted to coordinate the description of measures 
in the method section with the analyses reported in the 
results section. Measures administered at mass testing are 
referred to as Time 1 measures. Both Time 2 and Time 3 
measures were administered during the experiment proper. 
Those measures given prior to the downward comparison 
opportunity constituted the Time 2 measures, whereas the 
measures given following the comparison information are 
labeled as Time 3 measures. All measures administered during 
the follow-up session are listed as Time 4 measures. It is 
important to emphasize that not all of the primary dependent 
measures were collected at all four time intervals. For 
example, the first measurement of subjects' moods occurred at 
Time 2 (the pre-comparison interval), not Time 1 (mass 
testing). Other variables, such as perceptions of 
vulnerability and attitudes toward contraceptives, were first 
collected at mass testing—largely to reduce the number of 
questionnaires to be administered at the time of the 
experiment but also because these attitudinal dimensions 
presumably aren't as susceptible to temporary situational 
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Table 2 
Questionnaire Presentation 
Tlmm 1 (Hmas tmsting) 
- Modified Janis-Field (20-item scale) 
- Contraceptive Use/Opinion Survey 
a. Sexual/Contraceptive Use History 
b. Perceptions of Unplanned Pregnancy 
c. General Birth Control Opinion Survey 
d. Specific Birth Control Opinion Survey 
Tlwa 2 (Pzm-coiaparlaoit meaaures) 
- Wilder Social Awareness Inventory (threat manipulation) 
- Recorded Statement Evaluation (includes self adjective rating) 
- Wilder Social Awareness Evaluation 
- Janis-Field (10 item scale - Version A or B) 
- Mood I 
- Group Member Evaluation I (target adjective rating) 
Time 3 (Poat-aoapariaon meaauraa) 
- Group Member Contraceptive Evaluation (target contraceptive 
effectiveness rating - done in DCI conditions only) 
- Janis-Field (10 item scale - Version B or A) 
- Mood II 
- Discussion Group Questionnaire 
a. Group Member Evaluation II (target adjective rating) 
b. Specific Birth Control Opinion Survey 
c. Perceptions of Unplanned Pregnancy 
Time 4 (Follow up) 
- Modified Janis-Field (20 item scale) 
- Self adjective rating 
- Modified Contraceptive Use/Opinion Survey 
a. Sexual/Contraceptive Use History 
b. Perceptions of Unplanned Pregnancy 
c. Specific Birth Control Opinion Survey 
- Group Member Evaluation I (target adjective rating) 
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factors as is mood. Thus the temporal (i.e., time) labels are 
intended as merely a descriptive device designed to 
distinguish time intervals within the study. 
Mass testing (Time 1) 
Two questionnaires relevant to this study were 
administered during departmental mass-testing sessions. 
Subjects' mass-testing responses to the modified version of 
the Janis-Field "Feelings of Inadequacy" (JF) self-esteem 
measure (Eagly, 1967; Janis & Field, 1959) were used as the 
basis for assignment to high and low self-esteem conditions. 
To isolate the sample of sexually-active, effective 
contraceptors, a modified version of the Contraceptive Use and 
Opinion Survey (Gerrard, 1989; Gerrard & Warner, 1990; Reis, 
Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1993) was administered. This 
questionnaire contained four subscales. The first assessed 
subjects' sexual activity and contraceptive practices whereas 
the three remaining subscales measured subjects' opinions 
concerning likelihood estimates of unplanned pregnancy for 
themselves and others as well as their general and specific 
beliefs about the use of contraceptive methods. 
Janis-Field "Feelings of Inadequacy" scale. The modified 
Janis-Field (JF) contains 20 Likert type questions (see 
Appendix A). Ten questions reflect negative self-perceptions 
and 10 reflect positive self-perceptions (e.g., "How often do 
you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do well?". 
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"How often do you feel that you handled yourself well..."). 
Individual item scores range from 1 to 5 and indicate the 
relative frequency or intensity of the self-perception (e.g., 
very often or very pleased to practically never or very 
displeased). Negative self-perception items were reverse 
scored. Possible total score ranged from 20 to 100. The 
scale has been found to be both a reliable and valid measure 
of global self-esteem. For instance, Eagly (1967) reported 
split-half reliabilities of .72 and .88. Campbell, Chew, and 
Scratchley (1991) found high temporal stability for the 
measure (e.g., 3-month test-retest reliability = .92). 
Convergent validity has also been demonstrated between the 
Eagly version and the Rosenberg Self-esteem scale as indicated 
by a correlation of .82 between the two scales (O'Brien, 
1985). In the current study, the Time 1 reliability for this 
measure was also high (alpha = .90). 
Contraceptive use and opinion questionnaire. The 
modified Contraceptive Use and Opinion Survey consists of four 
subscales (see Appendix B). The Contraceptive Use subscale 
assesses subjects' sexual activity and contraceptive practices 
(e.g., number of sexual partners, frequency of intercourse, 
type of contraception used, consistency of contraceptive use, 
etc.). As mentioned earlier, subjects' responses to questions 
concerning type of contraceptive used and consistency of 
method use were included to identify effective contraceptors. 
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The Perceptions of Unplanned Pregnancy subscale includes 
8 questions that measure subjects' perceptions of their 
personal vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy while using 
their current contraceptive method, the vulnerability to 
unplanned pregnancy for other college women using a variety of 
contraceptive methods (i.e., current, birth control pills, 
nothing), subjects' personal vulnerability compared to that of 
other women using different methods of contraception, and the 
likelihood of unplanned pregnancy among the population of 
average college women (e.g., "What do you think the likelihood 
is that you will have an unplanned pregnancy within the next 
year ...?"). Subjects' perceptions of personal vulnerability 
using their current method as well as their vulnerability 
estimates for an average woman who uses no contraception were 
used as Time 1 measures in subsequent repeated measures 
analyses of self-other risk estimates. 
The General Birth Control Opinion subscale is a 9-item 
Likert type scale that was designed for this study to assess 
subjects' religious/moral beliefs regarding contraception 
(e.g., "Using contraception is morally or religiously 
wrong."). Responses range from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7). These items were included because all 
major religions have espoused doctrine concerning the morality 
of sexual conduct and, in more recent times, the morality of 
contraceptive use (Masters, Johnson, & Kolodny, 1985; 
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Parrlnder, 1980). While the clergy debate over which 
contraceptive methods may be used by their parishioners, many 
researchers note a discrepancy between religious beliefs and 
contraceptive practice. Specifically, religious beliefs have 
not been found to be significant predictors of actual 
contraceptive use (Schirm, Trussell, Menken, & Grady, 1982; 
Westoff & Jones, 1977) . However, it is still entirely 
plausible that an individual's religious or moral beliefs 
concerning contraceptive use could influence her judgments or 
beliefs surrounding a peer's contraceptive practice. Since 
indirect active DC in this experiment was expected to involve 
changes in subject's attitudes toward the target's 
contraceptive method, subjects' religious/moral beliefs about 
contraception were included as potential covariates (see 
Endnote 1). 
The Specific Birth Control Opinion subscale consists of 8 
Likert type questions that measured subjects' opinions 
concerning the likelihood that both they and the "average" 
college woman would use four different methods of 
contraception (e.g., "How likely would you be to use the pill 
if you were involved in a sexual relationship?", "How likely 
would the average college woman be to use the pill...."). The 
scale ranged from definitely would use (1) to definitely would 
not use (7). Subjects also indicated their approval of each 
of the four methods by placing a slash mark along a 12.7 cm 
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line anchored by strongly disapprove and strongly approve. 
Subjects* responses to the likelihood and approval questions 
for "no contraceptive method," the method used by the 
comparison target, were intended to be used as the Time 1 
measure of indirect active DC. 
Experiment (Times 2 and 3) 
The primary dependent measures in the experiment included: 
1. Pre-comparison (Time 2) and post-comparison 
manipulation (Time 3) measures of self-esteem, mood, and 
direct derogation of the comparison target. 
2. Post-comparison (Time 3) measures of indirect active 
DC of the comparison target (i.e., attitudes toward the 
target's contraceptive method) and perceptions of 
vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy. 
Self-esteem measures. Two shortened versions of the 
modified Janis-Field (JF-Version A and JF-Version B) were 
created for use as the Time 2 and Time 3 measures of self-
esteem. JF-Version A consisted of 10 randomly chosen items (5 
positive and 5 negative items) from the Eagly modification 
whereas JF-Version B consisted of the 10 remaining items (see 
Appendix C). The administration of JF-Version A and JF-
Version B were counterbalanced such that half the subjects 
received JF-Version A at Time 2 followed by JF-Version B at 
Time 3. The remaining half received the opposite presentation 
(i.e., JF-Version B followed by JF-Version A). The creation 
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of these two 10-item forms from the original 20-item scale was 
done to assess changes in self-esteem over time with less 
likelihood that subjects might suspect the empirical interest 
in self-esteem change. In a test of the psychometric 
properties of the split versions, the Time 1 20-item JF 
responses for a sample of 655 subjects drawn from the mass-
testing pool were separated into the items selected for the 
Times 2 and 3 versions (JF-version A and JF-version B). The 
correlation obtained in this procedure (r = .79) was well 
within the range of split-half reliabilities reported by Eagly 
(1967). Moreover, a correlation of .79 was obtained in a 
similar analysis of Time 1 JF scores for subsequent experiment 
participants (see Endnote 2) and reliabilities for JF-Version 
A and JF-Version B were .86 and .78, respectively (see Endnote 
3). Thus, the subscale splitting procedure was implemented in 
the current experiment. 
Mood indices. Two mood indices, each consisting of four 
positive and four negative mood adjectives, were created to 
measure mood change from Time 2 to Time 3 (cf. Gibbons, 1986; 
Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989). The Time 2 mood adjectives were 
delivered following the threat manipulation, but immediately 
prior to subjects receiving any information concerning the 
comparison target (see Appendix C). The Time 3 mood 
adjectives, polar opposites of the Time 2 mood adjectives, 
were administered immediately following the downward 
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comparison information (DCI conditions; see Appendix D) or 
following a brief delay (No DCI conditions; see Appendix E). 
Subjects indicated the degree to which each adjective 
reflected their current emotional state by placing a slash 
mark along a line anchored with not at all and very. The use 
of the polar opposites and the measured line (as opposed to a 
Likert type scale) was implemented to reduce the possibility 
that subjects would purposefully duplicate their Time 2 mood 
responses. Computed indices for both Time 2 and Time 3 mood 
were calculated by adding the scores for the four positive 
adjectives and for the four negative adjective to create 
positive and negative mood subscales. An overall mood index 
was calculated by subtracting the negative item subtotal from 
the positive item subtotal. Possible scores on the mood 
indices at Time 2 and Time 3 range from - 50.8, indicating a 
negative mood, to + 50.8, a positive mood. Reliabilities for 
the indices were quite strong with alphas measuring .90 at 
both T2 and T3 (see Endnote 4). 
Direct active DC measures. Two sets of measures relevant 
to the hypotheses concerning direct active DC (target 
derogation) were administered during the experiment—one 
measure assessed subjects' opinions of the comparison target 
whereas the other assessed opinions of self. The Time 2 
rating of the comparison target was provided by an 8-adjective 
index that consisted of four positive adjectives (e.g., 
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sincere, loyal) and four negative adjectives (e.g., 
unpleasant, reckless; see Endnote 5), whereas the Time 3 
measure consisted of the polar opposite forms of these 
adjectives. Subjects were asked to rate the extent to which 
the comparison target possessed each disposition by placing a 
slash mark along a 10.2 cm line anchored by not at all and 
very. Item scores were subtotaled into separate positive and 
negative disposition subscales and an overall target rating 
index score was calculated by subtracting the negative 
subscale from the positive subscale. These indices were found 
to be internally consistent (alphas: T2 = .75 and T3 = .77). 
Subjects completed the Time 2 index after hearing the target's 
social history tape (see Appendix E) and the Time 3 index 
either after hearing the target's contraceptive history 
statement (DCI conditions) or after a brief waiting period (No 
DCI conditions). Scores for the Time 2 and Time 3 indices 
were analyzed for change in perceptions of the target as 
evidence of active downward comparison processes. 
An index, similar to the one measuring subjects' ratings 
of the comparison target, was designed to measure their 
ratings of self at Time 2. The index was also found to be 
reliable (alpha = .71) . Items on this scale were identical to 
those on the target rating index administered at Time 3 and 
was used to determine differences in perceptions of self 
versus comparison target prior to downward comparison. 
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Indirect active DC measure. Subjects' Time 3 responses 
to the Specific Birth Control Opinion sub-scale were obtained 
as part of the discussion group questionnaire at the end of 
the experiment (see Appendix F). This subscale, like the Time 
1 version, contained approval and likelihood of use ratings 
for the birth control pill, the condom, withdrawal, and no 
contraception (unprotected sexual intercourse). Subjects' 
approval and likelihood of use ratings for "no contraception", 
the comparison target's method of contraception, were measured 
for use as a computed index of Indirect active DC at Time 3. 
Perceived vulnerability. The post-comparison (Time 3/ 
see Appendix F) measure of perceived vulnerability to 
unplanned pregnancy was also administered as part of the 
discussion group questionnaire and contained queries of 
vulnerability specific to self, other college women using no 
contraception, and self compared to other college women using 
no contraception. These responses, in addition to the Time 1 
perceptions of vulnerability estimates, were used in repeated 
measures analyses pertaining to bias increase, and alterations 
in self- vs. other-perceptions of risk. 
Manipulation checks. Aside from these primary dependent 
measures, several questions were administered for the purpose 
of checking the effectiveness of the threat and DC information 
manipulation. Among the most important manipulation checks 
were subjects' responses to two questions measuring their 
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perceptions of the target's contraceptive effectiveness. In 
one case, subjects responded to the question "In your opinion, 
how effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior in 
preventing pregnancy?" by placing a slash mark along a 12.7 cm 
line. Low scores indicated that subjects viewed the target's 
contraceptive effectiveness as extremely ineffective, whereas 
high scores indicated ratings of her contraceptive practice as 
extremely effective. A manipulation check was also conducted 
on subjects' perceptions of the comparative contraceptive 
effectiveness between themselves and the target. This 
question was measured so that low scores on the 0 to 12.7 cm 
scale indicated that the target was the more effective 
contraceptor in this comparison and high scores indicated that 
the subject was more effective. Mid-range scores indicated 
similarity in contraceptive effectiveness. 
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, it was 
important to measure the extent of subjects' perceived 
similarity to the comparison target prior to receiving DC 
information (cf. Festinger, 1954; Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991; 
Goethals & Darley, 1977) . A similarity manipulation check was 
conducted on the question "How similar is this woman to you?", 
which was measured after subjects had heard the target's 
social history statements. Strong perceptions of similarity 
to the target were coded as high scores on the 12.7 cm scale 
whereas low scores on the scale indicated low similarity. 
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The primary manipulation check for threat involved 
measuring subjects' satisfaction with their scores on the 
Wilder Social Awareness Inventory. Like the previous 
manipulation checks, this question required that subjects make 
a slash mark on a 12.7 cm line but in this case the anchors 
were not at all satisfied (0) and extremely satisfied (12.7). 
Ratings of the importance of the social awareness trait were 
measured, again using a 12.7 cm line with high scores 
indicating greater ratings of importance and were used to 
provide additional information concerning the impact of the 
threat feedback. Although the primary threat manipulation 
check was the satisfaction question, it should be noted that 
the Time 2 mood measures would also indicate the effectiveness 
of the threat manipulation in that threatened subjects should 
respond with lower mood scores than those reported by non-
threatened subjects. 
All remaining questions administered during the 
experiment (e.g., subjects' perceptions of the ease of making 
the tape recorded presentation, their opinions about 
discussion groups) were intended solely to enhance the cover 
story provided at the introduction of the study and subjects' 
responses to them were irrelevant to the central empirical 
questions. 
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Follow up (Time 4) 
Approximately six weeks after participation in the 
experiment, subjects who had consented to follow-up 
participation (at the time of experimental debriefing) were 
contacted to participate in a follow-up session. During the 
follow-up session they completed the following series of 
questionnaires: the modified version of the Janis-Field (full 
20 item scale) and the Contraceptive Use and Opinion Survey (a 
brief form of the mass-testing version; see Appendices Q and 
R). The latter questionnaire contained questions about 
subjects' contraceptive practices since participation in the 
experiment as well as a Time 4 measure of their evaluations of 
themselves and the downward comparison target (i.e., direct 
active DC), their responses to the Specific Birth Control 
Opinion Survey (i.e., indirect active DC), and their 
perceptions of vulnerability for unplanned pregnancy for self, 
other college women not using contraception, and self compared 
to other college women not using contraception. 
The self and comparison target indices of direct active 
DC were identical to those used at Time 2 and retained high 
levels of reliability (alphas: self index T4 = .74; comparison 
target index T4 = .80), Questions assessing indirect active 
DC and perceptions of vulnerability were identical to those 
used at all previous data collection points. 
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Procedure 
Mass testing 
Mass-testing sessions were conducted during the Fall and 
Spring semesters of the 1990-1991 academic year. The mass-
testing subjects (approx. 640 male and 850 female) were 
undergraduate students taking introductory-level psychology 
courses who sought extra credit points for their mass-testing 
participation. Female subjects were provided with a brief 
verbal description of the mass testing (Time 1) questions for 
this experiment. Consent procedures also included verbal and 
written notification that they had the option to refuse to 
answer any part of or all of the screening questionnaire (see 
Appendix G). 
Experiment 
Approximately 1 to 4 weeks following mass-testing 
sessions, mass-testing participants who met the self-esteem 
and effective contraceptor classifications were contacted via 
telephone and asked if they were interested in earning extra 
credit points for participating in a psychology experiment 
lasting approximately 70 minutes. The study was described as 
a "simulated discussion group." Any questions concerning the 
study, which were rare, were addressed. Appointments for 
experiment participation were arranged after subjects had 
agreed to engage in the research. 
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Introductory remarks. Upon subjects* arrival at the 
laboratory, a female experimenter briefly described the study 
as one concerning discussion group processes (see Appendix H 
for experimenter's script). The basis for subject selection 
for participation in the study was explained (i.e., they had 
all participated in mass testing and were selected due to 
their mass-testing responses). The discussion topic, 
contraceptive use, was introduced and discussion group 
procedures were reviewed. More specifically, given the highly 
personal nature of the discussion topic, subjects were told 
that the discussion group procedure would not involve the 
face-to-face interaction frequently used in conventional 
discussion groups. Rather, they would be asked to make tape-
recorded statements concerning their social and contraceptive 
use histories while seated in private laboratory rooms and 
then these tapes would be interchanged among the group members 
to simulate the exchange of information that typically occurs 
in discussion groups. Given the sensitive nature of the 
discussion material, particular care was taken to address 
subjects' concerns about confidentiality regarding this 
procedure and their personal statements. Additionally, 
subjects were given several opportunities to ask questions 
about the procedure. Consent forms were distributed following 
this explanation (see Appendix I). No subject refused further 
participation. 
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After completing their consent statements, all subjects 
were escorted by the experimenter to one of the 4 experiment 
rooms where, as a group, they were shown the use of the 
intercom system, the procedures for using the tape recorder, 
and the location of the experimental materials. Following 
this explanation, subjects were seated in individual rooms. 
The experimenter was seated in the laboratory control room 
where she presented the remainder of the experimental 
instructions over the intercom system. The first 
questionnaire was administered following a systems check of 
the intercom system. 
Social awareness. The experimental design for the study 
included a manipulation of threatening/non-threatening 
information. To accomplish this manipulation, subjects were 
led to believe that one of the functions of the present study 
was to investigate how differing levels of a (fabricated) 
trait called "social awareness" affected discussion group 
interactions. With that in mind, subjects were told that 
research indicated that some individual participant 
characteristics have been found to play an important role in 
discussion group processes. One such individual difference, a 
trait described as "social awareness," was to be examined as 
part of the current experiment. Subjects were told that one 
measure of social awareness had been administered during mass 
testing. A second measure of social awareness, referred to as 
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the Wilder Social Awareness Inventory, was the first 
questionnaire to be completed in the current experiment (see 
Appendix J). After subjects completed the Wilder (which was 
actually a bogus questionnaire containing 7 face-valid 
questions about other peoples' attitudes and opinions on 
"current social issues"), the scale was collected, ostensibly 
to be scored. 
Personal history statements. After the Wilder had been 
collected, subjects reviewed an information sheet containing 
the instructions for recording their social and contraceptive 
histories (see Appendix K). These instructions were also 
summarized by the experimenter. Subjects were asked to record 
2-3 minute statements about their social history (e.g., family 
background, school activities, leisure preferences, etc.) and 
then, after a 5-second silence on the tape, record a 1-2 
minute statement about their contraceptive use history (e.g., 
their sexual activity status, usual contraceptive method, use 
of their method, etc.). After recording their statements, 
subjects completed a Recorded Statement Evaluation (see 
Appendix L) that measured their evaluations of their own 
recorded statements for ease in presentation, perceived 
similarity to other persons making similar such statements, 
etc. These questions were designed solely to reinforce the 
cover story that the study was primarily concerned with 
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discussion group processes (i.e., how people feel about being 
in them, talking about themselves, etc.). 
Threat manipulation. The tape-recorded statements were 
collected at this point and subjects waited under the pretense 
that their recorded statements were being rewound for the 
forthcoming tape information exchange. During the waiting 
period, the threat manipulation was administered. Subjects 
were again reminded that one of the purposes of the study was 
to examine important dimensions of discussion group 
functioning including an individual's trait levels of social 
awareness. Subjects were given a feedback sheet summarizing 
their combined responses to the questionnaire they completed 
at mass testing (referred to as "the Norman Social Acumen 
Scale") and during the experimental session (the "Wilder 
Social Awareness Inventory"; see Appendix M)). Subjects 
assigned to the Low Threat condition were told that, in 
comparison with other ISU college students, they had performed 
fairly well on the two scales, obtaining scores at the 93rd 
and 89th percentiles (respectively) on the two measures. On 
the other hand, subjects in the High Threat condition were 
told they had not done very well (having received percentile 
scores of 39 and 34, respectively). 
After allowing subjects time to review their scores, they 
were asked to complete a Wilder Inventory Evaluation form 
including two questions concerning the degree to which they 
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were satisfied with their scores on the scale and their rating 
of the general importance of the "social awareness" trait 
(refer back to Appendix C). Both questions were designed as 
manipulation checks for threat. Following their evaluation of 
the Wilder feedback, subjects also completed the Time 2 
measures of the JF-Version A or B and the Mood I 
questionnaire. 
Comparison manipulation. At this point, subjects 
received a "rewound" tape and were told that it contained the 
social and contraceptive history statements made by another 
member of the discussion group. As described earlier, the 
tape actually contained pre-recorded statements describing the 
social background of a fairly typical college woman and the 
contraceptive history statement of an ineffective contraceptor 
target (i.e., a woman who did not use a contraceptive method 
but who was sexually active; see Appendix N). Using 
headphones, participants listened first to the target's tape 
recorded social history and, in keeping with the cover story, 
then evaluated the information in that statement for ease of 
presentation, comparability to their own statement, etc. 
Manipulation checks on subjects' perceptions of social 
similarity to target and their evaluation of dispositional 
attributes of the target were measured using the Time 2 
Opinion of Group Member scale (see Appendix E). 
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Subjects in the contraceptive information (DC) conditions 
then listened to the target's contraceptive history 
information and again evaluated that information for 
presentation style, etc. Manipulation checks on subjects' 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the target's contraceptive 
behavior in addition to their perceptions of the comparability 
of their contraceptive use to that of the target were also 
obtained (see Appendix D). Like subjects in the contraceptive 
information (DCI) conditions, subjects assigned to the no 
contraceptive information (No DCI) conditions listened to the 
social history portion of the recorded target statement and 
evaluated the comparison target's social history statement. 
They did not, however, listen to the contraceptive history 
portion of the tape nor did they complete the evaluation based 
on this information but rather these subjects waited without 
activity for a 2-3 minute time period. This waiting period 
was included to ensure that the time interval between Time 2 
and Time 3 measures was similar for both DCI and No DCI 
subjects. 
Concluding measures. Immediately following the No DCI or 
DCI manipulations, all subjects completed the Time 3 measures 
for the JF-Version A/B and Mood II (see Appendices E and D). 
The experiment was drawn to a close with the completion of the 
Discussion Group questionnaire, which contained the remaining 
Time 3 primary dependent measures: subjects' ratings of the 
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comparison target (direct active DC), their approval and 
likelihood of use ratings for the four specific contraceptive 
methods (indirect active DC), and their perceptions of 
vulnerability for unplanned pregnancy for self, other women 
not using contraception and self compared to other women 
(perception of vulnerability; see Appendix F). 
Experiment debriefing. Participants were debriefed as a 
group and progressively probed for general and/or specific 
suspicions concerning experimental instructions or procedures. 
A structured debriefing concerning the comparison target tape 
manipulation was used. Subjects were told that the tape they 
heard was not made by any member of their group but that the 
information on the tape was true and provided by an actual ISU 
student describing her social and contraceptive histories. 
The bogus nature and purpose of the social awareness measures 
(the threat manipulation) was discussed. It was explained 
that subjects were deceived along this dimension so that 
different reactions to social information following negative 
or positive personal information could be studied and 
emphasized that no measures of their personal abilities 
regarding social awareness obtained during the experiment were 
valid. Consent to listen to the participants' recorded 
statements for the purpose of obtaining more specific 
information from their statements was requested and tape 
analysis consent statements distributed (see Appendix 0). 
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Resource information concerning discussion groups and area 
service agencies providing information concerning 
contraception and additional personal conversation with the 
experimenter was offered. 
Follow-up. Approximately six weeks after participating 
in the experiment, the subjects who had indicated during 
experiment debriefing that they would be willing to return for 
the follow-up session were contacted via telephone. Follow-up 
sessions were held in classrooms or the experimenter's office 
suite with 1 to 6 participants attending each session. 
Privacy was increased through alternate seating arrangements 
(i.e., placing empty seats between participants as they 
completed the questionnaires). Because six weeks had passed 
since subjects' participation in the experiment, the female 
experimenter or a female assistant reviewed the experimental 
procedure and the deceptions, including the threat 
manipulation and tape manipulation, upon their arrival at the 
follow-up session. 
The follow-up questions were described as similar to 
those administered during mass testing and the experiment. 
Subjects were allowed ample, time to ask questions concerning 
follow-up and experimental procedures. Resource information 
or further conversation with the experimenter was again 
offered. After completing a follow-up consent statement, 
subjects completed the 20-item modified Janis-Field and a 
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brief form of the Contraceptive Use and Opinion Survey 
questionnaire. The latter questionnaire contained post-
experimental measures of sexual activity and contraceptive 
method use and the follow-up measures of perceived 
vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy, indirect active DC 
(contraceptive method derogation), and direct active DC 
(comparison target derogation; see Appendices P, Q, and R). 
No subject refused to complete the follow-up questionnaire 
after arriving for the session. 
It should be reiterated that ethical debriefing practices 
obligated informing subjects of all major experimental 
manipulations and deceptions prior to their departure from the 
original experiment. Additionally, the review of the 
experiment was incorporated into the follow-up procedure so as 
to refresh subjects' memories of the comparison target because 
one of the follow-up questions focused on subjects' post-
experiment impressions of this woman. It is possible that 
subjects' responses on Time 4 measures were affected by any 
number of factors including reactance to the information 
contained in the experimental debriefing procedures or the 
follow-up review of the experiment, the mere passage of time, 
or perhaps some other extraneous intervening events occurring 
between the time of the experiment and the follow-up. 
Therefore, all analyses concerning persistence of changes in 
attitudes toward the target, contraceptive methods, or 
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perceptions of vulnerability throughout follow-up were viewed 
as only exploratory. 
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RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
Two dimensions were manipulated in the current study: 
comparison information and threatening feedback. Separate 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) using unweighted means due to 
unequal cell sizes were conducted for the manipulation checks 
of these interventions. 
Downward Comparison Manipulation 
To establish the effectiveness of the downward comparison 
manipulation, it was first necessary to demonstrate that, 
prior to receiving any of her contraceptive information, 
subjects felt the target was similar to themselves (cf. 
Festinger, 1954/ Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1992) . Festinger 
(1954) noted that the tendency for social comparison decreased 
as differences between self and a comparison other increased. 
Thus, if these participants felt they were significantly 
different from the comparison target on dimensions other than 
contraception, they might not regard her as a valid source of 
social comparison information. Second, since contraceptive 
practice constituted the primary comparison dimension, it was 
important to demonstrate that subjects viewed the target as a 
generally "ineffective" contraceptor and, more importantly, 
that they saw her contraceptive practice as clearly worse than 
their own. 
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Social similarity. A 2 x 2 x 2 (High/Low SE x High/Low 
Threat x DCI/No DCI)) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted to compare similarity ratings across conditions 
prior to the DC manipulation. No significant differences 
across conditions were noted (all £S > .1). Moreover, the 
cell means ranged from 6.3 to 8.5 (scale mid-point = 6.3) 
indicating that subjects rated the target as generally similar 
to themselves. The target was also viewed as fairly similar 
to (or typical of) other ISU women as suggested by the trends 
across means from a 2 x 2 x 2 (SE x Threat x DCI) ANOVA on 
subjects' ratings of the target's similarity to other ISU 
women (all Ms > 7.9). These pre-downward comparison 
manipulation findings served as an important interpretive 
backdrop for determining the impact of the downward comparison 
(i.e., contraceptive) information. 
Contraceptive effectiveness. Two manipulation checks for 
effectiveness of the DC manipulation were conducted. A 2 x 2 
(SE X Threat) ANOVA was performed on ratings of the comparison 
target's contraceptive effectiveness provided by subjects in 
the DC information conditions. No main effects nor 
interactions were noted (all Fs < 1.65, £s > .20) and, most 
important, subjects viewed the target as an extremely 
ineffective contraceptor (Ms ranging from 1.2 to 2.7; scale 
m i d p o i n t  =  6 . 3 ) .  R e s u l t s  f r o m  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  2 x 2  ( S E  x  
Threat) ANOVA revealed that, when asked to make a comparison 
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between the target's contraceptive effectiveness and their 
own, subjects' overwhelming response was that they were the 
more effective contraceptor (Ms = 11.5 to 11.7 on a 0 - 12.7 
scale). In combination, these results provide fairly 
convincing evidence that subjects viewed the target as a 
highly ineffective contraceptor and, thus, a downward 
comparison target on this dimension. 
Threat Manipulation 
Threat was manipulated by providing subjects with 
fictitious personal "scores" on two social awareness trait 
measures. Clearly, the most straightforward, albeit obvious, 
check for this manipulation would have been to simply ask 
subjects how threatened they felt by this feedback. To avoid 
the demand that would result from such a question, however, a 
less transparent question was administered. Subjects' 
satisfaction with their social awareness score was assessed 
under the assumption that high threat subjects would report 
significantly lower satisfaction ratings than would low threat 
subjects. The anticipated threat main effect obtained from a 
2x2x2 ANOVA conducted on the satisfaction ratings was 
highly significant, F(l,89) = 716.76, p <.001, as high threat 
subjects were much less satisfied with their scores than were 
low threat subjects (Ms = 3.3 and 10.2, respectively). 
Additional effects included a significant DCI main 
effect, F(l,89) = 4.84, £ = .03, as well as a SE x Threat 
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interaction, F (1,89) = 7.0, £ = .01. The main effect revealed 
that the DCI subjects were more satisfied with their scores 
than were No DCI subjects. Because the threat manipulation 
check occurred prior to the presentation of the downward 
comparison information, this main effect represents a nuisance 
effect but does suggest that expected results in the primary 
analyses might be weakened somewhat by these systematic 
differences in reactions to the threat feedback. The SE x 
Threat interaction revealed that low SE, high threat subjects 
rated the least satisfaction with their scores while low SE, 
low threat subjects rated the greatest satisfaction. This 
observation is consistent with Cohen's (1959) conclusion that 
low self-esteem individuals are particularly sensitive to 
feedback information. 
Overall, the evidence from the satisfaction question 
suggested that the threat manipulation was reasonably 
effective. The significance of the threat main effect is 
amplified by an additional finding concerning subjects' 
ratings for the importance of social awareness as a personal 
trait. Results from a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA on importance ratings 
revealed a main effect of threat, F (1, 89) = 31 .42, £ < .001, 
such that high threat subjects rated the trait as less 
important than did their low threat counterparts. Moreover, 
the means across conditions were all well above the scale mid­
point suggesting that the trait was, in fact, viewed as 
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important. This finding bolstered the differences noted 
earlier on the satisfaction ratings thereby implying that low 
scores would most likely have been viewed as particularly 
threatening by most subjects. 
Primary Dependent Measures 
The empirical questions of central importance in the 
current study involved assessing changes in subjects' 
subjective well-being, attitudes toward self, the comparison 
target, and the target's contraceptive method, and perceptions 
of vulnerability for unplanned pregnancy for self and others 
as a result of the downward comparison opportunity. 
Consequently, the primary statistical analyses consisted of 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using 
unweighted means. It was expected that the downward 
comparison opportunity would have an immediate impact on 
subjects' mood and self-esteem; therefore, repeated measures 
ANOVA were conducted on those variables at Time 2 (i.e., the 
pre-comparison level) and Time 3 (the post-comparison level of 
the variable). It was possible that downward comparison might 
have both immediate and long-term effects on the remaining 
dependent measures, target and target method ratings (direct 
and indirect DC) and perceptions of vulnerability. 
Consequently, in addition to the primary T1-T3 or T2-T3 
repeated measures analyses for those variables, a set of 
exploratory repeated measures that included three time 
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intervals (T1-T3-T4 or T2-T3-T4) were conducted on these 3 
variables. 
Mood 
It was expected that high threat, low self-esteem 
subjects in the downward comparison conditions would 
demonstrate the greatest amount of mood improvement (cf. 
Gibbons, 1986; Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991). The computed 
general mood indices for Time 2 and Time 3 were used as 
dependent measures in the repeated measures analysis of mood 
change. Potential differences in pre-comparison mood states 
prior to the downward comparison opportunity were also tested. 
Pre-comparison mood. A 2 x 2 x 2 (SE x Threat x DCI) 
ANOVA was conducted on pre-comparison mood (T2), which had 
been assessed immediately following the threat manipulation. 
This analysis revealed main effects for SE, F (1,88) = 21.41, £ 
< .001) and for Threat, F(l, 88) = 9.74, jg = .002. Subjects 
with high SE reported more positive mood than did those with 
low SE (Ms = 25.7 and 14.2, respectively). Low threat 
subjects reported more positive mood than did high threat 
subjects (Ms = 23.8 and 16.1). This latter finding appears 
consistent with the assertion that the threat manipulation was 
effective. 
Mood change. A2x2x2x2 (SE x Threat x DCI x Time) 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed to test the assumption 
that overall mood would improve following an opportunity for 
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downward comparison. This analysis compared mood responses 
from T2 and T3 and produced a significant main effect for 
time, F (1, 84) = 7.63, £ < .01, as subjects tended to 
demonstrate improvements in mood (see Table 3). Two 
interactions were also noted. The first was a Threat x Time 
interaction, F (1, 84) = 9.22, £ < .01, reflecting the fact that 
high threat subjects' moods became significantly more positive 
than that of low threat subjects (change scores = + 5.1 and -
.3, respectively). In addition, there was a SE x Threat x 
Time interaction, F(l,84) = 4.46, £ < .04/ the pattern was 
such that the mood change of low SE, high threat subjects 
tended to be greater than those of other subjects (see Endnote 
6). The predicted SE x Threat x DCI x Time interaction was 
not significant (£ = .35). The additional variance that the 
responses from the No DCI (control) subjects contributed to 
the analysis may explain this observation. 
It should be noted, however, that within-subjects t-tests 
revealed a significant change score only for low self-esteem, 
high threat, downward comparison subjects, t(84)= 4.44, £ < 
.0001; ts for all other conditions were less than 1.68. 
Additionally, an a priori orthogonal contrast comparing the 
low self-esteem, downward comparison, threatened subjects (M = 
11.1) with the combined subjects from the remaining conditions 
(M = 1.2) did produce a significant difference in the 
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Table 3 
Mean mood scores (Time 2, Time 3, and change score) 
DC information subjects 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 10) 
Low threat (n = 14) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 
Low threat (n = 7) 
No DC information subjects 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 
Low threat (n = 17) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 10) 
Low threat (n = 12) 
Change 
Time 2 Time 3 Score 
23.4 25.2 + 1,8 
26.9 27.5 + .6 
9.3 20.4 +11.1* 
19.3 18.5 - .8 
27.0 30.3 + 3.3 
28.6 29.8 + 1.2 
7.8 12.2 + 4.4 
18.7 16.7 - 2.0 
Notes; 
1. Possible scores on the mood indices at Time 2 and Time 3 range from 
- 50.8, indicating a predominantly negative mood, to + 50.8, a 
positive mood. Valence signs on the mood change score indicate the 
direction in which mood moved (i.e., negative sign = mood worsened; 
positive sign = mood improved). 
2. * = within-subjects t-tests indicate mood change in this cell was 
significant at £ < .05; between-subjects t-tests indicate this cell 
differed significantly from all remaining cells (all £s < .05). 
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predicted direction (^(84) = 5.25/ £ < .0001). Thus, the 
pattern of results did conform to predictions. A significant 
difference was also noted in a specific contrast between low 
self-esteem, threatened subjects in DCI vs. the No DCI control 
condition, t(84) = 2.62, £ < .01—a particularly noteworthy 
finding as it extends the results reported in previous 
research by more clearly indicating that it was the DC 
information that was responsible for mood improvement for 
these subjects (see Endnote 7). Most previous studies had 
provided upward or lateral comparison information and did not 
provide a "no comparison" opportunity for statistical 
contrast. 
Internal analyses. To check the comparability of the 
current findings with the mood change findings demonstrated in 
previous studies conducted by Gibbons and colleagues, separate 
analyses were conducted on the mood responses from DCI 
subjects. Because No DCI (i.e., control) conditions were not 
included in those earlier studies, the most direct comparison 
of the results of the current study with previous findings 
would occur by analyzing the results for the DCI subjects 
only. A 2 X 2 (SE x Threat) repeated measures analyses 
revealed three significant findings. A main effect for Time, 
F(l,38) = 5.57, £ = .02, and a Threat x Time interaction, 
F (1,38) = 5.96, £ = .02, were obtained with trends identical 
to those obtained in the full design analyses. More 
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important, the expected SE x Threat x Time interaction, 
F (1, 38) = 4.07, £ = .05, was obtained. Trend analyses 
revealed mood improvements reported for low SE, high threat 
subjects that were significantly different from those of 
subjects in the three remaining conditions (all ts > 3.56, £s 
< .05). Thus, the pattern of results for the DCI subjects in 
the current study replicated the findings noted in previous 
studies that had not used control (No DCI) condition designs 
(cf.. Gibbons, 1986; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1988; see Endnote 8). 
Self-Esteem 
As was the case in the Reis et al. (1993) study, self-
esteem was assessed at T2 and T3 to investigate the impact of 
downward comparison on this measure of subjective well-being. 
Consistent with findings of that study, it was predicted that 
significant improvements in self-esteem would occur for low 
self-esteem, downward comparison subjects under conditions of 
low threat. This prediction reflects the assumption that 
changes in self-esteem that occur as a function of social 
comparison information are most likely to occur in the absence 
of threat-provoked emotional states. 
Pre-comparison equivalences and scaling order effects. A 
series of analyses were conducted to eliminate concerns about 
the presence of randomization error at T2 (pre-comparison) and 
determine whether the JF-A and JF-B 10-item versions of the 
self-esteem measure, which were to be used later in the 
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repeated measures analysis, were equivalent. At Time 2, half 
the subjects completed the JF-A subscale whereas the remaining 
subjects completed the JF-B subscale. Therefore, the test for 
s u b s c a l e  e q u i v a l e n c e  a t  T 2  i n v o l v e d  a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  ( S E  x  
Threat x DCI x Order) ANOVA with Time 2 JF-A and JF-B subscale 
scores as the dependent measure. Results revealed the 
expected main effect for self-esteem (F(l,81) = 73.71, p < 
.001), such that high and low self-esteem subjects differed 
significantly in their self-esteem levels. In addition, a 
marginal order (subscale) main effect was also observed 
(F(1,81) = 3.29, 2 = .07). Scores on the JF-B subscale tended 
to reflect higher self-esteem than the JF-A version; JF-B 
scores averaged .93 of JF-A scores. This finding suggested 
that the questions selected for JF-B and JF-A were tapping 
slightly different aspects of the self-esteem constructs 
measured by the Janis-Field modified scale. 
It should be noted that a further exploratory analysis of 
the self-esteem scores at T1 (mass testing) was also conducted 
to determine if this order effect pre-existed the T2 self-
esteem measure. All experimental subjects had taken the 20-
item Janis-Field at mass testing so, to perform this analysis, 
subjects' 20-item JF responses were divided into the JF-A and 
JF-B subscales (identical to those subsequently used in the T2 
analysis). Correlational analyses indicated that the JF-A and 
JF-B subscales at T1 were positively correlated (r = .79). A 
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2 x 2 x 2 x 2  ( S E  X  T h r e a t  x  D C I  x  O r d e r )  r e p e a t e d  m e a s u r e s  
ANOVA with subscale (or order) as the within-subjects variable 
was conducted to test for order differences. Results of this 
analysis also revealed an order main effect (F(l,89) = 14.75; 
£ < .001) with the JF-B subscale scores indicating higher 
self-esteem than the JF-A subscale scores. In this analysis, 
JF-B averaged .95 of JF-A. This result serves to confirm the 
assumption that the two subscales measure self-esteem somewhat 
differently. 
Because subscale differences at T2 would present a 
problem in subsequent repeated measures analyses for self-
esteem change, a correction weighting factor of 1.084 was 
calculated using the following formula (JF-A/JF-B = weight) 
and the JF-B scores were then multiplied by that weight. To 
confirm that the weighting factor eliminated the order main 
effect noted in the original T2 repeated measures analysis, 
the 2x2x2x2 (SE x Threat x DCI x Order) ANOVA was 
conducted a second time. This analysis produced the expected 
SE main effect (F(1,81) = 73.37, £ < .001), but no other main 
effects or interactions (all £ > .2). 
Self-esteem constancy. The T1 JF scores were used to 
classify subjects into the High and Low SE categories for 
experimental analyses. Thus, it was necessary to eliminate 
any concern that subjects might have been miscategorized due 
to changes in self-esteem during the time interval between 
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mass testing (Tl) and the experiment (T2). A2x2x2x2x 
2 (SE X Threat x DCI x Order x Time) repeated measures ANOVA 
was performed with self-esteem as the dependent measure and Tl 
and T2 as the Time within-subjects factor. At this point in 
the experiment the only anticipated significant result would 
have been a Threat x Time interaction, which would have 
provided additional support for the effectiveness of the 
threat manipulation. Instead, this analysis produced a main 
effect for Time, F(l,81) = 39.5, £ < .001. The trend was for 
most subjects to evidence improvements in self-esteem, even 
those individuals who had received the threatening feedback. 
Because it would be expected that an effective threat 
manipulation would have a negative impact on self-esteem, one 
plausible conclusion was that this particular threat 
manipulation, although it appeared to affect mood, did not 
have an impact on self-esteem. The absence of within-subjects 
interactions involving the self-esteem variable in these 
results did reduce concerns about miscategorization of 
subjects at T2, however. 
Self-esteem change; T2 and T3. Consistent with the 
findings in Reis et al. (1993), it was expected that 
significant changes in self-esteem would occur for low self-
esteem, low threat subjects following a DC opportunity. 
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  p r i m a r y  c h a n g e  a n a l y s i s  w a s  a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  
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X 2 (SE by Threat by DCI by Order by Time) repeated measure 
ANOVA with self-esteem as the dependent measure and Time as 
the within-subjects factor. The T2 weighting factor (1.084) 
was used for the JF-B subscale at both T2 and T3. Results for 
this analysis revealed a significant Order x Time interaction 
(F(l,81) = 8.61, £ = .004) in which subjects who completed the 
A/B order presentation demonstrated more negative self-esteem 
at T3 (change score = + .98) whereas those subjects who 
completed the B/A presentation improved in self-esteem (change 
score = - .94). It should be noted that this interaction was 
obtained in spite of the T2 adjustment for the JF-B scale. No 
further main effects nor interactions were obtained (see Table 
4). It would appear that, despite the use of the weighting 
factor, the order presentation of these subscales has an 
impact on subjects' responses. Similar effects were noted in 
a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the T2 and T3 
self-esteem scores for DC information subjects. 
In separate analyses conducted on the full design and on 
the DC information subjects only, the critical interactions 
(SE X Threat x DCI x Time and SE x Threat x Time, 
respectively) were not significant, £ > .30. It should be 
noted that the trends in means across the DC information 
conditions were similar to that found in Reis et al. (1993) in 
that the low self-esteem, low threat, downward comparison 
subjects demonstrated the largest increase in self-esteem. 
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Table 4 
Means for self-esteem 
DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 12) 
Low threat (n = 14) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 
Low threat (n = 10) 
No DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 
Low threat (n = 17) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 10) 
Low threat (n = 12) 
Time 2 
20.7 
19.5 
27.9 
2 8 . 8  
17.9 
19.1 
27.9 
27.6 
Time 3 
20.5 
19.9 
27.5 
28.1 
18.1 
19.1 
29.3 
27.6 
Change 
(T3-T2) 
- . 2  
+ .4 
-.4 
-.7 
+  . 2  
0 
+1.4 
0 
Notes : 
2. 
Index scores range from 10 to 50 with lower scores indicating higher 
self-esteem; higher scores represent low self-esteem. Thus, negative 
change scores indicate an increase in self-esteem whereas positive 
change scores indicate a decline in self-esteem. 
Although these means are collapsed across order, it is important to 
note that JF-Version B scores were calculated using the weighting 
factor. 
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Perceptions of Vulnerability 
Subjects were asked to estimate both their personal risk 
for an unplanned pregnancy as well as that for an average 
college woman who does not use a contraceptive method (a 
person whose contraceptive conduct was similar to that of the 
comparison target for the current study). These measures were 
taken at three points during the experiment (Time 1, Time 3, 
and Time 4). Two analyses, one of subjects' perceptions of 
risk for self and the other of their perceptions of risk for 
other, were conducted on Time 1 dependent measures of these 
risk perceptions (see Endnote 9). Neither analysis revealed 
significant main effects nor interactions (£s > .09) 
indicating that participants did not systematically differ in 
their self or other perceptions prior to participation in the 
study. The means in the self-risk analysis revealed that 
these subjects, all of whom used effective methods of 
contraception consistently, held fairly accurate perceptions 
of their personal risk for an unplanned pregnancy (Ms ranged 
from 3.6 to 9.9 on a scale of 1 to 100 where lower numbers 
indicated low likelihoods for pregnancy). On the other hand, 
the means for the risk perceptions of the average woman who 
uses no contraception reflected this type of target's 
likelihood of pregnancy (Ms ranged from 79.7 to 95.5)— 
particularly if subjects were assuming that this woman was 
sexually active on a regular basis. 
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Perception change. To test the impact of downward 
comparison on changes in perceptions of individual and 
comparative risk for unplanned pregnancy for both self and the 
a v e r a g e  w o m a n  w h o  u s e s  n o  c o n t r a c e p t i o n ,  a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  
(SE X Threat x DCI x Time x Target) repeated measures analyses 
with time (T1 and T3) and risk perception target (self or 
other woman using no contraception) as within-subjects factors 
was conducted. It was predicted that the information provided 
in the DC condition would result in the greatest changes 
(i.e., toward perceptions of less vulnerability) for high SE, 
high threat subjects—in other words, a SE x Threat x DCI x 
Time interaction. The extent to which the difference between 
self and other was a result of change in self or change in 
other-perception was also explored and a significant 5-way 
interaction was anticipated—a prediction that would require a 
fairly large effect size given the cell ns obtained in this 
particular study. 
These analyses revealed main effects for target (F(l,88) 
= 1226.44, £ < .001) and time (F(l,88) = 3.52, £ = .06) such 
that risk perceptions for self were significantly lower than 
were those for other and there was a trend for subjects to 
report less vulnerability over time for both self and other 
(see Table 5). Three unanticipated interactions were also 
revealed. A significant Threat x Time x Target interaction 
(F(1,88) = 4.61, £ = .03) indicated that high threat subjects 
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Table 5 
Means for perceptions of vulnerability (self and other woman 
using no contraception) 
Self Self Other other 
Time 2 Time 3 Time 2 Time 3 
DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 12) 
Low threat (n = 14) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 
Low threat (n = 10) 
2 . 1  
1.9 
3.1 
2.7 
2.1 
1.9 
2.9 
2 . 0  
9.2 
9.4 
9.8 
9.7 
8.9 
9.1 
9.2 
9.2 
No DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 2.5 
Low threat (n = 17) 1.9 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 9) 1.9 
low threat (n = 12) 3.1 
2 . 0  
2 . 1  
3.1 
2.5 
9.7 
8.9 
9.5 
9.7 
9.7 
9.7 
7.6 
9.7 
Notes: 
1. Due to skewed scores, square root transformations were performed on 
item scores; Transformed index scores range from 1 to 10 with lower 
scores indicating low probability for unplanned pregnancy. 
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tended to show the greatest reduction in risk perception for 
other. This observed result was further qualified by a SE x 
Threat x Time x Target interaction, (F(l,88) = 3.93, £ = .05), 
which revealed a tendency for low SE, high threat subjects to 
reduce their risk perception for others. The last of the 
three noted interactions, a SE x DCI x Time x Target 
interaction (F(l,88) = 3.94, £ = .05) was potentially the most 
noteworthy of the three since it involved the DC information 
factor. The pattern of effects across conditions lacked 
interpretable consistency, however. The predicted 
interactions, SE x Threat x DCI x Time and SE x Threat x DCI x 
Time X Target, failed to reach significance (£s of .55 and 
.16, respectively). 
Exploratory analyses; T1-T3-T4 perception change. An 
exploratory 2x2x2x3x2 (SE x Threat x DCI x Time x Risk 
Perception Target) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if changes in perceptions of vulnerability would 
emerge at any point over the mass testing (Tl), experiment 
(T3), and follow-up (T4) time intervals (see Endnote 10). 
Results of this analysis revealed effects generally similar to 
those of the T1/T3 repeated measure (i.e., main effects for 
Time and Risk Perception Target). The overall sample trend 
was for increasing levels of invulnerability across time. 
Differences between self- and other-perception continued to 
reveal low perceptions of vulnerability for self but 
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relatively high levels of vulnerability for other. The SE x 
Threat x Time x Target interaction indicated that, across the 
3 time measures, self-risk estimates tended to be increasingly 
less vulnerable whereas T3-T4 other-risk estimates remained 
consistent or tended toward minor regression to prior levels 
of vulnerability. 
Direct Active Downward Comparison 
To test the hypothesis that high SE, high threat subjects 
would engage in direct, active DC (i.e., derogation of the 
comparison target), subjects were asked to evaluate themselves 
and the comparison target during the experiment and at follow-
up. Time 2 adjective ratings for self were collected 
immediately following their tape recorded social and 
contraceptive histories—prior to the DC/No DCI manipulation. 
Ratings for the comparison target were collected at three 
times—twice during the experiment (pre- and post-comparison, 
T2 and T3) and once at follow-up (T4). Comparison target 
ratings indices for T2 and T4 were similar to those used for 
self-ratings. However, polar opposite forms of the adjectives 
were used at T3 to reduce the chances that subjects would 
observe that self and other ratings were an aspect of the 
study, which might have been the case if the same list was 
used repetitively. 
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Initial evaluations; self and target. To assess 
differences between subjects in their evaluations of self and 
of the comparison target prior to the DC opportunity, separate 
2x2x2 (SE by Threat by DCI) ANOVAs were conducted on T2 
self and target ratings. The analysis conducted on the self 
evaluation measure resulted in a main effect for self-esteem 
(F(l,89) = 3.91, p = .05) such that high self-esteem 
individuals rated themselves more favorably than did low self-
esteem individuals. No other main effects nor interactions 
were noted. The analysis conducted on the target evaluation 
produced no main effects nor interactions (all £S > .08). 
Initial differences in self vs. target. To determine the 
nature of subjects' self-perceptions compared to their 
perceptions of the comparison target prior to the DC 
opportunity, a2x2x2x2 (SE by Threat by DCI by Rating 
Target) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using T2 self-
and comparison target ratings as the repeated measure. No 
main effects nor interactions were obtained (all gs > .20) in 
this analysis. The means across all conditions ranged from 
24.0 to 29.5 (on a scale of 0 to 41), suggesting that subjects 
were rating both themselves and the comparison target in a 
very positive light. This finding is consistent with the 
similarity finding noted earlier in the manipulation checks 
analyses and indirectly supports the assertion that, prior to 
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any DC information about the target, subjects viewed 
themselves and the target generally as equals. 
Change in target ratings. In a test of the direct 
derogation hypothesis, a2x2x2x2 (SE x Threat x DCI x 
Time) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on subjects' 
ratings of the target at T2 (pre-comparison) and T3 (post-
comparison) . It was expected that high threat, high SE, 
downward comparison subjects would engage in the greatest 
amount of target derogation—their ratings of the comparison 
target should evidence the largest decline over time. Results 
of this analysis revealed a main effect for Time (F(l,87) = 
41.58, £ < .001); subjects tended to change their impression 
of the target over the course of the experiment—most became 
less favorable toward her. This effect was qualified by a DCI 
X Time interaction (F(l,87) = 56.94, £ < .001), which 
indicated that subjects in the DCI conditions reported 
negative change in opinions of the target from T2 to T3 
whereas subjects in the no-DCI conditions tended to develop 
more favorable opinions (see Table 6). All remaining main 
effects and interactions failed to reach significance (all £s 
> .2). In particular, the expected 4-way interaction (SE x 
Threat x DCI x Time) was not significant (£ = .74). 
Exploratory analyses; persistence in ratings change. A 2 
X 2 X 2 X 3 (SE X Threat x DCI x Time) repeated measures ANOVA 
with Time (T2, T3, and T4) as the within-subjects variable was 
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Table 6 
Means for direct active DC target ratings 
DC Information 
Nigh self-esteem 
High threat (n - 12) 
Low threat (n - 14) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n - 11) 
Low threat (n - 10) 
No DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n - 10) 
Low threat (n ~ 17) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n - 9) 
Low threat (n - 12) 
Time 2 
27.4 
26.2 
29.1 
24.9 
29.7 
27.4 
2 6 . 6  
24.0 
Time 3 
14.9 
16.5 
14.6 
14.5 
31.2 
27.6 
26.5 
26.1 
Change 
(T3-T2) 
—12.5*. 
-10.5 *a 
+ 1.5b 
+ .2)3 
- -lb 
+ 2.1b 
Notes; 
Index scores Times 2 and 4 range from +41.2 to -40.8; index scores for Time 
3 range from +40.8 to -41.2. Differences in scale endpoints were due to the 
scale adjustment required by the necessary removal of one of the subscale 
adjectives (see Endnote 5). The Time 3 index items were the polar opposite 
forms of the T2 and T4 index adjectives; thus the difference in ranges. 
Negative change scores indicate a decline in favorability in target rating 
whereas positive change scores indicate an improvement in favorability for 
target ratings. 
Asterisk (*) indicates this cell demonstrated significant change on within-
subject t-test (£< .05); cells with different subscripts indicate between-
subject differences at £ < .05. 
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performed on comparison target rating indices (see Endnote 
11). Like the T2-T3 repeated measures findings, analyses 
revealed a highly significant main effect for Time (F(2,144) = 
25.25, £ < .001), again reflecting the decline in target 
ratings from Time 2 to Time 3. These analyses also revealed 
that those ratings generally tended to remain at that level at 
Time 4. A DCI x Time interaction was also noted, F (2,144) = 
30.01, £ < .001, such that experimental subjects gave the 
comparison target significantly less positive ratings at Time 
3 and Time 4 than at Time 2 whereas control subjects varied 
less dramatically in their comparison target ratings. A 
marginally significant SE x DCI x Time interaction (£ = .065) 
revealed a tendency toward some movement within conditions 
across time; in particular high SE, downward comparison 
subjects became more positive toward the target at T4. Once 
again, the expected 4-way interaction (SE x Threat x DCI x 
Time) was not significant (£ = .697) 
Indirect Active Downward Comparison 
To test the indirect active DC hypothesis, subjects were 
asked to indicate their approval for and likelihood of using 
four different contraceptive methods including the pill, 
condom, withdrawal, and, the DC target's method—nothing. 
They were asked to provide these ratings at three time 
intervals; mass testing (Tl), experiment (T3), and follow-up 
(T4). Previous research has demonstrated that low self-esteem 
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individuals are the most likely to engage in indirect self-
enhancement techniques (Brown et al., 1988), thus the 
hypothesis was that low SE subjects would demonstrate the 
greatest decline in their ratings of the target's 
contraceptive method. 
"No method" index. It was expected that the most 
straightforward test of the indirect active DC hypothesis 
would involve a 2 x 2 x 2 (SEx Threat x DCI) repeated 
measures ANOVA with the computed likelihood of use/approval 
index for no method of contraception as the dependent measure 
and Time (T1-T3) as the within-subjects factor. However, 
reliability analyses indicated very weak associations between 
the two items at both time intervals (alphas = .15 and .34, 
respectively) suggesting that such a computed index could not 
be justified statistically and therefore negating the use of 
the index in further analyses. 
Since indirect active DC was conceptualized to be an 
attitudinal variable, likelihood ratings were dropped from the 
index and approval ratings alone were used as the dependent 
m e a s u r e s  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  s e t  o f  a n a l y s e s .  A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  ( S E  
X Threat x DCI x Time) repeated measure ANOVA was performed 
with "no method" approval ratings as the dependent measure and 
Time (T1 and T3) as the within-subjects variable. This 
analysis revealed a marginal main effect for Time, g = .08 
such that all subjects tended to report less approval for "no 
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method" at the end of the experiment. All remaining main 
effects and interactions failed to approach significance (all 
remaining £s > .20). Results for this analysis were affected 
by a "floor effect" in that subjects' responses at T1 were 
quite unfavorable (Ms = .8 to 2.1 on a 0 to 12.7 scale). As a 
result, there was little room for subjects to lower their 
approval for "no method" even further at T3. 
"Ineffective" methods index analyses. As originally 
hypothesized, the concept of indirect active DC was expected 
to extend to items relevant to the comparison dimension and it 
was expected that beliefs about the effectiveness of the 
comparison target's contraception and contraceptive method 
would meet that criterion. It was also plausible, however, 
that indirect active DC could extend to a more negative rating 
toward ineffective contraceptive methods as a class. 
Therefore, an index was computed combining subjects' approval 
ratings for no method with those from the other "ineffective" 
contraceptive method, withdrawal. Reliabilities for this 
index, although still very weak, tended to be higher than 
those for the "no method" index (alphas = .43 and .47 at T1 
and T3, respectively). 
A 2 X 2 X 2 (SE X Threat x DCI) ANOVA on Tl responses for 
this index was conducted to assess pre-experiment differences 
in opinions between subjects. A marginal SE x DCI interaction 
was obtained in this analysis (F(1,88) = 3.62, £ = .06). 
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Internal analysis revealed that low SE, DCI subjects reported 
significantly more favorable ratings than did their high SE, 
DCI counterparts. This effect represents randomization error 
since assignment to the DC conditions had not occurred at Tl. 
No other main effects nor interactions were noted. 
Change in "ineffective" methods index ratings. Again, a 
2x2x2x2 (SE x Threat x DCI x Time) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed, this time with subjects' computed scores 
on the "ineffective" methods index as the dependent measure. 
Results of this analysis indicated a significant main effect 
for time (F(l,88) = 4.73, £ = .03), with the pattern of means 
suggesting that subjects' approval ratings of the ineffective 
methods tended to decline from Tl to T3 (see Table 7). No 
other main effects nor interactions were noted (£s > .10). 
Exploratory analyses; approval over extended time. 
Persistence in approval ratings for the "no method" and 
"ineffective" indices over time was tested in two separate 2 x 
2x2x3 (SE X Threat x DCI x Time) repeated measures ANOVA 
(see Endnote 12). In both analyses, no main effects nor 
interactions were noted (£s > .1). Trends in both suggested 
that the movement toward method derogation that had been 
demonstrated in the T1-T3 analyses (the main effects for time) 
was reversed—subjects were tending toward less derogation at 
T4. 
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Table 7 
Means for "ineffective" methods index 
DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 10) 
Low threat (n = 10) 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 9) 
Low threat (n = 10) 
Time 1 
2 . 8  
3.1 
5.1 
5.2 
Time 3 
2 . 8  
3.0 
2.9 
6.5 
Change 
(T3-T1) 
0 
- .1 
-2.2 
+1.3 
No DC Information 
High self-esteem 
High threat (n = 11) 5.3 
Low threat (n = 14) 3.0 
Low self-esteem 
High threat (n = 10) 2.9 
Low threat (n = 12) 4.7 
2.5 
2 . 2  
1.9 
4.3 
-2.8 
-  . 8  
-1.0 
- .4 
Notes; 
1. Index scores range from 0 to 25.4 with higher scores indicating 
greater approval. 
2. Negative change scores indicate a decrease in approval. 
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DISCUSSION 
The current study was undertaken to explore three 
distinct extensions of downward comparison theory. The 
results concerning the hypotheses in each of the major 
conceptual areas will be discussed in terms of their 
contribution to a previously unresolved empirical question or 
a newly developed theoretical issue. 
Mood 
The fundamental principle guiding Wills' theory of 
downward comparison is that DC is a process motivated by 
decreased subjective well-being following situational or 
chronic dispositional threat. Empirical hypotheses extending 
from this premise have posited that persons who have been 
situationally threatened and who have low self-esteem or who 
are depressed will demonstrate a preference for and benefit 
from DC opportunities. As noted earlier, previous research 
has produced evidence to support these hypotheses (Gibbons, 
1986; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989). However, the designs 
implemented in these early studies have compared the mood 
change under DC conditions with that observed in upward or 
lateral comparison alternatives. Although the use of these 
designs has provided researchers with information about how 
people respond differently to a variety of social comparison 
opportunities, it has not provided basic information about how 
DC-elicited mood changes contrast with those observed in a no 
131 
DC, or control, situation. Since such a contrast would 
provide a baseline from which to compare the impact of 
downward comparison information, one goal of the current study 
was to incorporate such a control condition into a DC study. 
At the onset, it is important to note that the t-test 
results for the mood change data from the current study are 
consistent with earlier empirical findings; the low self-
esteem, high threat participants in the DCI conditions were 
the only group of individuals in the study to demonstrate 
significant improvements in mood across time. In addition to 
supporting earlier findings, this pattern of results 
challenges an alternative explanation that subjects' moods 
were simply returning to their baseline or normal "pre-threat 
induction" mood level because other subjects in threat 
conditions did not demonstrate significant mood improvements. 
More importantly, the t-test results derived from the 
full design analyses provided new evidence that the mood 
improvements demonstrated by low self-esteem, threatened, DCI 
individuals were significantly different from those obtained 
by persons who had not received any DC information. 
Admittedly, the strength of the argument is weakened by the 
absence of the expected 4-way interaction in the full design 
analyses. That observation may be accounted for, however, by 
the variance contributed to the analysis by the responses 
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given by the No DCI subjects. Overall, the t-test results 
both support and extend previous findings. 
This design also provided important comparative 
information about the mood change observed in the three 
remaining DCI conditions contrasted with that observed in the 
four No DCI conditions. It has been noted in previous 
research that subjects who were provided DC opportunities but 
who were not threatened or low in self-esteem have not 
evidenced mood amelioration (cf. Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 1991). 
Again, the results of the current study support that 
observation, but also contribute to the empirical literature 
by demonstrating that the mood changes for these individuals 
were not significantly different from the No DCI (control) 
participants. 
The role of threat. The results obtained in the full 
design analysis of this study provide some additional evidence 
concerning the relative importance of situational and chronic 
threat in downward comparison situations. Specifically, the 
fact that only low self-esteem, high threat, DCI subjects 
evidenced mood change suggests that it was the combination of 
DC information with situational and dispositional threat that 
was instrumental in the mood amelioration. Although Wills 
(1981) made an explicit point of hypothesizing that both 
situational and chronic threat are involved in the process, 
these data suggest that the chronic threat involved in low 
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self-esteem is not sufficient, in and of itself, to result in 
the observed mood improvements. If only situational or 
chronic threat were necessary to motivate the process and 
result in mood amelioration, then subjects in the low self-
esteem, low threat and high self-esteem, high threat DCI 
conditions might have been expected to show some change in 
mood levels. In this study, these individuals experienced 
only minimal (nonsignificant) affect changes. Therefore, 
these data suggest that the unique combination of chronic 
threat, situational threat, and downward comparison 
contributed to the mood amelioration in both this and similar 
downward comparison studies. 
Limitation. Although the mood results are consistent 
with the predictions made for the current study and the 
empirical findings of previous research, it is important to 
note that the low threat conditions provided in this study are 
not the same as a "no" threat condition. The feedback 
delivered in the low threat conditions was originally intended 
to simply provide a contrasting (nonthreatening) type of 
performance information. However, subjects in these 
conditions reported high levels of satisfaction with their 
"social awareness" inventory performances and may have 
interpreted this information as success feedback. Therefore, 
any interpretations of the specific comparisons between high 
and low threat conditions in this study could be considered 
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from a threat vs. success, rather than a threat vs. no (or 
low) threat, perspective. This distinction is particularly 
important when comparing the differences between the mood and 
self-esteem results of the current study with those obtained 
in Reis et al. (1993) because the self-esteem results in that 
study were observed in the absence of any threatening 
feedback. It is not as problematic when discussing the mood 
results in the current study, however, because mood change was 
predicted only under conditions of high threat. 
Self-esteem 
Only two studies to date have directly tested the impact 
of downward comparison on global self-esteem (Morse & Gergen, 
1967; Reis et al., 1993). In both cases, threat was not a 
manipulated variable. The current study was designed to 
explore the effects of different levels of threat on self-
esteem in DC situations. It was expected that a partial 
replication of Reis et al. (1993) would be obtained such that 
low self-esteem, low threat, DC participants would evidence 
improvements in self-esteem. The assumption was made that the 
low threat manipulation in the current study was analogous to 
the absence of threatening information in Reis et al. It was 
suggested that self-esteem improvement occurs primarily 
because individuals in nonthreatening situations are able to 
focus on the esteem-relevant information contained within a 
downward comparison opportunity. Although the means tended to 
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be in the predicted direction, results did not support that 
expectation, however. The absence of main effects and 
interactions in the T2-T3 repeated measures analyses suggested 
that the nonsignificant self-esteem changes were not moderated 
by subjects' global self-esteem, varying levels of threat, or 
downward comparison opportunity. 
One possible alternative explanation for the absence of 
the expected interaction in the DCI conditions might relate to 
subjects' reactions to or interpretations of the low threat 
information. If subjects interpreted the low threat 
information as success information, the conditions established 
prior to the downward comparison opportunity in the current 
study may have been different than those created by the no 
information conditions in Reis et al. Specifically, the self-
esteem of low self-esteem individuals may have been 
sufficiently bolstered by the success information (which was 
administered prior to the DC opportunity) so that the 
information contained in the downward comparison opportunity 
was less necessary to satisfy a self-enhancement motivation. 
This post hoc interpretation was supported by the fact that 
subjects in the low threat, low self-esteem condition 
demonstrated significant improvement in self-esteem from T1 to 
T2 (following the low threat manipulation). Thus, it may be 
that these subjects did not react to the self-enhancing 
properties of the downward comparison information (and, as a 
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result, experience improvements in self-esteem at T3) as might 
be expected in the absence of this additional positive 
feedback. 
Self-esteem subscale psychometrics, A second issue to 
consider in the self-esteem results in the current study is 
the order effect created by the subscale division technique. 
Although the weighting of the JF-B version eliminated all 
order effects at Time 2, it is important to note here that the 
Order x Time effect reoccurred in the T2/T3 repeated measures 
analysis (despite the use of the weighting factor for both the 
T2 and T3 JF-B scales). Subjects were clearly responding 
differently to the different subscales. However, the cause of 
these differences is not readily apparent. It seems unlikely 
that practice effects were occurring since subjects completing 
the A/B order demonstrated declines in their self-esteem 
scores whereas self-esteem improvements were noted in those 
individuals who completed the B/A order. If practice effects 
were occurring, both orders would have produced self-esteem 
improvements at T3. It may simply be that the different 
subscales tapped different self-esteem related domains (such 
as reactions to social evaluation or perceptions of skill 
competence). The reoccurring subscale order effects in the 
T2-T3 analysis arouses concern that the Janis-Field 20-item 
version does not measure self-esteem as a unitary construct 
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and that the subscales were not created with an equal 
distribution of questions from the different constructs. 
Other than the Order x Time interaction, there was no 
evidence of interactions of subscale order with the other 
independent variables in this study (i.e, all £s for 
interactions including order were greater than .1). Of 
greater relevance, the nonsignificant outcome of the SE x 
Threat x DCI x Order x Time interaction (£ = .3) suggests that 
the subscale orders created for this study were not related to 
the absence of the anticipated SE x Threat x DCI x Time 
interaction (£ = .86). In combination, these observations 
reduce concern about the effects of the psychometric 
properties of the subscales and redirect the explanation for 
the absence of anticipated self-esteem change to the concern 
with subjects' interpretations of the low threat feedback 
noted earlier. 
The Negative Mood Primacy Effect 
The mood and self-esteem change hypotheses for the 
current study were generated assuming that a threat 
manipulation would affect each of these dimensions of 
subjective well-being differently. Specifically, it was 
suggested that highly threatening feedback would generate a 
negative mood primacy tendency for low self-esteem, DCI 
subjects such that the amelioration of their negative mood 
states would take precedence over other forms of self-
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enhancing activities provided within the comparison 
opportunity. Thus, these individuals should experience 
improvements in mood but not self-esteem. When negative mood 
was not created (i.e., in the low threat conditions), it was 
suggested that low self-esteem, DCI subjects would be more 
likely to attend to the self-esteem relevant information and, 
thus, experience improvements in self-esteem. No significant 
mood improvements were anticipated in the low threat 
conditions because mood was not likely to be lowered by 
positive feedback concerning subjects' acuity at social 
acumen. 
Data from the current study provide partial support for 
these hypotheses. First, it is important to re-emphasize that 
a main effect for threat was noted for mood but not for self-
esteem at T2. Mood scores for highly threatened subjects were 
lower than those for low threat subjects, whereas self-esteem 
scores did not differ significantly across threat conditions. 
These findings suggest that the threat manipulation affected 
these measures of subjective well-being differently. This 
observation will be elaborated on shortly. 
More importantly, results obtained in the T2-T3 repeated 
measures analyses for mood partially supported the negative 
mood primacy hypothesis. As expected, significant mood 
changes, but not self-esteem changes, occurred for low SE, 
high threat, DCI subjects suggesting that high levels of 
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threat influence improvements in mood but not self-esteem. 
These results were consistent with the hypothesized negative 
mood primacy effect but would have been more fully supported 
if the low SE, low threat, DCI subjects had demonstrated 
improvements in self-esteem and not mood. Although the 
anticipated absence in mood change was noted for these 
subjects, the expected change in self-esteem did not occur. 
As noted in the previous section, the absence of self-esteem 
change may be attributed to the success (rather than no 
threat) interpretation of the social acumen information. 
However, at best, these results only partially support the 
negative mood primacy effect. Given subjects' reactions to 
the low threat information, a more adequate test of this 
hypothesis should be conducted using a threat/no threat design 
with a DC opportunity. 
Effects of high threat on mood and self-esteem. Although 
a central focus of the mood and self-esteem analyses involved 
the negative mood primacy effect, one of the secondary 
questions that arises from the T2 ANOVAs on mood and self-
esteem is why mood and self-esteem were affected differently 
by the high threat information. Specifically, why was there a 
T2 main effect for threat in the mood analysis but not in the 
self-esteem analysis? One explanation for the difference in 
these results involves a consideration of the dynamic 
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characteristics of each conceptualization of subjective well-
being. 
Many conceptualizations of mood and self-esteem have 
emphasized the "trait-like" qualities of these psychological 
dimensions (cf. Costa & McCrae, 1988; McCrae & Costa, 1987/ 
Janis & Field, 1959; Kaplan & Pokorny, 1971) . For example, 
Costa and McCrae have isolated neuroticism (i.e., 
emotionality) as one of five basic elements or traits of 
personality. Similarly, self-esteem has been described as an 
integral, self-evaluative component of an intricate, well-
developed cognitive network referred to as an individual's 
self-schema (Markus, 1977; Markus & Nurius, 1986). From this 
perspective, both conceptualizations of subjective well-being 
are argued to reflect relatively stable, enduring evaluations 
of self-regard. 
Although there has been considerable acceptance that mood 
and self-esteem represent stable individual differences, some 
researchers are careful to note that these dimensions also 
possess a labile quality. They are affected by situational 
events. For example, Cattell (1985) noted that emotions and 
mood are partly determined by the "provocative power" of 
situations. In other words, individuals' emotional states may 
be somewhat dependent on the positive and negative qualities 
of the immediate environment. Positive moods are associated 
with the presence of positive events and surroundings; 
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negative moods with negative events. Moreover, Lewinsohn and 
his colleagues have suggested that as situations change, so 
does mood (Lewinsohn & Graf, 1973; Lewinsohn, Youngren & 
Grosscup, 1979). In summary, these researchers have found 
that mood tends to fluctuate with the type of positive or 
negative events recently experienced. Other researchers have 
noted that self-esteem can also be temporarily enhanced or 
decreased under certain conditions. For example, good 
evaluations of a person's performance may raise self-esteem 
whereas poor evaluations may lower it (Flippo & Lewinsohn, 
1971). Moreover, negative mood inductions may lower self-
esteem (Esses, 1989). Taken together, these empirical 
findings would suggest that the threat manipulation in the 
current study should have had a negative impact on both mood 
and self-esteem at T2 (i.e., a main effect for threat should 
have been noted). Why, then, was this effect not observed? 
One plausible explanation for the differential impact of 
threat on mood and self-esteem requires a review of the 
methods for measuring mood and self-esteem in the current 
study. Mood scores were calculated using ratings of current 
mood assessments (i.e., "Please indicate the extent to which 
the following adjectives reflect your current mood.") whereas 
self-esteem scores were obtained from participants' responses 
to a measure of global self-esteem. In other words, for the 
assessment of mood state, participants were asked to reflect 
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on their immediate affective reactions following the 
threatening information. The self-esteem assessment required 
that participants consider their overall or general self-
evaluations—a methodological difference that might have 
required that they consider their self-esteem across a variety 
of situations, not just this one. The threatening information 
contained in this particular social comparison situation might 
have been viewed as either consistent or inconsistent with 
this more general self-evaluation. Specifically, a poor 
social acumen score might represent inconsistent information 
for high self-esteem individuals and, thus, be rejected. 
Alternatively, this score could have been viewed as consistent 
information for individuals low in self-esteem--it didn't tell 
much new about themselves. In either case, what was intended 
to be threatening information might not have affected global 
self-esteem. This could have been the case particularly if 
subjects viewed the social acumen dimension as a relatively 
minor (albeit important) element of their overall self-schema. 
No data were collected in the current study that might clarify 
this question, however. Moreover, the change in self-esteem 
noted in Reis et al. (1993) would provide a counter-argument 
that subjects are capable of demonstrating (at least) 
temporary change in general self-evaluations based on 
information from an immediate social comparison situation. 
That observation not withstanding, future research on this 
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issue should be sensitive to this state vs. trait dimension 
and should also determine the overall importance of the 
threatening information to participants' self-definition. 
With respect to the current study, it appears that the 
threatening information was sufficient to affect Immediate 
reactions (i.e., mood) but not sufficient to affect overall 
self-evaluations (i.e., self-esteem). 
Perceptions of Vulnerability 
Self-other risk estimate bias. Previous research has 
established that there may be a number of reasons that people 
believe they are less likely than others to experience a 
negative event. One of the cognitive mechanisms thought to 
influence this phenomenon is an egocentric tendency to focus 
on one's own risk-reducing behaviors. Weinstein (1980) has 
also suggested that, when people do think about another 
person's vulnerability for negative events, they tend to focus 
on the risks for someone who is "doing nothing" to protect his 
or her health. Requiring people to think about the risk-
reducing behaviors of others has been a successful technique 
in decreasing self-other risk estimate bias (Weinstein, 1983). 
In the current study, an attempt was made to expand this self-
other bias by providing people with information about the 
risk-increasing conduct of a downward comparison target. It 
was suggested that people may engage in similar activity under 
naturally-occurring circumstances in which they temporarily 
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feel threatened in an effort to preserve their feelings of 
invulnerability. 
The primary interest in the current study was to assess 
the impact of threat and downward comparison on self and other 
perceptions of vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy in high 
and low self-esteem women. In particular, it was predicted 
that individuals who have been threatened and are high in 
self-esteem, as opposed to their low self-esteem counterparts, 
would be more likely to change their self or other risk 
estimates. This result was anticipated due to individual 
differences in reaction to both threatening and downward 
comparison information. Specifically, high SE persons are 
more resistant to (negative) information that conflicts with 
their view of themselves (Cohen, 1959). In the current study, 
the feedback concerning poor social acumen performance fits 
that description—high SE individuals most likely would not 
expect to do poorly on such a dimension. Because these 
individuals were expected to react negatively to this 
information, it was anticipated that they might overreact to 
subsequent downward comparison information indicating that 
they were a more effective contraceptor than the DC target. 
The predicted result was that these high SE individuals would 
temporarily overestimate (i.e., increase) self-other 
differences in risk thus reaffirming their self-definition as 
a successful person. 
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Low self-esteem individuals, on the other hand, are more 
accepting of failure feedback (Cohen, 1959). Therefore, the 
threat feedback provided in this study should be more 
consistent with what these persons expect for their 
performance, and might not elicit the same negative effects as 
it does for individuals with high self-esteem. Moreover, low 
SE individuals might be somewhat cautious about accepting 
information that they are performing better than someone else 
(as would occur in a DC situation) because it doesn't fit with 
their overall self-concept (cf. Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 
1982). In combination, these reaction tendencies were 
expected to result in negligible change in self-other 
perceptions of vulnerability following threat and downward 
comparison. 
The results of this study indicated that, at mass 
testing, participants did view themselves as less likely to 
experience an unplanned pregnancy than women who don't use 
contraception. This difference does not represent a bias so 
much as it is an accurate reflection of the pregnancy 
probabilities for different groups of women who use effective 
vs. ineffective contraceptive methods. They rated their own 
risk for unplanned pregnancy to be minimal, which it is for 
someone who uses effective contraceptive methods regularly, 
and rated women who don't use contraception as considerably 
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more at risk. At Time 1, therefore, these data represent an 
accurate self-other assessment of risk. 
The primary question of interest in the current study was 
whether the threat and downward comparison manipulations would 
produce changes in self and other risk estimates. As 
expected, low SE, threatened, DCI participants did not change 
their self-other risk estimates significantly. However, this 
finding becomes less informative when the expected T1-T3 
change in self-other risk did not occur for high SE, DCI 
participants. Given these data, it remains unclear whether 
the absence of expected effects were due to the 
ineffectiveness of the threat manipulation to evoke self-
enhancing change in perceptions of vulnerability due to the 
use of either insufficient level of threat or the wrong kind 
of threat. Alternately, perhaps the downward comparison 
information was ineffective in producing larger self-other 
risk differentials. 
It is important to note that subjects' perceptions of 
risk for unplanned pregnancy for self and other were highly 
skewed—there was little room for their estimates of their own 
invulnerability to become smaller or the risk of women who use 
no contraception to become larger. Both "floor" and "ceiling" 
effects occurred. As pointed out earlier, these self-other 
perceptions were probably relatively accurate given subjects' 
personal contraceptive practices compared with those of women 
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not using contraceptives. Given the sample of women included 
as participants and the comparison target selected, this 
accuracy would work against the expected change in self-other 
risk estimates just as would other kinds of floor/ceiling 
effects. With so little room for self-risk estimates to 
decrease and other-risk estimates to increase, the most 
probable way for the difference self-other risk estimates to 
become greater is if changes occurred in both types of risk 
estimate. The results from previous research would not 
support the assumption that this type of risk-estimate change 
tends to occur (cf. Gerrard et al., 1991; Weinstein, 1982). 
For future research, one solution to the problem of 
ceiling and floor effects might be to select participants and 
the comparison target along less extreme contraceptive 
effectiveness levels. For example, by selecting participants 
who use contraceptives that are less effective (i.e., 
contraceptive sponge or withdrawal) and therefore have greater 
probabilities for "contraceptive failure," more possibility 
for a decrease in perception of self-risk following a DC 
opportunity might occur. Conversely, by selecting a 
comparison target who used a slightly more effective method, 
there would be more possibility for an increase in other-risk. 
Either situation might produce the anticipated change in self-
other risk estimates and, on a practical level, provide more 
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information about the perception changes that occur in a 
significant proportion of women actually using contraception. 
Self- vs. other-risk change. If we specifically seek 
evidence of change in other-risk estimates, we might suspect, 
based on previous literature such as Weinstein (1983), that 
such a tendency would occur in women who have had the 
opportunity to review their own conduct and that of a 
comparison target. Such a condition mirrors Weinsteins' 
(1983) "other information" condition in which he had people 
review their own risk behaviors and then consider another's 
risk-relevant behaviors. In that study, subjects who engaged 
in self and other review demonstrated more comparative risk 
change than did women who merely considered their own risk 
factors—suggesting that the change in perceptions was caused 
more by change in perceptions of other-risk estimates than in 
self-risk estimates. Moreover, changes in self-risk estimates 
might occur for women who had only reviewed their own 
behavior, as was the case for Weinstein and Lachendro's (1982) 
subjects. In either case, we might expect to observe a DCI x 
Target x Time interaction. Support for the other-risk 
hypothesis would be obtained if other-risk estimates for 
subjects in the DCI conditions increased from T1 to T3. 
Support for the self-risk hypothesis would be obtained if 
T1/T3 increases in self-risk estimates for subjects in the No 
DCI conditions were observed. Neither of these trends 
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occurred, however. Although the SE x DCI x Target x Time 
interaction was significant, the trends in means did not 
support these hypotheses. More important, no predictable 
pattern of changes in self- or other-risk estimates were 
obtained from this downward comparison opportunity. 
Target characteristics and self-other risk. Another 
issue with respect to this specific sample of women is that 
subjects in the DCI condition reported that their 
contraceptive practices were significantly more effective than 
were those of the comparison target. Although they initially 
reported social similarity to this woman, it could be that the 
contraceptive information changed that perception such that 
she became too dissimilar for meaningful social comparison. 
If she was not viewed as a relevant source of information for 
determining one's comparative risk for pregnancy, subjects 
might not have been affected by this comparison information. 
The issue of similarity to the comparison target is a 
significant one as a number of researchers have pointed out. 
For example. Wills (1991) argues that the affective 
consequences of engaging in downward comparison will vary 
depending on the degree of similarity with the downward 
comparison target. Specifically, he states that as the 
difference between self and target increases, individuals 
become increasingly less comfortable with the process. Others 
have found that, as people identify less with comparison 
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targets, DC opportunities become less impactful (cf. Miller, 
1984; Tesser, 1988) and less helpful (cf. Sanders, 1982) . 
Although these observations are more directly relevant to 
preferences for DC targets or the benefits derived from 
engaging in the process, there is little reason to doubt that 
similarity holds less importance when perceptions of 
vulnerability are the dependent measures under consideration. 
Although this issue can not be resolved directly since no 
specific data on change in similarity ratings were obtained in 
the current study, this remains a plausible explanation for 
the lack of expected results. This post hoc interpretation 
has to remain largely speculative, however. 
In a related concern, subjects in this experiment had 
been asked to provide their perceptions of vulnerability for 
the average ISU woman who doesn't use contraception—not for 
the specific target whose contraceptive behavior they 
reviewed. Weinstein (1980) has suggested that part of the 
development of perceptions of invulnerability involves calling 
to mind a prototypical victim for a negative event. When 
subjects are asked to compare with a typical other, they 
supposedly refer to this prototypical image. It is entirely 
plausible that, even though the comparison target fit in the 
general category of "women who do not use contraception," she 
may not be a good match for subjects' prototype for this 
category (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). She may differ along 
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other social dimensions, in her sexual activity levels, in her 
personal contraceptive history from what participants expect 
of an ineffective contraceptor. She may be viewed as a unique 
case of a woman who doesn't use contraception but who varies 
due to her other personal characteristics. An analogous 
situation occurs when a member of a minority group is viewed 
as an unusual example of a member in that group—information 
about that particular individual doesn't change the overall 
impression of that group of persons (cf. Weber & Crocker, 
1983). To the extent that she doesn't fit that image, her 
specific contraceptive information may not have a direct 
relationship to subjects' expectations about members of this 
category. Therefore, when asked to consider the risk for 
average women who don't use contraception, subjects may rely 
more on their prototype than on the information this woman's 
contraceptive behaviors provide. If nothing has occurred to 
change their prototype, then changes in self-other risk 
estimates may not occur. 
Direct and Indirect Active Downward Comparison 
Previous researchers have suggested that individuals 
differ in their use of passive and active forms of DC (Gibbons 
& Boney McCoy, 1991) . Recently, similar individual 
differences have been suggested regarding direct and indirect 
forms of self-enhancement (Brown et al. 1988). Brown et al. 
(1988) hypothesized that high self-esteem persons may engage 
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in more direct forms of self-enhancement such as in-group 
favoritism. This line of reasoning is consistent with Crocker 
et al.'s (1987) observation that these individuals are likely 
to engage in both in-group favoritism and out-group 
derogation. Low self-esteem persons, on the other hand, were 
hypothesized to engage in indirect forms of self-enhancement 
such as the derogation of an out-group's work or the selection 
of a less-skilled comparison target—methods that don't focus 
attention on self-superiority. 
Target derogation. In the current study, direct active 
downward comparison was expected to take the form of change in 
the favorability of trait ratings for the downward comparison 
target. The hypothesis was that high self-esteem, threatened 
downward comparison subjects would demonstrate the greatest 
amounts of derogation. The results from the current study 
indicated that subjects who received DC information tended to 
change their opinions of the comparison target over the course 
of the experiment. In particular, individuals who received 
information about the target's ineffective contraceptive 
practices became more negative toward her than did those 
persons who hadn't received this information, which indicates 
that the downward comparison manipulation did have an impact 
on subjects' opinions of this target. It must be stressed, 
however, that none of the anticipated interactions were 
obtained. 
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The threat manipulation did have an impact on subjects' 
opinions of the target in that participants who experienced 
high threat tended to derogate the target more than did low 
threat, DCI subjects. These analyses also suggested that low 
self-esteem, high threat, DCI participants tended to derogate 
the target the most, followed by their high self-esteem 
counterparts. This finding indicates that, under certain 
conditions, even low self-esteem persons are likely to 
derogate another person severely. As noted earlier, the 
contraceptive differences between self and target were 
perceived to be highly significant. It is possible that there 
are some levels of performance that are so clearly ineffective 
that the impact of that information overwhelms other 
interactive effects of personality and situational threat. 
Target method derogation. In the current study, indirect 
active downward comparison was expected to occur via the 
development of more negative attitudes toward the comparison 
target's method of contraception. Based on Brown et al.'s 
(1988) observations, it was expected that low self-esteem, 
high threat, DC subjects would be most likely to engage in 
this form of active DC. However, the Time main effects from 
T1/T3 repeated measures analyses revealed that there was a 
general trend across all participants to develop increasingly 
more negative views on both the "no method" and "ineffective 
methods" indices. This observation could suggest two 
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different dynamics were occurring. First, perhaps the DC 
information did not provide any unique contribution to 
attitude change in this situation or, second, the development 
of more negative attitudes toward these methods might have 
been due primarily to subjects' efforts to provide socially 
acceptable responses. Prior to arriving at the laboratory, 
these participants knew the study pertained to contraceptive 
use and opinions. It is possible that their responses were 
somewhat influenced by social desirability (either in an 
attempt to create a positive impression on the experimenter, 
who was obviously interested in contraceptive issues, or so 
they wouldn't be embarrassed for advocating the use of 
ineffective contraceptives if an actual discussion of 
contraception did occur). 
As was the case with the data on perceived vulnerability, 
it should be noted that the method derogation data were also 
skewed such that subjects held generally negative opinions 
about the use of no contraception. Therefore, the lack of 
(negative) change in opinions toward this contraceptive 
practice could have been due to a floor effect. Persons with 
polarized ideas, either highly positive or extremely negative, 
may be fairly inflexible to change in the face of social 
information—there is little room for their opinions to become 
more favorable in the former case or less favorable in the 
latter. It might be the case that changes in attitudes would 
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occur in a sample of women who hold more moderate views toward 
a particular contraceptive practice. For such individuals, 
there would be more opportunity for opinions to become more or 
less negative under the influence of information gained from 
others. Therefore, attitude change as a form of indirect 
active DC may only be applicable for persons who do not hold 
extreme opinions. 
Conclusions 
Conceptual Contributions 
In spite of the lack of empirical support for its 
hypotheses, the current study makes a number of conceptual 
contributions to the research in downward comparison through 
its effort to expand the theory and by introducing several new 
concepts to the literature. Most notably, the 
conceptualization of attitude change as a form of indirect 
active DC allows for a form of derogation that serves the 
purpose of self-enhancement. Because people might feel some 
ambivalence about engaging in target derogation (Wills, 1981), 
attitude change on a tangential dimension may produce the 
self-enhancing effect without producing negative feelings 
about derogating another person. 
Moreover, this process allows low self-esteem people to 
engage in derogation, albeit in a more socially acceptable 
manner. The suggestion that attitude change represents a type 
of downward comparison is consistent with an expanding list of 
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techniques available for engaging in the process. Moreover, 
many aspects of the indirect active DC process are analogous 
to ideas developed to explain the dynamics of dimensional 
comparisons. For example, some researchers investigating 
dimensional comparisons suggest that when comparison along one 
dimension will prove less favorable to the self, people may 
actually switch to comparison dimensions upon which they rate 
more favorably (Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983). The process 
of indirect active DC is consistent with such a dimension 
shift. 
The current study also contributes to the downward 
comparison literature through its investigation of the impact 
of threat on self-esteem and mood. Given the problems with 
interpreting subjects' reactions to the "low" threat 
information, it remains difficult to determine the basis for 
the absence of self-esteem effects. However, the trends in 
the self-esteem and mood data in this study suggest that 
threat does have different effects on different measures of 
subjective well-being. The suggestion that "state" vs. 
"trait" variables respond differently to threat manipulations 
expands the interpretations of the mood/self-esteem findings 
in the current DC literature. It may be these very 
differences that produce inconsistent findings across the 
relatively few studies that have incorporated both dimensions. 
Moreover, the possibility that negative-emotion primacy may 
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influence mood and self-esteem changes in DC provides a means 
for studying differences in these dimensions under 
threatening, downward comparison situations. Further research 
is needed to provide support of these hypotheses, however. 
The final contribution, but perhaps one that would be of 
particular importance to health psychologists, involves the 
dynamics underlying increases in perceptions of 
invulnerability. To the extent that illusions of safety 
concerning personal health interfere with initiating health 
preventive programs (Weinstein, 1988), it becomes incumbent 
upon researchers to determine the mechanisms that sustain 
these biased perceptions. The hypothesized process described 
in the current study provides one explanation of why these 
illusions or biases can be so persistent. People may be 
motivated, at times, to temporarily strengthen those biased 
views and may accomplish that by adopting a more extreme 
position or perception. The ceiling effects noted in the 
current study did not allow for much change in perceptions. 
Work with a different sample of subjects, however, might 
produce more meaningful results. 
Limitations 
Although the current study has several conceptual merits, 
some limitations should also be noted. The first relates to 
the comparison target selection; the second, to the sample 
selected for the study. In an effort to create a downward 
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comparison opportunity, the selection of a comparison target 
who used nothing for contraception might have been too 
powerful a contrast to meet the basic requirement of 
similarity thought to be an integral part of social comparison 
processes. Subjects' reactions to such a target were clearly 
negative—so negative, in fact, that all persons thought less 
positively of the target upon finding out about her 
contraceptive practices. The manipulation, though powerful, 
may have undermined the direct active DC hypothesis. 
Moreover, when asking subjects to provide an approval rating 
for using no methods of contraception, social desirability 
alone is likely to create very skewed data. 
The use of effective contraceptors as the sample for this 
study also brought with it some generalization limitations. 
People who are already engaging in the most efficacious 
behavior possible (i.e., the sample was mostly pill users who 
reportedly used it consistently) are not likely to think of 
themselves as vulnerable to an unplanned pregnancy, nor are 
they likely to be as affected by information about someone who 
doesn't use any method at all—they are very different than 
that person. 
It is also important to point out that, in the current 
study, subjects received feedback that could essentially be 
considered as "success" and "failure" information—a "no" 
information condition was not provided. Both forms of 
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feedback have the potential to produce emotional reactions, 
which may serve to focus their reactions to social comparison 
information to an emotional dimension. In a "no" information 
situation, they might have more opportunity to focus on social 
comparison information itself. Under these circumstance, it 
might be more likely that such SC would affect self-esteem. 
This distinction might be an important in the pursuit of the 
negative-emotion primacy hypothesis. 
Implications 
The basic rationale for the current study appears sound. 
The questions of the impact of threat on self-esteem and mood 
have yet to be resolved. The data from this study suggest 
that focusing on the dynamic aspects of these dimensions might 
be a fruitful line of investigation. Perceptions of 
vulnerability and flexibility in changing optimistic bias also 
continue to be important issues. More research is again 
indicated here—perhaps using samples that do not have overly 
skewed perceptions of vulnerability. The study of indirect 
active DC also may have an impact on the theory of downward 
comparison by clarifying and expanding scientific knowledge 
about the variety of ways in which people engage in self-
enhancing strategies. Although the skewed distribution of 
attitudes in the current study did not allow an adequate test 
of this question, change in attitudes less firmly held might 
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still be influenced by such a process. Again, further work 
will be required to test this question. 
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ENDNOTES 
A factor analysis was conducted on the 9-item General 
Birth Control Opinion Survey to determine if a specific 
morality factor could be extracted. Three items from the 
questionnaire produced a moral issues factor: "The whole 
idea of contraception is unpleasant to me.", "Using 
contraception is morally or religiously wrong", and "I 
would be ashamed if others important to me knew I use 
contraception". A morality index was created by adding 
the scores for each response (alpha = .67) and this index 
was subsequently used as a covariate in reanalyses of 
each of the major dependent variables to determine if 
subjects' moral beliefs are significant mediating 
variables in contraceptive comparison situations. 
Results of these ANCOVAs did not reveal any significant 
or meaningful differences between the original findings 
and those using a moral index covariate. 
Correlational analyses indicated that the T1 and T2 
measures of JF-A and JF-B were positively correlated, rs 
= .80 and .86, respectively. Self-esteem scores at T2 
and T3 on the different orders were positively correlated 
(JF-A/B order, r = .89 and JF-B/A order, r = .88). 
Reliabilities for the 10-item JF versions were also high 
at T2 and T3 (alphas JF-Version A = .87 and .88, and JF-
Version B = .84 and .85). 
162 
4. Correlational analyses of T2 and T3 mood scores revealed 
a positive correlation, r = .78, suggesting reasonable 
reliability between these measures. 
5. Reliability analyses were conducted on both self and 
target indices at all time intervals. Based on these 
analyses, the adjectives "sincere" and "insincere" were 
eliminated from the computed index to increase the 
overall alphas, which subsequently ranged from .71 to 
.80. Indices were balanced by multiplying the 3-item 
subscale at each Time interval by 4/3 before that 
subscale was entered into the index formula. 
6. This interaction appears to be driven by the fact that 
the low self-esteem, DC, threatened subjects tended to 
experience the largest decrease on the 
negatively-valenced adjectives (those items comprising 
the negative adjective subscale). Repeated measures 
analyses on the negative subscale revealed a main effect 
for Time (F(1,84) = 10.69, £ = .002) such that subjects 
in all conditions reported less negative mood state. 
Additionally, a marginal SE x Threat x DC x Time 
interaction (F(1,84) = 3.30, g = .07) was observed with 
the trend just mentioned. Separate repeated measures 
(T2-T3) analysis conducted on positive subscales revealed 
a significant Threat x Time interaction (F(l,85) = 16.86, 
£ < .001) and a SE x Threat x Time interaction (F(l,85) = 
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3.86, £ =.05). Threatened subjects reported more 
positive moods at Time 3. Moreover, the threatened, low 
self-esteem individuals tended to report more positive 
mood than subjects in the remaining SE and threat 
conditions. 
7. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA on T2 mood (controlling for possible 
differences in T1 mood levels) for all experiment 
subjects revealed a main effect for Threat, F(1,84) = 
11.97, £ = .001. As in the repeated measures ANOVA, the 
4-way interaction failed to reach significance, £ = .602. 
T-tests similar to those conducted on T2-T3 mood change 
results did not reveal similar trends as those noted in 
the repeated measures. In this case, the T2 mood levels 
(controlling for T1 mood levels) for low SE, threatened, 
DCI subjects was significantly different from that of 
subjects in 3 contrasting conditions (£s < .2). The £s 
in the remaining 4 conditions exceeded .2. 
8. A 2 X 2 (SE X Threat) ANCOVA on DCI subjects' T2 mood 
(controlling for differences in T1 mood levels) revealed 
a marginal SE x Threat interaction (F(l,37) = 3.1, £ = 
.09) in which the tendency was for low SE, high threat 
subjects to demonstrate the most positive mood. 
9. Data for perceived vulnerability ratings were skewed and 
thus all analyses were performed using square root 
transformation (cf. Howell, 1987; p.302), 
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10. Sphericity tests indicated that the sphericity assumption 
was not violated for these repeated variables (sph test £ 
= .25). Therefore, results were obtained from univariate 
F-tests (cf. Vasey & Thayer, 1987). 
11. Sphericity tests indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity was not violated (£ > .13). Therefore results 
are drawn from univariate analyses. 
12. Sphericity tests indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated (£ > .001) for the "No method" 
repeated measure but not for the "Ineffective" index 
repeated measure. Therefore, results are drawn from 
multivariate analyses for the former and univariate 
analyses for the latter. 
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Contraceptive Use and Opinion 
Questionnaire 
Background 
1. Your age at last birthday 
2. Marital Status 
single married divorced separated 
Seacual/Contraeeptlv Ua# History 
Please answer the following questions concerning your sexual and 
contraceptive use history. Ba aaaurad that all answers to these questions 
are confldantlal and will not be usad by anyone besides the experimenter 
involved in this research. 
3. Have you ever engaged in sexual intercourse ? yes no 
If your answer to question 3 was "no", skip to question 10. If it was 
"yes", please also answer questions 4 through 9. 
4. How many sexual partners have you had? 
5. On the average, how often were you engaging in sexual intercourse in 
the 6 months prior to now (answer in terms of average number of times 
per month) : per month. 
6. On the average, how often were you engaging in sexual intercourse in 
the 3 months prior to now (answer in terms of average number of times 
per month) : per month. 
7. Over the past 6 months, what contraceptive method did you use most 
often? 
8a. Over the past 3 months, what contraceptive method did you use most 
often? 
8b. How consistently did you use that method (one listed in 8a)? 
used every time 
used most of the time (approximately 80% of the time) 
used half the time (approximately 50% of the time) 
used occasionally (approximately 30% - 40% of the time) 
seldom used (less than 20% of the time) 
8c. Again considering the method you listed in 8a, what percent of the 
time during which you were sexually active and using this method did 
you feel that you were using the method exactly as it was intended to 
be used (i.e., followed instructions accurately, etc)? % 
If you can think of any times when you think you or your partner did 
not use this method exactly right, how frequently did this happen? 
(times per month) 
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Bd. How important were the following factors in your selection of this 
method? (Please rate each of the following using a scale where 1 = 
not at all important and 7 = extremely important) 
effectiveness of method 
moral/religious beliefs 
low sexual intercourse activity levels 
partner's preference for method 
your preference for method 
availability of method 
cost of method 
convenience of method 
medical "side effects" associated with method 
opinions/advice of friends 
9. If there is additional information that you feel might be of importance 
in describing your contraceptive practices but which has not been covered 
in the preceding questions, please briefly provide that information below. 
Perceptions of Unplanned Pregnancy 
We would now like you to consider for a moment the issue 
pregnancy. Then answer the following questions using a 1 
1 = not at all possible and 100 = extremely likely, most 
happen. 
10a. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year if you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months and if you used your current 
method of contraception as you usually do? (1 - 100 scale) 
10b. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year if you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months, but did not use any method 
of contraception? (1 - 100 scale) 
10c. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she continues using 
the contraceptive method she is currently using? (1-100 scale) 
lOd. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used the birth 
control pill? (1-100 scale) 
of unplanned 
- 100 scale where 
definitely will 
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lOe. What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the 
birth control pill ? (Indicate your answer by placing a slash mark 
along the line at the location that best represents your answer). 
lOf. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used no method of 
contraception? (1-100 scale) 
lOg. What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the no 
method of contraception ? (Indicate your answer by placing a slash 
mark along the line at the location that best represents your 
You are more 
likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
Average woman 
who uses pill is 
more likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
answer). 
You are more 
likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
Average woman 
who uses no contraception 
more likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
lOh. What percent of average college women become pregnant in a typical 
year? (0 to 100%) 
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General Birth Control Opinion Survey 
In this section of the survey, we are interested in some of your general 
opinions concerning contraception. Please think carefully about each 
statement and then indicate your opinion about the statement by circling 
the number which best reflects your opinion. 
11. The whole idea of contraception is unpleasant to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
12. The most important thing about contraception is that it makes sex 
worry free and enjoyable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
13. Using contraception is morally or religiously wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
14. Anyone engaging in sexual intercourse definitely should use 
contraception of some kind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
15. I would be ashamed if others important to me knew I used 
contraception. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
16. It is morally imperative that contraception is used with each and 
every sexual interaction. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
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17. The importance of contraception has been greatly exaggerated. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
18. If a person uses or has available methods of contraception, it is 
like admitting to everyone that s/he is planning to have sex. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
19. Having contraceptive methods readily available invites sexual 
behavior. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
Specific Birth Control Opinion Survey 
In this section of the survey we are interested in your opinions about 
several specific birth control methods. Please answer each question even 
if you do not know much about the method and/or have never used it. For 
each question, circle the number which best represents what you know or 
believe. 
20. How likely would the average college woman be to use the pill if she 
was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 
would 
definitely 
use the pill 
21. How likely would you be to use 1 
sexual relationship? 
6 7 
definitely 
would not use 
the pill 
pill if you were involved in a 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the pill the pill 
185 
22. Please indicate your opinion about using the pill as a contraceptive 
method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a 
slash mark along the line at the location that best represents your 
answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
23. How likely would the average college woman be to use the condom if 
she was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the condom the condom 
24. How likely would you be to use the condom if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the condom the condom 
25. Please Indicate your opinion about using the condom as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
26. How likely would the average college woman be to use withdrawal if 
she was Involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use withdrawal withdrawal 
27. How likely would you be to use withdrawal if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use withdrawal withdrawal 
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28. Please indicate your opinion about using withdrawal as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
2 9 .  How likely would the average college woman be to use no contraception 
if she was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely go would not go 
without contraception without contraception 
30. How likely would you be to use no contraception if you were involved 
in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely go would not go 
without contraception without contraception 
31. Please indicate your opinion about using no contraceptive method in a 
sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a slash mark 
along the line at the location that best represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
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WILDER SOCIAL AWARENESS INVENTORY 
FEEDBACK EVALUATION 
(VERSIONS A AND B) 
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WILDER SOCIAL AWARENESS INVENTORY 
FEEDBACK EVALUATION 
(Version A) 
1. To what extent are you satisfied with your score on the Wilder Social 
Awareness Inventory? 
Not at all Extremely 
Satisfied Satisfied 
2. In your opinion, how important is it to have social awareness as a 
personal trait? 
Not at all Extremely 
Important Important 
Please answer the following questions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice. 
3. How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do 
well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
4. How often do you feel that you have handled yourself well at a social 
gathering? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
5. How often do you worry about whether people like to be with you? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
6. How often do you feel that you are a successful person? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
7. How often do you feel self-conscious? 
A. very B. fairly C, sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
8. How confident are you that your success in your future job or career 
is assured? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
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9. How often do you feel inferior to most of the people you know? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E, practically 
often often great while never 
10. When speaking in class discussions, how sure of yourself do you feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
11. How much do you worry about how well you get along with people? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
12. In general, how confident do you feel about your abilities? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
MOOD 
Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives reflect your 
current mood. 
Not at 
all Very 
13. Hopeful 
14. Discontented 
15. Happy 
16. Encouraged 
17. Dissatisfied 
18. Insecure 
19. Optimistic 
20. Gloomy 
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WILDER SOCIAL AWARENESS INVENTORY 
FEEDBACK EVALUATION 
(Version B) 
1. To what extent are you satisfied with your score on the Wilder Social 
Awareness Inventory? 
Not at all Extremely 
Satisfied Satisfied 
2. In your opinion, how important is it to have social awareness as a 
personal trait? 
Not at all Extremely 
Important Important 
Please answer the following (Questions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice). 
3. When you have to talk in front of a class or a group of people your 
own age, how afraid or worried do you usually feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
afraid afraid unafraid unafraid 
4. How often do you have the feeling that you can do everything well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
5. How often are you troubled with shyness? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
6. When you talk in front of a class or a group of people your own age, 
how pleased are you with your performance? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
pleased pleased pleased displeased displeased 
7. How often do you think that you are a worthless individual? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
8. How comfortable are you when starting a conversation with people whom 
you don't know? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
comfortable comfortable comfortable uncomfortable uncomfortable 
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9. How often do you feel that you dislike yourself? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E, practically 
often often great while never 
10. How sure of yourself do you feel when among strangers? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
11. How often do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder 
whether anything is worthwhile? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
12. How confident do you feel that some day the people you know will look 
up to you and respect you? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
MOOD 
Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives reflect your 
current mood. 
Not at 
all Very 
13. Hopeful 
14. Discontented 
15. Happy 
16. Encouraged 
17. Dissatisfied 
18. Insecure 
19. Optimistic 
20. Gloomy 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Contraceptive History 
(Version A) 
Please indicate your answer to each of the following questions concerning 
the group member's contraceptive history information. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments in a small group 
setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
2. In your opinion, how effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior 
in preventing pregnancy? 
Extremely Extremely 
Effective Ineffective 
3. How effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior compared to 
average, sexually-active ISU undergraduate woman? 
Woman is more Average ISU is 
Effective More Effective 
4. How effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior compared to 
yours? 
You are more Woman is 
Effective More Effective 
Please explain briefly your answer to question 4. 
Please answer the following c[uestions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice). 
5. How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do 
well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
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How often do you feel that you have handled yourself well at a social 
gathering? 
very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
How often do you worry about whether people like to be with you? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
How often do you feel that you are a successful person? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
How often do you feel self-conscious? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
How confident are you that your success in your future job or career 
is assured? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
How often do you feel inferior to most of the people you know? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
When speaking in class discussions, how sure of yourself do you feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
How much do you worry about how well you get along with people? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
In general, how confident do you feel about your abilities? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
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AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Using the following adjective, please indicate your current feelings. 
Not at 
all Very 
15. Satisfied 
16. Secure 
17. Sad 
10. Hopeless 
19. Pessimistic 
20. Cheerful 
21. Discouraged 
22. Contented 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Contraceptive History 
(Version B) 
Please indicate your answer to each of the following questions concerning 
the group member's contraceptive history information. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments in a small group 
setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
2. In your opinion, how effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior 
in preventing pregnancy? 
Extremely Extremely 
Effective Ineffective 
3. How effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior compared to 
average, sexually-active ISU undergraduate woman? 
Woman is more Average ISU is 
Effective More Effective 
4. How effective is this woman's contraceptive behavior compared to 
yours? 
You are more Woman is 
Effective More Effective 
Please explain briefly your answer to question 4. 
Please answer the following questions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice). 
5. When you have to talk in front of a class or a group of people your 
own age, how afraid or worried do you usually feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
afraid afraid unafraid unafraid 
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6. How often do you have the feeling that you can do everything well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
7. How often are you troubled with shyness? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
8. When you talk in front of a class or a group of people your own age, 
how pleased are you with your performance? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
pleased pleased pleased displeased displeased 
9. How often do you think that you are a worthless individual? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
10. How comfortable are you when starting a conversation with people whom 
you don't know? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
comfortable comfortable comfortable uncomfortable uncomfortable 
11. How often do you feel that you dislike yourself? 
A. very B, fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
12. How sure of yourself do you feel when among strangers? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
13. How often do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder 
whether anything is worthwhile? 
A. very B, fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
14. How confident do you feel that some day the people you know will look 
up to you and respect you? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
198 
AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Using the following adjective, please indicate your current feelings. 
Not at 
all Very 
15. Satisfied 
16. Secure 
17. Sad 
18. Hopeless 
19. Pessimistic 
20. Cheerful 
21. Discouraged 
22. Contented 
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(DCI AND NO-DCI VERSIONS) 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Social History 
(DCI Version) 
Please indicate your answer to each of the following questions concerning 
the group member's social information by placing a slash (/) at the point 
on the line that best represents your answer. YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments in a small group 
setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
2. How typical of Iowa State undergraduate women is this woman? 
Not at all Extremely 
Typical Typical 
3. How similar is this woman to you? 
Not at all Extremely 
Similar Similar 
Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe the 
group member whose tape you just listened to. 
Not at 
all Very 
4. Sincere 
5. Unpleasant 
6. Loyal 
7. Reckless 
8. Intelligent 
9. Unkind 
10.Capable 
11.Unobservant 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Social History 
(NO DCI Version A) 
Please indicate your answer to each of the following questions concerning 
the group member's social information by placing a slash (/) at the point 
on the line that best represents your answer. YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments in a small group 
setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
2. How typical of Iowa State undergraduate women is this woman? 
Not at all Extremely 
Typical Typical 
How similar is this woman to you? 
Not at all Extremely 
Similar Similar 
Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe the 
group member whose tape you just listened to. 
Not at 
all Very 
4. Sincere 
5. Unpleasant 
6. Loyal 
7. Reckless 
8. Intelligent 
9. Unkind 
10. Capable 
11. Unobservant 
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Please answer the following questions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice. 
12. How often do you have the feeling that there is nothing you can do 
well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
13. How often do you feel that you have handled yourself well at a social 
gathering? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes 0. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
14. How often do you worry about whether people like to be with you? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
15. How often do you feel that you are a successful person? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
16. How often do you feel self-conscious? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
17. How confident are you that your success in your future job or career 
is assured? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
18. How often do you feel inferior to most of the people you know? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
19. When speaking in class discussions, how sure of yourself do you feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
20. How much do you worry about how well you get along with people? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
21, In general, how confident do you feel about your abilities? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
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AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Using the following adjective, please indicate your current feelings. 
Not at 
all Very 
22. Satisfied 
23. Secure 
24. Sad 
25. Hopeless 
26. Pessimistic 
27. Cheerful 
28. Discouraged 
29. Contented 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Social History 
(NO-DCI Version B) 
Please indicate your answer to each of the following questions concerning 
the group member's social information by placing a slash (/) at the point 
on the line that best represents your answer. YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments in a small group 
setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
2. How typical of Iowa State undergraduate women is this woman? 
Not at all Extremely 
Typical Typical 
3. How similar is this woman to you? 
Not at all Extremely 
Similar Similar 
Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe the 
group member whose tape you just listened to. 
Not at 
all Very 
4. Sincere 
5. Unpleasant 
6. Loyal 
7. Reckless 
8. Intelligent 
9. Unkind 
10. Capable 
11. Unobservant 
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Please answer the following questions about yourself (by circling the 
response of your choice. 
12. When you have to talk in front of a class or a group of people your 
own age, how afraid or worried do you usually feel? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
afraid afraid unafraid unafraid 
13. How often do you have the feeling that you can do everything well? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
14. How often are you troubled with shyness? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
15. When you talk in front of a class or a group of people your own age, 
how pleased are you with your performance? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E, very 
pleased pleased pleased displeased displeased 
16. How often do you think that you are a worthless individual? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
17. How comfortable are you when starting a conversation with people whom 
you don't know? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
comfortable comfortable comfortable uncomfortable uncomfortable 
18. How often do you feel that you dislike yourself? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
19. How sure of yourself do you feel when among strangers? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
sure sure sure unsure unsure 
20. How often do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder 
whether anything is worthwhile? 
A. very B. fairly C. sometimes D. once in a E. practically 
often often great while never 
21. How confident do you feel that some day the people you know will look 
up to you and respect you? 
A. very B. fairly C. somewhat D. fairly E. very 
confident confident confident unconfident unconfident 
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AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Using the following adjective, please indicate your current feelings. 
Not at 
all Very 
22. Satisfied 
23. Secure 
24. Sad 
25. Hopeless 
26. Pessimistic 
27. Cheerful 
28. Discouraged 
29. Contented 
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Discussion- Group Questionnaire 
Now I'd like you to answer some questions concerning discussion groups in 
general. Some questions will require placing a slash along the line while 
other questions require short comments. 
1. What is the likelihood that you would join a discussion group 
(regardless of subject content)? 
(Please indicate your answer by placing a slash (/) along the line.) 
Definitely Would Definitely Would 
Join Not Join 
Now I'd like you to answer some questions specifically concerning 
contraception and contraceptive discussion groups. 
2. What is the likelihood that you would join a discussion group if the 
topic was contraception? 
(Please indicate your answer by placing a slash (/) along the line.) 
Definitely Would Definitely Would 
Join Not Join 
Please describe the extent to which the following adjectives describe the 
woman whose tape you just listened to. 
Not at 
all Very 
3. Unintelligent 
4. Kind 
5. Incapable 
6. Observant 
7. Insincere 
8. Pleasant 
9. Disloyal 
10. Careful 
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In this section of the survey we are interested in your opinions about 
several specific birth control methods. Please answer each question even 
if you do not know much about the method and/or have never used it. For 
each question, circle the number that best represents what you know or 
believe. 
11. How likely would you be to use the pill if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1  2  3  4 . 5  6  7  
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the pill the pill 
12. Please indicate your opinion about using the pill as a contraceptive 
method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a 
slash mark along the line at the location which best represents your 
answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
13. How likely would you be to use the condom if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the condom the condom 
14. Please indicate your opinion about using the condom as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
15. How likely would you be to use withdrawal if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 
would 
definitely 
use withdrawal 
3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
would not use 
withdrawal 
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16. Please Indicate your opinion about using withdrawal as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
17. How likely would you be to use no contraception if you were involved 
in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely go would not go 
without contraception without contraception 
18. Please indicate your opinion about using no contraceptive method in a 
sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a slash mark 
along the line at the location that best represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
We would now like you to consider for a moment the issue of unplanned 
pregnancy. Then answer the following questions using a 1 - 100 scale where 
1 = not at all possible and 100 = extremely likely, most definitely will 
happen. 
19. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year if you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months and if you used your current 
method of contraception as you usually do? (1 - 100 scale) 
20. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year if you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months, but did not use any method 
of contraception? (1 - 100 scale) 
21. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she continues using 
the contraceptive method she is currently using? (1-100 scale) 
22. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used the birth 
control pill? (1-100 scale) 
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What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the 
birth control pill ? 
What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used no method of 
contraception? (1-100 scale) 
What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the no 
method of contraception ? 
You are more Average Woman 
likely to become who uses no contraception 
pregnant next yr. more likely to become 
You are more 
likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
Average Woman 
who uses pill is 
more likely to 
become pregnant next yr. 
pregnant next yr. 
What percent of average college women become pregnant in a typical 
year? (0 to 100%) 
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Mass-testing Consent Statement 
The Department of Psychology supports the practice of protection for 
participants in research. The following information is provided so that 
you can decide whether you wish to complete the following questionnaire. 
During mass testing, you have been asked to complete several 
questionnaires about yourself. An earlier questionnaire (the Janis-Field) 
asked you to describe how you feel about yourself and how often you feel 
that way. The following questionnaire asks a number of questions about 
your opinions and perceptions about contraception in addition to some 
specific questions about your personal contraception practices. Be assured 
that your responses to these questions will be kept confidential. Your 
name will not be associated directly with your responses. Each mass 
testing packet is numbered and after mass testing, this consent statement 
will be removed from the packet. All completed questionnaires will be 
stored under double-locked conditions and all identification numbers 
removed within two months after the completion of the study. No one other 
than the experimenters associated with this research will have access to 
your responses. Some participants from today's mass testing session will 
be called for participation in additional experiments. If you give your 
permission for experimenters to call you for these experiments, you will 
need to sign the second signature line and provide your telephone number. 
You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice. Do not 
hesitate to ask questions about the study. If you feel uncomfortable 
answering any questions, skip them. Your participation is solicited, but 
is strictly voluntary. We appreciate your cooperation very much. 
Signature 
***************************** 
***************************** 
"I agree to allow the experimenter to call me for additional experiments if 
I am eligible" 
Signature 
telephone number 
/ / a copy of this consent form is available upon request 
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Experimenter's Scripts 
Experiment 
Introduction 
Hello, my name is and I am a graduate student 
in the psychology department. (This is my assistant, ' , who will 
be helping me out with the experiment today.) The first thing I'm going to 
do is explain briefly what we will be doing in today's experiment. As you 
were told when you were called, you are going to participate in a simulated 
discussion group. In fact, this study is one of several we have conducted 
in the department which involves discussion groups. What we are doing is 
looking at different aspects of how discussion groups work. Our discussion 
groups have had different groups of people as participants and have looked 
at a variety of different topics; I'll tell you more about today's topic in 
a few moments. I want to tell a little bit about how you were selected for 
today's experiment. You were picked on the basis of some of your responses 
on mass-testing questionnaires and, as a group, you tended to have similar 
response patterns to some questions. 
The topic for our simulated discussion group is a rather personal one 
- contraceptive use. Because I realize this topic may be a sensitive 
issue, I want to alleviate any apprehensions by describing how our 
discussion group will operate. First of all, as in any discussion group, 
you will be asked to give some information about yourselves. In this case, 
you'll be asked to provide some background statements concerning your 
personal social history and contraceptive use history. Because this is very 
personal information, you will not be asked to interact with one another in 
a face-to-face group. Instead you will interact with the other group 
members indirectly, through the use of tape-recorded statements. 
Specifically, you'll go back to individual rooms in the laboratory and tape 
record both a social and contraceptive history statement. Because you will 
be recording personal information, your recording will remain anonymous. In 
other words, you will be asked not to give any identifying information 
(such as your name) on your tape. Your tape will be identified only by a 
number and only the principal experimenter will know which number goes with 
a particular name. After answering some questions concerning your tape, I 
will collect all the tapes and then give each of you a tape from one of the 
other members of the group. This exchange of the tapes represents the 
"simulation" of typical discussion group processes. I want to emphasize 
that you will not know whose tape you are listening to. I also want to 
stress to you that when you are recording these history statements, the 
idea is for you to make statements similar to those you would make in an 
actual discussion group. Please do not feel pressure to say anything which 
makes you feel uncomfortable or which you normally wouldn't want to say. 
Are there any questions? OK, now I'll pass out the consent forms. 
Please read it over carefully and then sign it if you still agree to 
participate. (Experimenter passes out consent form and has subjects keep 
with them when going to individual cubicles.) 
Now we'll go back into the lab. I will be giving you most of the 
remaining instructions over an intercom system so right now I'd like us all 
to go into one of the rooms where I will show how this system works. Then 
you will go to your individual room so we can begin. (Experimenter escorts 
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subjects to one of the cubicles and shows intercom and answers any 
questions. Experimenter then has subjects separate into individual rooms.) 
Experiment Proper 
1. To Start with, I'd like you all to test your intercom system by 
pressing the call light button. (Experimenter pauses until all call 
lights tested.) Please remember if you have any questions throughout 
the experiment, please press your call button several times and we'll 
come to answer your question. 
2. As I mentioned earlier, in this experiment I'm interested in how 
groups (particularly discussion groups) function. Right now I want 
to focus briefly on one particular factor which I believe affects how 
discussion groups work. That factor is called "Social Awareness" or 
the extent to which people are aware of others' attitudes and 
opinions about current social issues. A number of scales have been 
developed to measure social awareness. One of these scales, called 
the Norman Social Acumen Scale, was embedded in the many questions 
that you completed at mass testing so I already have some information 
about your abilities of social awareness. In today's group I want to 
look more closely at this trait called Social Awareness. I'd like you 
to take the questionnaire out of envelope #1. This measure is called 
the Wilder Social Awareness Inventory and it will provide me with 
additional information about the extent to which you are socially 
aware. When you fill out this questionnaire, please make sure to 
follow the instructions to each question very carefully. You'll 
notice that you are asked to respond to each question according to 
how you think the group listed would respond. You will have 4 1/2 
minutes to complete this measure. When you are done, return the 
measure to envelope #1 and press your call button. (Experimenter 
waits approximately 4 1/2 minutes while subjects complete Wilder. 
Once all Ss have pressed call buttons, exp. collects envelope #1). 
3. The next step will be to make your recorded social and contraceptive 
history statements. I'd like you to take the written instructions 
for recording your statements out of envelope #2. You will have 
approximately 2-3 minutes to read over those instructions. 
(Experimenter pauses briefly to allow subjects time to take 
instructions out of the envelope and read them.) 
4. I'd like to summarize those instructions briefly. To make your 
recording I'd like you to start the tape recorder, state the title 
"social history" and then make a brief 2 minute statement. After 
you're done with your social history statement, let the tape recorder 
run for 5 seconds and then state the title "contraceptive history" 
followed by a 1 minute statement. Are there any questions? 
(Experimenter pauses briefly to allow questions.) OK, I'd like you 
to take the next 60 seconds to consider what you're going to say in 
your social and contraceptive history statements. I would suggest 
that you jot down some notes on the blank piece of paper provided in 
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the envelope and use your notes and this instruction sheet when your 
making your recording. Please begin thinking about your statements. 
(Experimenter waits 60 seconds.) OK, now I'd like you to begin 
recording your history statements. Please make sure to pause for 
approximately 5 seconds between the social and contraceptive history 
statements. Press your call light buttons when you are done with 
your recordings. 
(Experimenter waits approximately 3 minutes while subjects record 
statement.) 
5. (Once all subjects have pressed their call button)...Now that you are 
done with your recordings, please take the questionnaire out of 
envelope #3. Please read the instructions carefully before you start 
to answer the questions. When you are finished, return the 
questionnaire to the envelope, set the envelope aside, and press your 
call button so that I'll know that you are done. Please do not look 
ahead to any upcoming envelopes. (Once all subjects press the call 
button, collect tapes and gives subjects envelope #4, which contains 
the Wilder Feedback sheet.) 
6. While we are rewinding your tapes, I want to return your attention to 
the issue of Social Awareness. As I said earlier, both the Norman 
Social Acumen Scale (which you completed at mass testing) and the 
Wilder Inventory, which you completed today, measure the extent to 
which a person is socially aware of other peoples' attitudes and 
opinions on current social issues. This particular trait has been 
found to be highly predictive of success in various professions that 
involve interpersonal interactions (such as law, business, medicine, 
and education for example). In addition, I believe that a person's 
level of social awareness affects their behavior in a wide variety of 
social settings (such as a discussion group) and this is why I are 
looking at this variable in this experiment. While you have been 
recording your social and contraceptive history statement, I scored 
your responses on the Wilder and compared them to your earlier 
performance on the Norman Social Acumen Scale. By comparing the two 
scales, we are able to obtain a fairly reliable picture of the extent 
to which you are socially aware. I would like to provide you with 
some feedback about your performance on these measures right now so 
I'd like you to take your feedback sheets out of envelope #4 and read 
over the information about your scores. 
"The Wilder Social Awareness Inventory is a highly reliable measure 
that provides information about the extent to which a person is aware of 
other people's attitudes and opinions about important current social 
issues. Often the Inventory is combined with other measures of social 
awareness (such as the Norman Social Acumen Scale or the Miller Awareness 
SubScale of Social Skills) that results in a fairly accurate diagnostic 
assessment of the degree to which a person has the trait of social 
awareness (usually accurate to within 9 to 10 percentage points). 
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Scores on the Wilder and the comparison measure of social awareness 
are reported below in percentile rankings and are based on the overall 
scores obtained by students are your university who have taken the 
measures. On both measures for example, if you scored at the 55th 
percentile, 54 students obtained scores lower than yours while 45 students 
obtained scores higher than yours. High percentile ranks on these scales, 
those ranks greater than 80th percentile, are good indicators that you have 
high levels of social awareness. Low percentile ranks, those ranks less 
than 40th percentile, indicate that it is probably likely (but not entirely 
definite) that you have low levels of this trait." Additionally, if the 
percentile ranks on both measures are within 10 percentile points of each 
other, the probability of any errors in the scoring of these scales is very 
low. In other words, the percentile rankings are probably accurate." 
Below that explanation you will notice that we have written your 
percentile score on the Wilder and also your percentile for the 
comparison social awareness scale, the Norman Social Acumen Scale 
(from mass testing). Keep in mind that your percentile score 
indicates how your performance compares with other ISU students who 
have completed the measure. We will be talking more about your 
social awareness scores later but for now I'd like you to simply 
review your scores and answer the questions that follow it. Please 
press your call light buttons when you're finished with this step of 
the experiment. (Experimenter pauses until all subjects have pressed 
call button. Once all have pressed call button, target tape 
(experimental or control version) is delivered to each subject.) 
7. You have just received a tape made by another group member. For this 
part of the experiment I'd like you to imagine that the other group 
member is talking about herself just as she would in a small group 
discussion and that you are listening to this person as another 
member of the same group. When I tell you, I'd like you to put on the 
headphones and start listening to the social history information. 
Once you've listened to the social history, shut the recorder off and 
press the call button. OK...put on the headphones and begin 
listening to the social history portion of the tape. Please do not go 
on to the contraceptive history part of the tape yet. (Experimenter 
pauses until all subjects have listened to target's social history 
and pressed call button.) 
8. Please take the cjuestionnaire out of envelope #5. When you are done 
answering those questions, return the questionnaire to envelope #5, 
set it aside, and press the call button. (Experimenter pauses until 
all subjects have pressed call button.) 
9. (EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ONLY) Now I'd like you to listen to the rest 
of the other group member's tape which should consist of a brief 
contraceptive history. Again, please put on the headphones while 
listening to the tape and when you are finished, shut off the 
recorder and press the call button. Please begin listening to the 
contraceptive history portion of the tape. (Experimenter pauses 
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until all subjects have listened to target's contraceptive history 
and pressed call button.) 
Please take the questionnaire out of envelope #6. After you answer 
the questions, return the questionnaire to envelope #6, set it aside, 
and press your call button. Please do not go back to any previous 
envelopes. 
Please take the questionnaire out of envelope #7 (i 6 FOR CONTROLS) 
and answer those questions. When you are done with this 
questionnaire, return it to envelope #7 (t 6 FOR CONTROLS), set it 
aside, and press your call button. Please do not go back to any 
previous envelopes. (Experimenter pauses until all subjects have 
pressed call button. Once all subjects are done with questionnaires 
in envelope #7 (i6 FOR CONTROLS), experimenter requests that subjects 
return to lobby.) 
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Experiment Debriefing Script 
Before I continue, does anyone have any questions? Did you have any 
difficulty understanding or following any of the directions during the 
study? (Experimenter pauses for comments.) Did all of you have enough 
time to complete all your questionnaires? (Experimenter pauses for 
comments and to allow questions.) 
As I mentioned at the beginning of the experiment, I am studying 
psychological processes involved in discussion groups. In particular, I'm 
looking at what people feel and think about telling information about 
themselves and receiving information about others in a discussion group 
setting. To look at these sorts of issues, I asked you to give information 
about yourselves and then evaluate how comfortable you felt doing so. Then 
you were asked to listen to another group member's tape and evaluate it 
much like you might do when making silent, personal evaluations of that 
person during an actual group setting. 
At any time in the experiment did you find yourself trying to figure 
out what I was doing in the experiment? (Experimenter pauses for 
comments.) Were any of you suspicious that I might be trying to deceive 
you in any way just because this was a psychology experiment? 
(Experimenter pauses for comments.) 
After you made your tapes, you were given some feedback about your 
performance on the Wilder Social Awareness Inventory. What did you think 
about that inventory?..about your scores? Did you agree with the 
feedback?...Were you at anytime suspicious of the feedback? (Experimenter 
pauses for subjects' comments, probes & clarifies any suspicions). In 
fact, the Wilder Social Awareness Inventory is not real. It is a 
fictitious scale that I made up for this experiment. Some of you would be 
told that you hadn't done very well on this scale while the rest of you 
would be told that you had done well. I did this so I could later test to 
see if people react differently to social information (such as what we had 
in this discussion group) when they are made to feel somewhat threatened or 
successful. Once again, I want to emphasize that the Wilder does not 
exist... I do not have any information about how socially aware any of you 
are. Do you have any questions on this aspect of the study? 
Another important procedure in this study included making personal 
tapes and then listening to the tape from another person. What did you 
think of this procedure? Did it seem awkward or did it make you feel more 
comfortable when describing your contraceptive histories? Did you think 
about this procedure? What did you think about the other person's tape? 
Was there anything out of the ordinary? (Experimenter pauses—if any 
subjects respond "yes" during these pauses, experimenter asks further 
cjuestions to determine extent of problem, confusion, or suspicion.) In 
fact, the tape you listened to were not made by anyone in this group. I 
want to emphasize, however, that the information on the tape is real and 
was provided by a female student here at ISU. I've had someone read her 
information so that her confidentiality will be protected however. One of 
the things I'm interested in looking at in this study is how different 
people react to similar information, therefore it was necessary to make 
certain that you all heard the same information. You all heard similar 
social information and some of you heard the woman describing a phase in 
I 
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her contraceptive history where she used no contraception. Others of you 
did not listen to the contraceptive history at all. Again, I want to 
emphasize that while there was a minor deception here in that the tape was 
not made by one of your group members, the information is about a woman who 
really exists. 
I'd like to explain a little more about what we'd like to do with 
your tapes now. I would like to listen to each of your recordings for 
different types of information such as the types of contraception you 
prefer and the consistency with which you indicate that you use that 
method. To do this I will have the help of an experimental assistant and 
only this person and myself will listen to your tapes. No one else will 
hear what you had to say on those tapes and when we are all finished 
listening to the tapes, they will be erased. I want you to know, however, 
that if you do not want your particular tape listened to, you do have the 
right to refuse to let us do so. If you decide that you don't want your 
tape listened to, it will be erased immediately. 
Do any of you have any questions? Does anyone have any questions 
about the tape procedures and do you all understand about the tape? 
Sometimes when people participate in this experiment they have questions 
about discussion groups that are available on campus or tell me that they 
are interested in getting more information about contraception. 
Additionally, being in an experiment sometimes gets people to start 
thinking about personal issues. If you find that you have any questions of 
this sort I'll be happy to provide you with information about resources in 
the Ames and ISU campus communities or talk with you further personally. 
Finally, because I will be running this experiment more during the semester 
and because subjects won't respond naturally to the tape if they know ahead 
of time that it isn't made by one of their group members, I am asking that 
you not talk about the experiment with people once you leave the experiment 
today. (Experimenter passes out credit slips and expresses thanks to 
subjects for participating in the experiment. 
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Follow-up Introduction and Debriefing Script 
The questionnaires you will be asked to complete today are part of a 
follow-up to the discussion group experiment you participated in 6 weeks 
ago. As I mentioned at the debriefing for that part of the experiment, I 
am studying psychological processes involved in discussion groups. In 
particular, I'm looking at how people feel and think about telling 
information about themselves and receiving information about others in a 
discussion group setting. To look at these issues during the experiment, I 
asked you to give information about yourselves and then evaluate how 
comfortable you felt doing so. Then you were asked to listen to another 
ISU student's tape and evaluate what was said much like you might do when 
making silent, personal evaluations of that person during an actual group 
setting. At that time, I told you that the tape was not made by one of 
your group members but the information was describing an actual ISU woman. 
Do any of you have any further questions concerning that taped information? 
Today you will be asked to complete several questionnaires that are 
very similar to those you completed during mass testing and at the 
experiment. Are there any questions ? Once again, I would like reiterate 
something I said at the end of the lab portion of this experiment—if you 
have any questions about discussion groups or contraception or find some 
personal issues were brought up as a result of being in the experiment I 
will be happy to talk with you further about those issues or provide you 
with some resource information. (After subjects complete the 
questionnaire, they are again asked if they have any questions. If so 
those are addressed and then the experimenter passes out credit slips and 
thanks subjects for participating.) 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
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Informed Consent Form 
The Department of Psychology supports the practice of protection for 
participants in research. The following information is provided so that 
you can decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. 
During this experiment, you will participate in a simulated 
discussion group concerning contraceptive use. You will be asked to make a 
brief tape recording of your personal social and contraceptive history and 
will then be asked to listen to another group member's tape. You will also 
be asked to express a number of personal opinions regarding discussion 
groups and issues related to contraception use. Your name will not be 
associated with your tape recording and the other members of the 
"discussion" group will not know whose tape they have been given. If you 
feel uncomfortable answering any of the questions involved in the study, 
skip them. 
You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time. Your participation is 
solicited, but is strictly voluntary. Do not hesitate to ask questions 
about the study. Be assured that your name will not be associated in any 
way with the research findings. We appreciate your cooperation very much. 
This experiment will recjuire approximately 1 hour to complete. 
Signature 
/ / a copy of this consent form is available upon request 
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THE WILDER SOCIAL AWARENESS INVENTORY 
The Wilder Scale measures awareness of social attitudes; in other 
words, it is an assessment of how you perceive the attitudes and opinions 
of others on a number of current social issues. Please answer each 
question by indicating how you think that the people specified in each 
question would respond. Time Allotted; 5 min. 
1. Please put a 1 next to the political/social topic listed below that 
you think matters most to Am#riomn «dults and put a 5 next to the 
topic that you think matters least to them. (Only rate these two 
alternatives). 
the environment 
the economy 
foreign affairs 
social programs 
national defense 
2. Please rank order all of the following concerns in the order that you 
think that they matter to oolleg# students who graduated in the top 
25% of their classes. (Using the numbers from 1 to 5, where 1 = issue 
of most concern and 5 = issue of least concern.) 
family 
grades 
dating 
relationships with friends 
money 
3. Put a 1 next to the statement that you think is most likely to be 
supported by people who have done well professionally, (regardless of 
their field), and put a 5 next to the statement that you think is 
least likely to be supported by them. (Only rate these two 
alternatives.) 
"Success is 5% luck and 95% effort." 
"The ability to get along with others is critical 
in any field." 
"Leadership ability is the best predictor of 
success." 
"A good education is one's most valuable 
possession." 
"Anyone can make it if they try." 
Please continue on the next page. 
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Put a 1 next to the statement that you think is most descriptive of 
the attitude of the averaqa collmg* student toward cheating, and put 
a 5 next to the least descriptive statement. (Only rate these two 
alternatives.) 
"Cheating on anything at any time is totally 
wrong." 
"It's O.K. to cheat if you know that several 
other people in the class are also doing so." 
"It's O.K. to cheat if you know that you could 
have done the work honestly if only you'd had 
enough time." 
"It's O.K. to cheat if you're sure you won't get 
caught." 
"It's O.K. to lielp someone else cheat even though 
it's not O.K. for you to cheat." 
Put a 1 next to the quality that you think moat Ameriomn adults would 
emphasize most in choosing their friends, and put a 5 by the quality 
they would emphasize least. (Only rate these two alternatives). 
social contacts of a potential friend 
physical attractiveness of a potential friend 
financial standing of a potential friend 
interests and preferred activities of a potential 
friend 
political beliefs of a potential friend 
Please rank order all of the following concerns in the order that you 
think that they concern eouplea who have atayed married for more than 
20 years. (Using the numbers from 1 to 5, where 1 = issue of most 
concern and 5 = issue of least concern.) 
spouse relationship 
family relationships 
career success 
financial success 
personal health 
Put a 1 next to the characteristic that you think matters moat to 
successful business managers when they evaluate an employee, and put 
a 5 by the characteristic they would emphasize least. (Only rate 
these two alternatives). 
employee works hard 
employee is on time 
employee takes initiative 
employee takes orders exactly 
employee gets along well with co-workers 
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The tape recorded statement you are about to make consists of two 
parts: your social history and your contraceptive history. The social 
history should consist of a brief 2 minute statement describing personal 
details such as your: 
a.) family relationships (e.g., numbers of brothers & sisters, how 
you get along with them, etc.) 
b.) school activities (e.g., extracurricular activities) 
c.) recreational activities (e.g., types of things you like to do 
in your free time) 
d.) dating backgrounds (e.g., when you started dating, frequency of 
dates, what types of things you like to do on dates, etc.) 
When I tell you to begin recording, begin your social history statement by 
starting the recorder and stating "Social History" at the beginning of your 
tape. Follow this title by approximately 2 minutes of personal social 
information. After you are done recording your social history statement, 
let the tape run for about 5 seconds and then begin your contraceptive 
history statement. 
The contraceptive history statement should consist of a brief 1 
minute statement indicating, first of all, if you have ever had sexual 
intercourse. 
a.) if you have never had sexual intercourse - what method of 
contraception do you think you probably will use when you do 
become sexually active. 
b.) if you have had sexual intercourse - have you ever used a 
contraceptive method? If you have used a contraceptive, what 
method(s) did you usually use and how consistently did you use 
that method. 
Begin your contraceptive history statement by stating "Contraceptive 
History" at the beginning of this portion of your tape. Follow this title 
by approximately 1 minute of personal contraceptive information. When you 
are through, shut off the recorder and press your call button. You will 
have a total of 3 minutes to make your social and contraceptive history 
recordings. Please remember that the idea here is for you to make 
statements similar to what you would typically say in an actual discussion 
group. Please do not feel as though you have to say anything which might 
make you feel uncomfortable. 
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Subjects' Recorded Statement Evaluation 
For each of the following questions concerning the social and contraceptive 
information you've just given, please indicate your answer by placing a 
slash (/) at the point on the line that beat represents your answer. 
1. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments about your social 
history in a small group setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
How similar do you think you are to the average Iowa State 
undergraduate woman? 
Not at all Extremely 
Similar Similar 
3. Would you feel comfortable making similar comments about your 
contraceptive history in a small group setting? 
Extremely Extremely 
Uncomfortable Comfortable 
4. How effective is your contraceptive behavior in preventing pregnancy? 
Extremely Extremely 
Effective Ineffective 
5. How conscientious is your use of your usual contraceptive method? 
Extremely Not at all 
Conscientious Conscientious 
6. Compared to the average ISU undergraduate woman, how effective is 
your contraceptive behavior ? 
You are more Average ISU 
Effective More Effective 
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7. How effective do you think the average ISU undergraduate woman Is 
with regard to her contraceptive use? 
Extremely Extremely 
Effective Ineffective 
Please Indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe you. 
Not at 
all Very 
8. Unintelligent 
9. Kind 
10. Incapable 
11. Observant 
12. Insincere 
13. Pleasant 
14. Disloyal 
15. Careful 
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"The Wilder Social Awareness Inventory is a highly reliable measure that 
provides information about the extent to which a person is aware of other 
people's attitudes and opinions about important current social issues. 
Often the Inventory is combined with other measures of social awareness 
(either the Norman Social Acumen Scale or the Miller Awareness SubScale of 
Social Skills) that results in a fairly accurate diagnostic assessment of 
the degree to which a person has the trait of social awareness. 
Scores on the Wilder and a comparison measure of social awareness are 
reported below in percentile rankings and are based on the overall scores 
obtained by students are your university who have taken the measures. On 
both measures for example, if you scored at the 55th percentile, 54 
students obtained scores lower than yours while 45 students obtained scores 
higher than yours. High percentile ranks on these scales, those ranks 
greater than 60th percentile, are good indicators that you have high levels 
of social awareness. Low percentile ranks, those ranks less than 40th 
percentile, indicate that it is probably likely (but not entirely definite) 
that you have low levels of this trait." Additionally, if the percentile 
ranks on both measures are within 10 percentile points of each other, the 
probability of any errors in the scoring of these scales is very low. In 
other words, the percentile rankings are probably accurate." 
Subject name: 
Wilder Percentile Score: 
Comparison Scale: Percentile Score: 
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Recorded Target Social/Contraceptive Histories Script 
Social History 
"I came to school here from a sort of mid-sized city where my dad and 
my mom both have full-time jobs. I have three sisters and a brother and I 
guess you could say that we get along fairly well.... although sometimes we 
do get into some disagreements. 
"As far as school goes, I'd describe myself as a good student mainly 
I guess because I can get good grades in classes I'm pretty fired up about 
and get average grades in other courses that I think are more difficult. 
When I first came to ISU, I felt a little lonely because I didn't know a 
lot of people and really felt overwhelmed by all I had to do here for 
school and everything. I guess, though, once I got used to things around 
here, I got more comfortable and met more people. Since then I've really 
enjoyed school a lot more. As far as leisure activities go, I like to go 
to the show and talk with my friends. Sometimes we go to parties but I 
don't always have alot of time for that." 
"Let's see...as far as dating is concerned, I dated a few guys in 
high school, but those relationships turned out to be more just good 
friendships than romantic relationships. During my senior year, I got into 
a pretty serious relationship with a guy and we dated pretty much through 
senior year, and up until right before I came to school here. Guess we 
both kinda decided that a long-distance relationship wasn't going to work 
out real well and decided to date other people." 
Contraceptive History 
"Well..about my contraceptive history...let's see...I don't really 
know what to say I don't talk about this alot you know. I have had sex 
and I have thought about going on contraception but never seemed to get 
around to getting anything. Every once in a while I do think about using 
something. You know...come to think of it...there are time when I do try 
to avoid having sex..but I guess to be truthful I probably have had sex 
when I shouldn't have. I guess that pretty much describes my contraceptive 
history cause I haven't really ever used anything. 
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TAPE ANALYSIS CONSENT STATEMENT 
During this experiment you have been asked to make a tape consisting 
of your social and contraceptive histories. As part of the data analysis 
for the experiment, we would like to analyze the information you provided 
on this tape. Your tape will be listened to by the principal experimenter 
and a trained rater. Your name will not be identified at any time on the 
tape and at the conclusion of the analysis your tape will be erased. 
Your permission for this analysis is solicited but it is strictly 
voluntary. If you choose not to allow your tape to be analyzed, it will be 
erased immediately following the experimental session. Your extra credit 
earnings will not be affected by your refusal to allow this analysis. 
"I have read and understand the above statement and allow my tape to be 
analyzed." 
signature 
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Follow-up Session 
EXPERIMENT #12 
The Department of Psychology supports the practice of protection for 
participants in research. The following information is provided so that 
you can decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. 
This follow-up session is part of the simulated discussion group in 
which you participated earlier this semester. During this session you will 
be asked to complete a series of questions concerning your feelings about 
yourself, your sexual and contraceptive use history, and your opinions 
about the likelihood of unplanned pregnancy. If you feel uncomfortable 
answering any of the questions involved in the study, skip them. 
You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time. Your participation is 
solicited, but is strictly voluntary. Do not hesitate to ask questions 
about the study. Be assured that your name will not be associated in any 
way with the research findings. We appreciate your cooperation very much. 
This experiment will require approximately 1/2 hour to complete. 
Signature (both signed and printed) 
date 
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APPENDIX Q 
MODIFIED JANIS-FIELD 
PLEASE NOTE 
Copyrighted materials in this document have 
not been filmed at the request of the author 
They are available for consultation, however 
in the author's university library. 
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Contraceptive Use and Opinion 
Questionnaire 
Sexual/Contraceptive Use History 
Please answer the following questions concerning your sexual and 
contraceptive use history. Be assured that all answers to these questions 
are confidantlal and will not b#.U8«d by anyone besides the experimenter 
involved in this research. 
1. How many sexual partners have you had over the past 6-8 weeks? 
2. On the average, how often were you engaging in sexual intercourse in 
the 6-8 weeks prior to now (answer in terms of average number of 
times per month) : per month. 
3. Over the past 6-8 weeks, what contraceptive method did you use most 
often? 
4. How consistently did you use that method (the one listed in 3) ? 
used every time 
used most of the time (approximately 80% of the time) 
used half the time (approximately 50% of the time) 
used occasionally (approximately 30% - 40% of the time) 
seldom used (less than 20% of the time) 
5. Again considering the method you listed in 3, what percent of the 
time during which you were sexually active and using this method did 
you feel that you were the method exactly as it was intended to be 
used (i.e., followed instructions accurately, etc)? % 
If you can think of any times when you think you or your partner did 
not use this method exactly right, how frequently did this happen? 
(times per month) 
6. How important were the following factors in your selection of this 
method? (Please rate each of the following using a scale where 1 = 
not at all important and 7 = extremely important) 
effectiveness of method 
moral/religious beliefs 
low sexual intercourse activity levels 
partner's preference for method 
your preference for method 
availability of method 
cost of method 
convenience of method 
medical "side effects" associated with method 
opinions/advice of friends 
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7. If there additional information that you feel might be of importance 
in describing your contraceptive practices but that has not been 
covered in the preceding questions, please briefly provide that 
information below. 
We would now like you to consider for # moment the Issue of unplanned 
pregnancy. Then answer the following questions using a 1 - 100 scale where 
1 = not at all possible and 100 » extremely likely, most definitely will 
happen. 
8. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year ^  you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months and ^  you used your current 
method of contraception as you usually do? (1 - 100 scale) 
9. What do you think the likelihood is that you will have an unplanned 
pregnancy within the next year if you had sexual intercourse at the 
same rate you did in the past six months, but did not use any method 
of contraception? (1 - 100 scale) 
10. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she continues using 
the contraceptive method she is currently using? (1-100 scale) 
11. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used the birth 
control pill? (1-100 scale) 
12. What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the 
birth control pill ? 
You are more Average Woman 
likely to become who uses pill is 
pregnant next yr. more likely to 
become pregnant next yr. 
13. What is the likelihood that the average college woman your age will 
have an unplanned pregnancy in the next year if she used no method of 
contraception? (1-100 scale) 
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14. What is your likelihood of having an unplanned pregnancy in the next 
year compared to the average college woman your age who uses the no 
method of contraception ? 
You are more Average Woman 
likely to become who uses no contraception 
pregnant next yr. more likely to become 
pregnant next yr. 
15. What percent of average college women become pregnant in a typical 
year? (0 to 100%) 
Specific Birth Control Opinion Survey 
In this section of the survey we are interested in your opinions about 
several specific birth control methods. Please answer each question even 
if you do not know much about the method and/or have never used it. For 
each question, circle the number which best represents what you know or 
believe. 
16. How likely would the average college woman be to use the pill if she 
was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the pill the pill 
17. How likely would you be to use the pill if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the pill the pill 
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Please indicate your opinion about using the pill as a contraceptive 
method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a 
slash mark along the line at the location that best represents your 
answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
How likely would the average college woman be to use the condom if 
she was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the condom the condom 
How likely would you be to use the condom if you were Involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use the condom the condom 
Please indicate your opinion about using the condom as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
How likely would the average college woman be to use withdrawal if 
she was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use withdrawal withdrawal 
How likely would you be to use withdrawal if you were involved in a 
sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely would not use 
use withdrawal withdrawal 
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24. Please indicate your opinion about using withdrawal as a 
contraceptive method in a sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer 
by placing a slash mark along the line at the location that best 
represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
25. How likely would the average college woman be to use no contraception 
if she was involved in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely go would not go 
without contraception without contraception 
26. How likely would you be to use no contraception if you were involved 
in a sexual relationship? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would definitely 
definitely go would not go 
without contraception without contraception 
27. Please indicate your opinion about using no contraceptive method in a 
sexual relationship. (Indicate your answer by placing a slash mark 
along the line at the location that best represents your answer). 
approve of disapprove of 
strongly strongly 
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Group Member Evaluation 
Please recall for a moment the woman whose tape you listened to in 
the discussion group experiment 6 weeks ago. Please describe the extent to 
which the following adjectives describe the woman whose tape you listened 
to. Indicate your answer by placing a slash (/) at the point on the line 
that best represents your answer. 
Not at 
all Very 
28. Sincere 
29. Unpleasant 
30. Loyal 
31. Reckless 
32. Intelligent 
33. Unkind 
34. Capable 
35. Unobservant 
